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Abstract 
The thesis investigates two major mechanisms of corporate governance in terms of 
their impact on corporate performance. These mechanisms are the composition of 
board of directors, and the ownership structure. The thesis focuses on the UK FTSE 
All Shares non-financial firms. The reason for excluding financial firms was the 
different regulations that monitor the financial sector, and by excluding this sector 
from the study, findings more comparable with prior research can be obtained. The 
sample size arrived at 363 companies that had survived at least four years in the 
FTSE All shares between the year 2005 and 2010. The main hypotheses tested were 
whether board composition and ownership structure have an impact on firm 
performance, using Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a market based performance measure, and 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Capital Employed 
(ROCE), and growth in total sales (SGRTH), as accounting-based performance 
measures. Correlation and multi-regression analysis (univariate and multivariate 
regression) were carried out to test these hypotheses. The results suggested a high 
positive association between board size and TQ, and insignificant association 
between board size and accounting-based performance measures (ROA and ROE), 
while some evidence was found of an impact of an independent board on firm 
performance. The results also found a negative association between blockholdings 
and performance during the financial crisis in 2008, whilst an insignificant 
relationship was observed before 2008.  
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1. Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides a brief background to the main issues that this thesis is 
aiming to investigate. It also presents the aims and objectives of the thesis and gives a 
brief description of the sample, data, and methodologies used. Finally, the chapter 
presents the structure of the thesis with a general explanation of its contents. 
1.2. Research Question, aims and objectives 
Since the collapse of a number of giant corporations around the world, in 
particular after the demise of Enron in the USA in late December 2001, corporate 
governance has attracted a high level of interest amongst professionals, academics, 
and scholars. Corporate governance, in general terms, describes the set of systems 
with which corporations are managed and controlled to ensure the achievement of 
their objectives. Corporate governance has been explained by using different 
theories, such as the stakeholder theory and the agency theory. The stakeholder 
theory views the firm as an entity, which has the objective of achieving the interest 
of its stakeholders, that is to say its employees, suppliers, lenders and shareholders. 
The agency theory (principal-agent relationship), in the other hand, explains 
corporate governance from the perspectives of the relationship between the principal 
(shareholder) and the agent (manager), with the duty of the manager being to manage 
the company’s resources and assets to the benefit of shareholders. Corporate 
governance, in particular in the UK and USA, is widely explained through the 
principal-agent relationship, which focuses mainly on the relationship between 
shareholders and managers and the issue of the separation between ownership and 
control. Therefore, research on corporate governance predominantly takes the view 
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of agency theory and attempts to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms in reducing any conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, 
and ensuring that managers work for the benefit of shareholders.  
Studies have suggested many mechanisms to reduce the cost of the conflict 
between the principal and the agent, for instance Depken et al., (2005) suggested 
internal and external mechanisms to reduce agency costs. External mechanisms 
include monitoring activities by actors from the capital market including legislators, 
investment professionals and investors, while the internal mechanisms can be the 
offer of incentives such as compensation and managerial ownership to managers with 
the aim of aligning their interests with the interests of the shareholders. However, 
despite the vast number of mechanisms addressing the principal-agent issue, the 
problem of conflict of interests between shareholders and managers remains 
unsolved.  
According to Holderness (2003), this is due to the lack of clear evidence of the 
effectiveness of mechanisms such as the blockholder and the activism of the 
institutional investor or the remuneration of the board which have been suggested by 
researchers to protect the rights of shareholders, and in particular those of minority 
shareholders. In addition to the Enron shock, the global financial crisis that started 
with the collapse of another American corporate giant, Lehman Brothers, in 
September 2008, has fuelled the debate about the need for more effective corporate 
governance mechanisms to promote good practice and ensure effective board of 
director. This led to the publication of the new UK Corporate Governance Code, 
which focused on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance to ensure 
effective management of the company’s resources. Recommendations includes to 
have a sufficient number of non-executive directors so that the board is balanced, 
implement effective remuneration policies that can be aligned to the company’s 
performance, transparency and accountability, and promoting effective relationship 
between the board of directors and the shareholders. 
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The thesis seeks to examine and investigate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate performance using the UK FTSE All Shares non-financial 
companies. The thesis focuses mainly on two mechanisms (i.e. the composition of 
the board of directors, and the ownership structure), and investigates their influence 
on two types of financial performance, which are the market based measures 
(Tobin’s Q), and the accounting based measures (Return on Assets, Return on 
Equity, Return on Capital Employed, and Sales Growth). The main objectives, which 
the research is attempting to achieve, are: 
- To examine whether board composition can ensure good corporate 
governance practice and enhance firm performance; 
- To investigate whether managerial ownership provides effective 
incentives to managers to work in the best interests of shareholders; 
- To examine whether ownership concentration can be considered as an 
effective monitoring  instrument to ensure that managers are managing the 
company’s resources for the interests of shareholders and therefore reduce the 
principal-agent problems. 
1.3. Brief on the main theoretical and empirical literature 
There are different conceptual models in which corporate governance practiced 
around the globe. The main two models are the shareholder’s model and the 
stakeholder’s model. The UK share ownership is widely dispersed across small 
shareholders, and therefore, similar to USA and other Anglo-Saxon countries, where 
the shareholder concept is the adopted concept. This concept focuses on the interest 
of shareholders since they are the owners of the company, and because the ownership 
of the company is separated from the management, the company’s resources need to 
be managed effectively to achieve shareholders interest. According to Berle and 
Means (1932), the fundamental assumption of the shareholder’s concept is that 
shareholders interest must be the focus of the corporation. Therefore, in a widely 
dispersed shareholders market, such as the UK and the USA, the responsibility of 
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managing the company is high, and the mechanisms to control and monitor 
management can be a challenging task to the shareholders.  
Blair (1995) and La Porta et al., (1998) argue that one of the major problems of 
the dispersed ownership is that shareholders are unable to effectively monitor and 
control their company, and therefore the need for a board of directors to carry out 
these responsibilities is essential. This, according to Fama and Jensen (1983), is the 
main cause of the agency problems. According to the agency theory, the board of 
directors must control and manage the company on behalf of the shareholders and act 
in their interest; however, there are considerable risks that the directors will favour 
their own interest rather than the interest of the principals.  
The literature provides an extensive theoretical framework on the reasons 
behind the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers, the consequences 
of this conflict, and the possible actions to mitigate the impact of this conflict. One 
cause for conflict of interest and the divergence of preferences is the low level of 
stake, which the managers hold in the company, this leads to them aiming to achieve 
their own interest before the interest of the shareholders. However, others argue that, 
managers who have high level of ownership in the company are difficult to remove 
(entrenched) and tend to have highly concentrated investment portfolios that can 
result on divergent risk attitude in comparison to more diversified shareholders. 
Previous empirical studies show an interesting insight into the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders.  Datta et al., (2005) found that entrenched 
managers are more likely to choose long-term debts over the short-term debts. 
Others, such as Jensen (1986); Hu and Kumar (2004); Harford et al., (2008), argued 
that entrenched managers pay less dividends and holds more cash; and can exhibit 
significant underperformance (Morck et al., 1988; Davies et al., 2005; Core et al., 
2006). 
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There are different proposals by the shareholder model to reduce the agency 
problems. For instance, aligning the interest of the shareholders to the interest of the 
managers through managerial ownership and/or compensation; improving the 
effectiveness of board of directors by including non-executive directors; contracting 
and clarifying the tasks of the directors; and increasing the engagement of the 
shareholders through effective dialogue with the board, and increasing shareholders 
activism. In addition, the literature on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and agency problems suggests that companies can deal with the impact 
of conflict of interest and improve their financial performance by adopting effective 
internal and external governance mechanisms. This can reduce and control the costs 
of aligning the interest of managers to the interest of shareholders to limit any 
potential suboptimal managerial behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Weir et al., 2002).  
In terms of managerial ownership, some empirical studies found mixed results 
in terms of the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. For instance, 
Sultz (1988) argue that the performance of the firm can improve with a low 
proportion of managerial ownership, however, the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance can become negative when the managers own a 
large proportion of the firm’s share capital. In contrast, Hu and Zhou (2008) found a 
positive association at below 53% managerial ownership. Papanikolaou and Panousi 
(2012) suggest that the higher the proportion of share ownership by managers, the 
more sensitive the firm’s equity and investment is to the influence of specific risk, 
and therefore the firm will be more risk averse. 
Furthermore, the literature on corporate governance also suggests that to 
reduce the problems that arise from the principle-agent relationship no shareholder 
should have a significant stake in the company, and large shareholder who has 
control over the firm should not hold the ownership of shares (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, previous empirical 
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studies suggest that share ownership is often concentrated in the hand of several large 
shareholders and not only one shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Becht and Mayer 
2002). This can create a second level of agency problem and conflict of interest 
between the large shareholders and other ‘minority’ shareholders. In addition to the 
conflict of interests between shareholders, such conflict can also appear between 
large shareholders and board of directors, which has a responsibility, is to manage 
the company for the interest of all shareholders and not only large shareholders. This 
can result in a less motivated board of directors and therefore have a negative impact 
on the performance1. In contrast, Shleifer and Vishney (1986) found that large 
controlling shareholders could benefit minority shareholders through external control 
mechanisms over the managers. However, the interest of large shareholders can 
contrast with the interest of minority shareholders, where large shareholders might 
pursue their interest and focus on maximising their wealth by reducing valuable 
managerial incentives. This can divert funds to their private benefits, which can be 
harmful to the interest of minority shareholders. 
The literature of corporate governance and the corporate governance codes also 
suggests that the structure of a board of directors as a major mechanism for reducing 
the impact of the agency problems. For instance, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code suggests that an effective board of directors is one that is sufficient in size, and 
balanced in terms of the existence of independent non-executive directors whose role 
is to ensure that the board is functioning to the best interest of the shareholders. 
Previous empirical studies examined the impact of board size on firm performance 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Bhagat 
& Black, 2001; Guest 2009; Larmou & Vafeas, 2010; Kumar & Singh 2013). 
Conyon and Peck (1998) and Guest (2009) reported a negative relationship between 
the firm performance and the size of the board. They suggested that in the UK and 
1 Where a firm is dominated by large shareholders, it is established usage to call the other shareholders 
‘minority’ shareholders, even though, in aggregate, they may hold a majority of the shares. 
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the Netherlands, the increase in board size is negatively associated with financial 
performance, because within a large board the communication can be less efficient, 
and the conflict between the board members can be higher.  
However, Larmou and Vafeas (2010) found a positive relationship between 
board size and performance, suggesting that with larger boards the possibility of 
strong individuals to control the board can be less. Other studies, suggested non-
linear relationship between board size and performance. For instance, Jensen (1993) 
and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested an optimal board size of seven to eight 
members. Concerning independent directors, because they are disinterested, there is 
no conflict of interest between them and the shareholders, which means effective 
monitoring by independent directors is expected to lower agency costs and increase 
firm performance (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rhoades et al., 2000; 
Lefort & Urzua, 2008; Duchin et al., 2010; Kumar, 2012). 
Based on the previous discussion, the thesis investigates the impact of board 
size; board independence; managerial ownership, blockholders owners; and 
institutional shareholders on the corporate financial performance. In addition, the 
thesis investigates whether the level of conflict between blockholders and managers 
can also influence the firm performance. 
1.4. Research Design & Methodology 
The methodology implemented in this thesis is based on quantitative analysis 
and secondary data. The thesis uses the UK FTSE All Shares non-financial 
companies. The data relates to the period between 2005 and 2010. The final sample 
size reached 363 companies, which were categorised into six main categories based 
on the Waterloo Stock Exchange Yearbook industry classification. The data was 
collected from various sources, mainly Bloomberg Database, companies’ annual 
reports, and Waterloo Stock Exchange Yearbook. The analysis was carried out using 
the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  
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The initial stage of the analysis was descriptive statistics, which helps in 
understanding the general description and feature of the data used in this thesis. The 
descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum) were also used 
to identify any outliers, abnormal and/or any missing data. Some of the variables 
were transformed into natural logarithm values to reduce variations and to increase 
their validity to the model. This was followed by testing different other assumptions 
for the regression model, such as normality, the absence of multicollinearity and the 
heteroscedasticity. This was followed by using the Pearson’s correlation between the 
independent variables and between the performance measures to examine the 
interrelationship between these variables and to gain deeper understanding of the 
relationship between these variables. Pearson’s correlation analysis was followed by 
multivariate regression analysis to obtain more accurate observations and 
conclusions, and then Two Stages Least Square (2SLS) analysis was used to examine 
the explanatory power of the independent variables. The thesis also tests instrumental 
variables to identify possible endogeneity problem; and dummy variables analysis. 
 
1.5. Motivations and Contribution 
Corporate governance has been attracting increasing attention for the last three 
decades following the collapse of high profile corporations that were mainly blamed 
on the lack of effective mechanisms and practices of corporate governance. The 
importance of corporate governance has continued to increase in particular since the 
global financial crisis in 2007-2008, together with the expansion of multinational 
companies and their trade across borders, which produced demands for clear and 
efficient principles and practices of corporate governance across the globe. The UK 
corporate governance framework provides one of the highest standards and 
principles for corporate governance amongst others around the world, and therefore 
it gives an interesting context to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate performance.  
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Moreover, there is high number of international and multinational companies 
that operate in the UK market. This means that the need for good and effective 
corporate governance practices is essential to avoid any corporate failure that can 
influence not only the UK market, but also the international market. Therefore, the 
first motivation for researching corporate governance in the UK is its continuous 
development, attention and importance to the success of organisations and stability 
of international economies, and the position of the UK corporate governance as a 
model for other countries in which the UK corporate governance has influenced the 
establishment of other international corporate governance practices. The contribution 
in which this thesis makes is an insight into the latest developments in the UK 
corporate governance practices and codes, and an extension to the previous and 
current literature on the main mechanisms of effective corporate governance, such as 
board of directors and ownership structure.  
The role of a board of directors as effective mechanism to mitigate the agency 
problems, in particular separation between ownership and control, conflict of 
interest, and information asymmetry, has attracted high level of debate amongst 
scholars and researchers across the globe. This increase in attention is evident in the 
evolution of the corporate governance codes since 1992 with the Cadbury report until 
present with the 2014 amendments of the UK Corporate Governance Code. These 
developments concentrated on the importance of the board of directors, and the 
elements to ensure directors’ effectiveness, in particular independent non-executive 
directors. In addition, the Companies Act (2006) in the UK has been amended to 
reflect changes in the corporate governance system and adopt the changes of the 
updated combined codes. Therefore, the second motivation for this thesis was 
investigating the structure of board of directors in terms of size and level of 
independence to evaluate the effectiveness of this development of UK corporate 
governance code. The thesis uses data from 2005 to 2010; hence, it contributes to the 
existing empirical studies by investigating the impact of recent corporate governance 
changes on corporate performance. 
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Previous research on the UK ownership, reported an average block ownership 
of 29%, while average insiders ownership is about 3 to 9 percent (Shabbir & Pudgett 
2005; Florackis et al., 2009), indicating that one of the major features of the UK 
share ownership is that the UK has a widely dispersed ownership base, which 
increases the problem of conflict of interest. This requires an effective corporate 
governance mechanisms and control systems to reduce this agency problem. 
Therefore, the third motivation of the thesis was to investigate whether the current 
mechanisms as listed UK firms practise them are effective enough to mitigate to 
problem of conflict of interest in the UK market. The thesis uses information and 
data on the level of block ownership and institutional ownership to investigate their 
role and influence in mitigating agency problems by providing effective control and 
monitoring of the board of directors. In addition, the thesis contributes to the current 
empirical research by examining the impact of level of conflict between board of 
directors and blockholders in corporate performance. 
Despite the extensive research on investigating the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate performance, there is no clear opinion or 
conclusion on the association between corporate governance and performance. For 
example, Conyon and Mallin (1997) argued that after the Cadbury report in 1992, 
there was an improvement in corporate performance, however Weir and Laing 
(2000), in contrast to Conyon and Mallin’s (1997) conclusion, reported that the 
recommendations of Cadbury report had an insignificant impact on company 
performance. Therefore, because of the lack of consensus in relation to the causal 
relationship between corporate governance and performance, the fourth motivation 
for this thesis was the need for more research in this area. This thesis uses data on 
managerial ownership and blockholders, which were directly collected from the 
companies’ annual reports. This contributes to providing up to date analysis on the 
influence of the new practices of corporate governance in corporate performance. 
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In comparison to the empirical studies which have been done on the USA and 
other corporate governance mechanisms (such as Morck et al., 1988, McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990, Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991, Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996, Bhagat & 
Black, 1999, Vafeas, 2005), it is evident that empirical studies in the UK corporate 
governance and the UK market are very limited. Therefore, the need for more 
research on UK corporate governance practices and their effectiveness on firm 
performance was the fifth motivation for this thesis. The thesis uses a sample of 
companies from the UK FTSE All Shares non-financial companies and therefore it 
contributes toward limiting such a gap. Furthermore, most of the UK studies, as well 
as other international studies on corporate governance and performance, used data 
prior to 2005. This means that most of these studies did not investigate whether the 
development of corporate governance practices since 2005 has contributed to the 
performance of the companies, and whether the global financial crises, which 
initiated in 2007, have influenced the practices of corporate governance mechanisms 
and their impact on performance. This thesis uses data between 2005 and 2010, 
which contributes toward updated research and conclusions, and allows a useful 
comparison between the impact of corporate governance on performance before, and 
during, the global financial crisis. 
1.6. The Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters as follows: 
Chapter one – Introduction: this chapter summarises the main questions in 
which the thesis is aiming to achieve; presents the research aims and objectives, and 
the major theoretical empirical research on the internal aspects of corporate 
governance and their impact on corporate performance. The chapter also presents the 
motivations of this thesis, which are briefly relates to the extensive development of 
corporate governance practices in the UK, and the increase attention to the 
importance of boards of directors as major tool to mitigate agency problems. The 
chapter also discusses the importance of blockholders individuals/institutions as an 
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external control mechanism to monitor the board of directors. The chapter outlines 
the contribution the thesis makes to both, the theoretical and empirical literature of 
corporate governance, such as an insight into the latest developments in the UK 
corporate governance reforms and extending the empirical studies in the practices of 
the UK corporate governance and their impact of firm performance.  
Chapter two – Background on the development of corporate governance in the 
UK: this chapter presents the major reforms and developments which have 
contributed to the development of corporate governance in the UK between 1992 
with Cadbury Report, to 2014 with the latest amendments to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code. The reasons for discussing the development of corporate 
governance in the UK are the extensive development in UK, in particular during the 
beginning of 2000s, and the global credit crisis that was to some extent blamed at 
corporate governance and the lack of transparency and the effectiveness of boards of 
directors. 
Chapter three – Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review: this chapter is 
focused on the main theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate governance and 
corporate performance. The chapter starts with explaining the agency theory and the 
agency problems to highlight the rationale of the agency theory. This includes 
providing powerful empirical models that can be used to investigate the agency 
conflict and testing corporate governance codes recommendations related to board 
effectiveness and ownership structure (for example board size, the presence and level 
of independent non-executive directors, managerial ownership, and blockholders) to 
mitigate agency problems. The chapter also provides an extensive review for 
previous empirical studies on corporate governance and performance around the 
world, in particular the USA and the UK. After the explanation of the agency theory 
and other supporting theories, the chapter discussed the theoretical and empirical 
literature for the main corporate governance variables used in this thesis (i.e. board 
size; board independence; managerial ownership; blockholders) and corporate 
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performance. As mentioned previously, the paragraphs on empirical studies includes 
a discussion of the findings from international studies (Kole, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 
1998; Maka & Kusnadi, 2005; Di Pietra et al., 2008; Bermig & Frick, 2010; Kumar 
& Singh, 2013; Erkens et al., 2012; Fernandes, 2008; Noor & Fadzil, 2013; Pham et 
al., 2008; Hu & Zhou, 2008; Schmid & Zimmermann, 2008; Singhchawla et al., 
2010), followed by more focus on findings from US studies (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; 
Morck et al., 1988; Agrawal & Mandelker 1990; Denis & Denis 1994; Mehran, 
1995; Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Rosenstein & Wyatt 1997; Klein, 1998; Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008), and finally focus on results reported by 
UK studies (Leech & Leahy, 1991; Short & Keasey, 1999; Faccio & Lasfer, 1999; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Weir et al., 2002; Davies et al., 2005; Dahya & McConnell, 2007; 
Mura, 2007; Guest, 2009; Abdullah & Page, 2009; Muravyev et al., 2014; El-
Faitouri, 2014). This has helped in highlighting any differences between the findings 
in different regions, and in providing any possible reasons for such differences. The 
chapter also outlined the hypotheses, which have been developed from the theoretical 
and empirical literature. 
Chapter four – Research Design: the chapter outlines and describes the 
methods used to analyse the data and to test the hypotheses which were identified in 
chapter three. This includes, describing the population and the sample, which are the 
FTSE All shares non-financial companies, and the reasons for using non-financial 
companies. The chapter also defines the explanatory, independent, and control 
variables for the model, as well as their sources and methods of collection. In 
addition, the equations for the regression models and other additional analysis (such 
as two stages least square; non-linearity, and endogeneity tests). The chapter also 
describes the process for data selection and the methods used to test regression model 
assumptions, such as the absence of multicollinearity; dealing with outliers, and 
normality. 
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Chapter five – Empirical Results and Discussion: This chapter presents the 
results for the empirical studies as well as conducts data analysis. In this chapter, the 
results on the descriptive statistics of the main variables were reported (such as 
mean, maximum, medium, and standard deviation). This provided clear 
understanding to the trends of the data used in the thesis. The results of the univariate 
and multivariate regression were provided and compared with previous empirical 
studies and highlighting any possible theoretical and empirical implications. In 
addition, the results and discussions for further analysis and tests were reported, such 
as the outcomes of the changes of board independence and whether it can be 
explained by previous corporate performance; and the outcomes of 2SLS analysis as 
well as the 2SLS using instrumental variables; endogeneity analysis; and dummy 
variables analysis. 
Chapter six – Summary and conclusion: this chapter summarises the main 
findings and conclusions of the hypotheses tested in chapter five, and highlights the 
contributions in which the thesis adds to the corporate governance research. In 
addition, the chapter outlines the main limitations of the thesis and provides 
explanation and recommendations about how this thesis can be used and developed 
for further future research. 
 
1.7. Chapter Summary  
This chapter introduced the thesis with a brief background to corporate 
governance and some issues surrounding it. It also offered a brief explanation of the 
methodology used for the analysis and the sample. Finally, the chapter included an 
outline of the thesis, briefly explaining the content of each chapter. The following 
chapter provides an insight into the main developments of the UK corporate 
governance code since 1992 until 2014. 
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2. Chapter two: The Development of 
Corporate Governance in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
2.1. Introduction  
There are various reasons that initiated the development of the corporate 
governance code in the UK that started in the 1990s. The reasons included the 
increase of institutional shareholders, the establishment of the Financial Service 
Authority2 in 2001; the increased awareness of the importance of independent 
external auditors, as well as the code and regulations of the London Stock Exchange 
and the Companies Acts and the rules related to share dealing and transactions by 
directors. This chapter provides an explanation to the extensive corporate governance 
reforms in the UK starting with the Cadbury report 1992 and ending with the latest 
changes of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 and its amendments in 2012 
and 2014. 
 
2.2. The development of Corporate Governance in the UK: 
an overview 
There are number of corporate governance codes that have shaped the 
development of corporate governance, not only in the UK but also around the globe. 
The most important codes that have contributed to global development are the Code 
of Best Practices contained in the Cadbury Report (1992, revised 1995), and the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999, revised 2004). After the 
2 The Financial Service Authority originated as the Securities and Investment Board in 1985. In 2012 
the FSA replaced by two separate regulatory authorities, which are The Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA); and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).  
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publication of Cadbury Report (1992), many corporate governance codes were 
introduced in different countries in order to introduce effective corporate governance 
practices in a way that could be successfully integrated within the governance culture 
across these countries. For instance, an important contributor to current corporate 
governance development and practices is the King Report (1994) in South Africa.  
According to this report, corporations should decide on their corporate 
strategies taking into consideration the wider community and other stakeholders, 
such as customers, suppliers, and employees. Moreover, the King Report (1994) 
identified seven main concepts that are necessary for good and effective corporate 
governance practices: accountability, responsibility, discipline, independence, 
transparency, fairness, and social responsibility. Thus, the report looks at corporate 
governance from the perspective of the stakeholders. Following the King report of 
1994, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 1999 (revised 2004), mainly 
focused on promoting transparency, protecting shareholders’ and stakeholders’ rights 
and ensuring effective monitoring of management by the board of directors and 
board accountability to the company and its shareholders. 
A study by Gregory (2001) investigated over twenty corporate governance 
codes across developed markets. The study found that all the codes have mainly 
focused on the role of boards of directors, the structure of boards (dependent and 
independent members), board composition, committee structures and independence, 
and the separation between the role of the Chairman and the CEO. There has been a 
very considerable increase in comparing different corporate governance systems and 
regimes around the world, and examining how corporate governance plays an 
important role in facilitating deep and liquid financial markets. According to Armour 
(2008), the methods and ways in which corporate and commercial laws are enforced 
within countries can have an impact on the incentive for the agents to comply. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of regulatory regimes is a function of both commercial 
and corporate rules on one hand and the enforcement mechanisms on the other. 
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UK corporate governance codes, particularly those contained in the Cadbury 
Code (1992), the Combined Code (2003), and the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010, 2012, 2014), have focused on the effectiveness of the board of directors and 
their control over the managers, as well as board composition, and the importance of 
the separation between the chair and the CEO role. The United Kingdom has a large 
degree of dispersion in stock ownership of listed corporations; this suggests that 
there may potentially be a significant problem with the corporate governance system 
in the United Kingdom for public companies in rendering managers accountable to 
shareholders. In particular, Armour (2008, p 2) stressed that “for the UK’s listed 
companies, the central governance problems concern how to minimise the costs of 
conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders, and between 
shareholders and creditors”. 
The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2014) sets out principles 
that can assist in protecting the interests of shareholders. For example, according to 
Article 1 section A, the board of directors “should set the company’s values and 
standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and others are 
understood and met”. 
Concerns about corporate governance in the United Kingdom increased toward 
the end of the 1980s with corporate scandals such as Polly Peck and Maxwell 
(Taylor, 2006). Lax financial reporting resulted in the establishment of the Cadbury 
committee, which published its report in 1992 and outlined general rules for best 
practice in corporate governance, such as the structure of board of directors, the 
importance of audits and ways to increase their effectiveness and value, and the role 
of institutional shareholders (Goddard & Masters, 2000).  
Two years after the publication of Cadbury Report, the Rutteman Report 
(1994) on Internal Control and Financial Reporting was published; this set out 
guidance for corporations to enable them to comply with the principle of the Cadbury 
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Code on “reporting on the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal control”. 
At the same time, the increased debate on directors’ pay and share options in 1995 
led to the Greenbury Report (1995) which recommended extensive disclosure in 
annual reports of directors’ remuneration, and also recommended the establishment 
of a remuneration committee comprised of non-executive directors. This was 
followed by the Hampel Report in 1996 and the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance (1998) consolidating the previous guidance which covers areas related 
to the structure of the board of directors’ remuneration and the responsibilities of 
institutional shareholders to use their influence on their companies to comply with 
the Code. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the development of corporate 
governance.  
Corporate governance practices in the United Kingdom have not only been 
influenced and shaped by these reports, but it has been also influenced by the 
European Union practices. For example, the European Commission’s “Corporate 
Governance and Company Law Action Plan” of 2003, proposed a mix of legislative 
and regulatory measures that affect all member states in relation to: Disclosure 
requirements; Exercise of voting rights; Cross-border voting; Disclosure by 
institutional investors; and Responsibilities of board members. 
The following paragraphs explain, in more detail, the development of the UK 
Corporate Governance principles from 1992 until 2014. 
2.2.1. Cadbury Report (The Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance). 
The collapse of high profile companies in early 1990s, such as Polly Peck 
1990; Bank of Credit and Commerce International 1991; Maxwell Communications 
1992, and the extensive impact of these scandals on shareholders and employees, 
have increased the awareness for the need for important practices of corporate 
governance, not only in the UK, but also around the globe. In the UK, the initial 
response to the growing concerns of corporate governance practices was the 
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establishment of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 
1992, chaired by Adrian Cadbury3. The London Stock Exchange contributed to the 
immediate credibility of the report by incorporating the report recommendations into 
its listing rules and requirement in which the corporations are required to comply 
with the code or to explain to their shareholders why they company is not complying 
with the code.  
The establishment of Cadbury committee also caused by the increase concern 
of the wide use of creative accounting and earnings management practices, and the 
weak authority and enforcement of the UK Accounting standards, as well as lack of 
authority of auditors (Dahya et al., 2002). The focus of the Cadbury Committee was 
on the role of institutional shareholders in enhancing control; financial reporting in 
terms of disclosure and transparency; mechanisms of the board of directors; and, the 
role of auditors in promoting disclosure and transparency. The committee dealt with 
issues such as the structure and responsibilities of board of directors; enhancing the 
effectiveness of the audit; improving effective relationship between the board of 
directors and shareholders; and the responsibilities of institutional shareholders to 
encourage investees to comply with the Code. However, despite this narrow focus, 
the outcomes of the committee and its recommendations have largely contributed to 
the global promotion of good corporate governance practices, not only in terms of 
control and in terms of reporting, but also concerning the good practices of corporate 
governance as whole (Daily et al., 2003). The committee published its report, the 
Cadbury Report, in December 1992. 
The recommendations of the committee and which were included in the report, 
covered the operations of the board of directors, and the composition and formation 
of different key board committees; the importance of non-executive directors and the 
contribution in which they can make to ensure transparency; and the reporting and 
3 The Cadbury Committee and consequently Cadbury report were named after the Chair. 
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control mechanisms that can be applied by corporations. Some of these 
recommendations are as follows: 
- Clear separation between the responsibilities of the CEO and the Chairman to 
ensure the balance of power and authority. This can prevent excessive power 
being left in the hand of one individual (para 1.2). 
- Minimum number of three non-executive directors in the board, so that 
according to the committee recommendations, their views can carry 
significant and effective weight in the decisions taken by the board (para 1.4). 
- Establishment of an Audit Committee with at least three independent 
directors (para, 4.3) 
- Encouraging institutional shareholders to use their voting rights, and make 
clear disclosure of their policies in the use of voting rights (para, 6.12). 
The adoption by the London Stock Exchange of these principles, made the majority 
of the UK listed corporations apply these principles. 
2.2.2. Greenbury Report (1995) 
The Greenbury Committee was setup by the Confederation of British Industry 
in 1994 as a response to the increase in concern regarding directors’ remuneration; in 
particular, the bonuses and rewards of senior executive directors in newly privatised 
utility industry. The goal of the Greenbury committee, as stated in its published 
report in 1995 paragraph 1.2 was “to identify good practices in determining 
directors’ remuneration and prepare a code of such practices for use by UK Plcs.”. 
Similar to the Cadbury report, although the main goal of the Greenbury Committee 
was to deal with a specific mechanism of corporate governance, their 
recommendations broadened to include other corporate governance aspects, such as 
strengthening the role of non-executive directors. The Greenbury Committee 
published its report in 1995, which established the principles of the executive 
remuneration committee based on five areas which are: accountability; 
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responsibility; full disclosure; alignment of director interest with shareholder interest; 
and improving corporate performance.  
The Greenbury report endorses the recommendations of the Cadbury in terms 
of establishing a remuneration committee. However, the Greenbury report consists 
fully from non-executive directors, rather than maximum three non-executives as 
recommended by Cadbury report (1992). In its report, the Greenbury Committee 
argued that UK corporations are no different from other European corporations in 
dealing with directors’ remuneration, and that UK corporations are within the range 
of remuneration paid to directors in other European companies. The Greenbury 
report also noted that the remuneration policies applied in UK companies are linked 
to performance, and that increases in directors’ rewards and bonuses can be justified 
by improved industrial performance; directors should be well rewarded in order to 
motivate them to effectively and successfully achieve the company’s strategic goals.  
The main recommendations of the Greenbury Committee, as published in its report 
in 1995 were: 
- Listed Companies to disclose their directors’ remuneration in the annual 
report 
- Listed companies should establish a remuneration committee, which entirely 
consists of non-executive directors. This is different from the Cadbury report 
recommendation of a minimum three non-executive directors (two for small 
companies). 
- Listed companies are recommended to disclose information about the 
members of the remuneration committee, including details on the components 
and amount of their remuneration package and that shareholders be required 
to approve them, such as salary, bonuses, fees, pensions, and long-term 
option schemes. 
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- Remuneration policies should be designed in such a way that they are linked 
to the company’s performance, and to motivate and attract talented executive 
directors without being excessive. 
The report and its recommendations are on a “comply or explain bases”, which is 
similar to the Cadbury report, where listed companies need to explain to 
shareholders the reasons for not complying with the report recommendations. 
2.2.3. Hampel Report (1998) 
Both the Cadbury report (1992) and the Greenbury report (1995) recommended 
the establishment of a committee, which has its main responsibility as to review the 
extent in which the UK listed companies are implementing the recommendations of 
both reports and their guidelines on good practices of corporate governance. The 
committee was established by the Financial Reporting Council, sponsored by the 
London Stock Exchange, the Institute of Directors, the Confederation of British 
Industry, and Chaired by Sir Ron Hampel.  
The Committee published its Hampel report in 1998, and suggested that there 
was no need for considerable change except that the at least one third of the board of 
directors must consist of non-executive directors (para 3.14). Thus, Hampel report is 
similar to the Cadbury report and the Greenbury report, except that the Hampel 
report considers the performance of the company as more important than the details 
of corporate governance, such as transparency and accountability. Therefore, the 
Hampel report considers that more flexibility must be given to the board of directors 
in terms of complying with guidelines of good practices of corporate governance 
with full explanation if otherwise. The Hampel report consisted of four main 
sections, which are the role of board of directors; directors’ remuneration, the role of 
shareholders, and accountability and audit. In terms of directors’ role, the Hampel 
report recommended directors to evaluate and review the effectiveness of all the 
internal control tools, and not only the financial control tools. 
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In addition to the number of non-executive directors (minimum one third of the 
board) for effective performance, the Hampel report recommended a diversified 
board of directors in relation to the background of the directors. The report 
confirmed the recommendations of the Greenbury report in terms of the importance 
of remuneration in maintaining and attracting motivated and talented executives, and 
the board of directors should disclose that remuneration so that shareholders are 
informed and can judge whether the remuneration is appropriate, and whether it 
reduces agency cost (Paragraph 4.3). The Hampel report (1998) argues that although 
it is important to disclose detailed information about each individual director, “it 
should also be recognised that full disclosure of individual directors’ total 
emoluments has led to an upward pressure on remuneration in a competitive field” 
(Paragraph, 4.5). 
2.2.4. The Combined Code 1998 
The provisions of the Cadbury and the Greenbury reports were consolidated 
into the combined code in 1998. The code consists of two main sections, section one 
aimed at listed companies, and section two for institutional shareholders. Under this 
code, listed companies were required to include a narrative statement in their annual 
report explaining how they have applied the principles of the combined code, and to 
explain why any of the principles were not applied.  
The code confirms the importance of separation between the role of the 
Chairman and the role of the CEO in order to ensure balance of power and authority 
rather than placing unfettered power in the hand of one individual. However, the 
code suggested a balanced board of directors in term of number of non-executive and 
executive directors in the board (the Hampel report suggested minimum of third of 
the board to consist of non-executive directors), so no small group or individuals 
could dominate the decisions of the board. In relation to the internal control system, 
the Code states in section D2 that “The board should maintain a sound system of 
internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets”.  
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More focus on the internal control system and its effectiveness followed the 
combined code in 1999, when the Turnbull Report was published, requiring 
companies to report on internal control and risk management. 
2.2.5. Turnbull Report (1999, revised 2005) 
The Turnbull Report (1999, paragraph 20) highlighted the importance of 
internal control and risk management within corporations, and identified the features 
of an effective internal control system that: 
- Facilitates an effective and an efficient operation of a company by enabling 
appropriate respond to any operational, financial, compliance, strategic risks 
- ensures the quality of internal and external reporting 
- ensures compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and also with 
- internal policies with respect to the conduct of business 
The Turnbull report introduced risk management as part of the effective 
internal control system. Paragraph 31 of the Turnbull Report (1999), suggests that 
the board of directors should, on an annual basis, deal with significant risks. This is 
through evaluating and assessing whether the internal control system in place is 
capable of effectively managing the identified significant risks, and ensuring that 
appropriate actions are taken to deal with any control system weaknesses and 
whether more extensive monitoring for the system of internal control is required.  
According to Page and Spira (2004), the Turnbull Report (1999) was the last 
report of a convoluted process started with the publishing of the Cadbury Report 
1992 on the requirement of the listed companies to report information about their 
internal control system. Moreover, the Page and Spira (2004) study examined the 
influence of the Turnbull report recommendations on internal audit departments of 
the FTSE 350 companies, and found that such recommendations were helpful to the 
internal auditors, and that the recommendations show the positive impact of internal 
audit on the company.  
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The report was revised in 2005 by the Turnbull Review Group which was 
established by the Financial Reporting Council to consider further the guidance and 
related disclosure requirements. The report suggested some actions that the board 
needs to consider in order to successfully embed the internal control system in the 
operations of the business and form a part of the business environment and culture. 
These actions were: 
- ensure effective communication between managing directors and all other 
managers and employees; 
- provide appropriate training across the company on internal control and risk 
management; 
- Set up communication channels that allow people to report any problems. 
In summary, the report aimed to enhance and promote a corporate culture that 
manages risk and focuses on meeting the objectives of the company. 
2.2.6. The Myners Report (2001) 
HM Treasury, prepared by Lord Paul Myners, issued the Myners Report on 
institutional investment in 2001. The focus of the report was the institutional 
investment. The UK government was concerned about that institutional investors 
were increasingly investing in quoted equities rather than small and medium sized 
companies. The report had an impact on the pension fund investments in UK in terms 
of investment decision making; setting the investment fund objectives; and engaging 
with management and shareholders.  
The main conclusions of the Myners Report (2001) were that institutional 
investors are not investing their customers’ savings in efficient ways that can 
maximise their interest. This is because a considerable number of pension fund 
trustees do not have the enough expertise to act for the best interest of their 
customers who seek investment consultations, which influence their investment 
decisions. The Myners Report also raised the concern regarding the lack of active 
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engagement by the fund managers with the companies they have holdings in. Further 
finding in which the report highlighted were related to lack of setting clear objectives 
by the fund managers; and lack of accountability due to the lack of performance 
evaluations which allows judging the performance of the fund manager. 
In response to the issue of lack of expertise, the report recommends to follow 
the USA step in terms of trustees having a legal requirement to have the skills about 
the issues before taking investment decisions. In other words, a person with 
sufficient expertise and knowledge must make the decision on investment. 
Concerning the issue of lack of fund manager’s clear objectives, the report suggests 
that an overall objective for the fund must be clear and must relate to the fund itself 
rather than to other circumstance that belongs to other fund managers. When 
considering an investment, the report recommends that decision makers within the 
fund must take into consideration a full range of investment opportunities including 
private equities and small and medium size companies, rather than investing only on 
large equities. To tackle the issue of lack of evaluation of manager’s performance 
and accountability, The Myners Report recommended that the trustees should 
provide the fund manager with clear objectives, and clear timescale to achieve these 
objectives in order to effectively measure and evaluate its performance. 
For the implementation of the principles of the Myners Report, the report 
suggests that the pension funds should annually publish their efforts and methods to 
comply with its principles, and if they choose not to comply with a particular 
principle, then the fund must publicly and clearly explain why. The annual report in 
this case should be evolved into a discussion forum between the decision makers 
who seeks to justify their approach to other stakeholders, which therefore can bring 
behavioural change to both, customers and institutional investors. 
The government welcomed the recommendations made by the Myners Report 
and considered it as an important step toward enhancing institutional shareholders 
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activism, and that the “comply or explain” nature of the principles can enhance the 
engagements of stakeholders with the principles, and promote commitment and 
transparency. 
2.2.7. Higgs Report 2003 
The collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 shook shareholders’ confidence 
in the practices of corporate governance and the pressure for more effective 
corporate governance mechanisms was raised. In response to this increased pressure, 
the UK government established a committee chaired by Derek Higgs to review the 
corporate governance practices at the time and provide recommendations in the light 
of the corporate scandals. The focus of the committee was on the effectiveness of the 
non-executive directors in UK listed companies, including non-executive directors’ 
remuneration; independence, and their relation with shareholders. The report 
develops the UK corporate governance framework, which started with the Cadbury 
report in 1992, followed by the Greenbury, Hampel, and Turnbull reports afterward 
(Higgs, 2003).  
Higgs (2003) blamed the lack of corporate governance effectiveness for the 
falling markets, which both together contributed a number of corporate collapses 
before 2003. The report considered the board of directors as the main element of 
successful corporate performance. Most of the Higgs report’s recommendations on 
the effectiveness of board of directors supported the principles of the Combined 
Code such the importance of the board, its responsibilities, and the separation 
between the role of the Chairman and the CEO. The main recommendations of the 
Higgs report are as follows: 
• Annual reports should include the number of meetings of the board, a record 
of attendance per director, and a clear explanation about how the board 
functions and operates. 
• Separation between the role of the Chairman and the role of the CEO 
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• The non-executive directors should meet in group without the presence of the 
executive directors at least once a year. 
• Appointing the new non-executives is the responsibility of the nomination 
committee, which is also responsible to check that newly appointed non-
executives has the right and balanced skills needed. 
• It is the responsibility of the board to explain to the shareholders why they 
believe that an individual should be appointed as non-executive director. 
• New non-executive directors should be provided with an induction and 
training to enhance their effectiveness. 
• The performance of the board should be assessed at least once every year 
• Non-executive director’s responsibility should not be given to an executive 
director. 
The Higgs report worked on one of the main corporate governance factors that 
contributed to the collapse of high profile corporations in 2001, conflict of interest 
between the board and the shareholders and the lack of independent board that can 
ensure that the company’s assets to the interest of shareholders. Hence, in addition to 
the above recommendations, the report also focused on the relationship between non-
executive directors and recommended non-executive directors to attend Annual 
General Meetings; meet with major shareholders to understand their views and 
explain in the annual report the steps taken to ensure that the board of directors’ in 
particular non-executive directors understand these views. 
2.2.8. Smith Report 2003 
The Higgs report in 2003 was not the only UK response after the Enron shock. 
In addition to the effectiveness of the board of directors and its independence as 
major contributor to the Enron failure, the blame was also on the financial report and 
the role of auditors, in particular external auditors and their relationship with the 
board of directors. As a response, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK has 
established a small group, chaired by Sir Robert Smith, to develop the existing 
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guidance for audit committee, which were included in the Combined Code. 
Therefore, the main concern for the Smith Report (2003) was the framework of the 
audit committee and the relationship between external auditors and the board of 
directors.  
The Smith report resulted in changes to the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, and it applied to all companies on the primary market of the London 
Stock Exchange. According to the report, the primary responsibility of the audit 
committee is to monitor the integrity of the financial statements prepared by the 
company, which ensures the application of appropriate principles of financial 
reporting, and fair information about the company financial position. Furthermore, 
the audit committee is responsible to evaluate the company’s financial control 
systems as well as the risk control systems to prevent fraud and to ensure that 
directors are managing the company’s assets to the best of shareholders’ interest.  
Moreover, the report gives the audit committee the responsibility to develop 
and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditors in non-audit service 
(as respond to Enron case). The audit committee to review in annual bases is own 
effectiveness and provide the board of directors with any necessary changes. Smith 
Report suggests that conflicts between the audit committee and board of directors 
have to be solved and dealt with in the board level, and that the audit committee has 
the right to report to any issues to the shareholders. In terms of the Committee 
members, the report recommends every listed company to have an audit committee 
that consist solely of independent non-executive directors at least one of them with 
relevant financial experience. Moreover, the report recommends that the committee 
to meet at least three times per year, and to ensure the independence of the external 
auditors through effective monitoring. 
 
29 
 
2.2.9. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance (Revised 
2004) 
After the publication of Higgs and Smith reports in 2003, the debate on 
corporate governance was increasing. Some of the conclusions made by the reports, 
in particular in relation to the separation between the role of the Chairman and the 
CEO, were criticised by many British institutions. This criticism was mainly from 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institution of Directors, and 
considerable number of Chairmen (in particular the ones who held at the time dual 
role as Chairman and CEO in their companies). However, the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF) has strongly supported the changes recommended by the 
two reports. The debate was not only heated within the professionals, but also some 
scholars have criticised the reports in some aspects, for instance Solomon and 
Solomon (2004), argued that the Smith report should have not distinguished between 
the consultancy and auditing services provided by the external audits since it can 
influence their independence.  
In terms of the Higgs report, Cassell (2003, cited by Jones & Pollitt, 2004, p 
165) argues that in contrast to the Higgs recommendation of board independence, 
conclusions suggested that companies with more independent directors on their 
board are more likely to perform less in comparison to companies with fewer 
independent directors. However, such criticism of the Higgs report and the Smith 
report did not influence the Financial Service Authority updating the corporate 
governance principles, which resulted in the update of the 1998 Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance.  
Similar to the 1998 Code, the revised Combined Code 2003 consists of two 
main sections, section one for board of directors and its effectiveness, and section 
two is for shareholders.   
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The Code addresses the collective responsibility and accountability of the 
board, which the 1998 Code did not clearly state. In addition, the revised Code 
suggests that the board role is to set the goals and objectives of the company and to 
ensure that effective control systems in place to deal, assess, and manage the various 
business risks. The revised Combined Code 2003 clearly suggest the separation 
between the Chairman role and CEO, as reported by the Higgs Report, the revised 
Combined Code quoted that “the value of ensuring that committee membership is 
refreshed and that undue reliance is not placed on particular individuals should be 
taken into account in deciding chairmanship and membership of committees”.  
Furthermore, the revised Combined Code explicitly recommends the separation 
between the Chairman and the CEO, when it stated in A.2.1 that “The roles of 
chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual. The 
division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be 
clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board”. In addition, the 
revised code clearly lists the circumstance, which could influence the independency 
of the directors, such as being an employee in the company for the last five years; 
material relationship with the company; close family tie with any of the company’s 
advisors; or represents a significant shareholder.    
The revised Combined Code also emphasized the importance of independent 
non-executive directors on the board, and it did not recommend a large board size. In 
addition, the revised Code recommends, “at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be 
independent” (A.3.3), which is higher than the number included in the previous code 
recommendation which was for non-executives to comprise at least one third of the 
board, with the majority being independent. 
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In terms of the audit committee and its relationship with the board of directors, 
the revised code provided more clarity about the audit committee duties, to include 
the following: 
• Monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the company 
• Reviewing the effectiveness of the company’s internal financial control 
system and its risk management systems 
• Monitoring and reviewing the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit 
• To make recommendations to the board about removing/appointing new 
external auditors and to review their independence  
• To develop and implement a policy for the external auditors on engaging in 
non-audit service with the company 
Despite the revisions made to the Combined Code in 2003 and the 
consideration given to the issues raised after the Enron crises in 2001, the Financial 
Reporting Council continued to develop and update the UK Combined Code for 
Corporate Governance in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. This development was a 
respond to the financial crises commenced in 2007 with the collapse of other high 
profile corporations, such as Northern Rock in the UK and Lehman Brothers in the 
USA. 
2.2.10. The Combined Code of Corporate Governance revisions 
2006 to 2014 
In 2005, the Financial Reporting Council in UK carried out a review to 
evaluate the extent on which the companies are complying with the Combined Code 
principles. This review has resulted in recommendations for some changes, which 
were published in the revised version of the Combined Code in 2006. These changes 
were not significant, and did not add any significant changes to the 2003 principles, 
however, added more details about some of the previous principles. For instance, in 
relation to the role of the Chairman and the effective remuneration committee, the 
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principles of the 2003 Combined Code suggested that the Chairman should not be a 
member in the committee, and the committee should include at least three non-
executive directors (at least two for small companies). The revised Combined Code 
(2006), allowed the chairman to be a member of the remuneration committee with a 
condition that he/she was considered as independent when appointed as chairman. 
Another change was in relation to the supplementary provisions on “vote withheld” 
which was originally recommended by the Myners report (2004), which suggested 
companies to include a "vote withheld" box on proxy voting forms to allow 
shareholders to withhold votes as a means of communicating reservations about a 
particular resolution whilst not going as far as voting against the resolution.  
The impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 together with the collapse of 
giant corporations in USA and UK such as Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock 
have also increased the demand and need for more transparent and stricter corporate 
governance principles, particularly principles which can ensure the effectiveness of 
the board of directors, increasing transparency and responsibility. This led to the 
publication of the UK Corporate Governance Code (The Code) in 2010 and its 
revision in 2012 by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), replacing the Combined 
Code (2006). The FRC’s review of the corporate governance practices before the 
global financial crisis resulted in the following main recommendations: 
1- More attention is required to promote a greater understanding of the spirit of 
the Code as well as of the text; 
2- Enhancing the influence of shareholders by improving the interaction 
between shareholders and board of directors 
The revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 focused mainly on 
increasing the effectiveness of the board of directors by recommending a sufficient 
board size with qualified and knowledgeable directors, and a balanced number of 
non-executive directors and executive directors. In September 2014, the Financial 
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Reporting Council issued an update to the Code, which aimed to enhance the quality 
of information investors receive about long-term health and strategy of listed 
companies through including viable statements in the strategic report to those 
investors. The update also raised the bar for risk management and internal control by 
requiring companies to identify any major uncertainties to their ability to adopt the 
going concern basis of their accounting; and robustly assess their principal risks and 
explain how they are being managed and mitigated.  
With this development of corporate governance rules in the United Kingdom, 
the UK’s corporate system is considered well developed and able to cover the main 
principles and mechanisms of corporate governance, such as board structure, 
ownership structure, and institutional investors (Abdullah & Page, 2009).  
2.2.11. Companies Act 2006 
The UK government in 2006 as an update to the provisions of the Act in 1985 
published the Companies Act, without completely replacing them. The Act presented 
significant changes and provisions in particular in relation to directors, auditors, and 
shareholders. The Act was implemented during different stages ending in October 
2009, when the last stage was implemented. According to Mallin (2010, p, 33), one 
of the main reasons for implementing the Act in three yearly stages was to give 
companies enough time to prepare for the significant provisions which were 
introduced. The main features of the Companies Act 2006 are: 
1- The act codified the duties and responsibilities of directors 
2- Enhancing the communication between companies and shareholders through 
greater use of electronic communication 
3- Giving shareholders ability to decide and agree on limiting the liabilities of 
directors 
4- Encouraging companies to produce a high quality Business Review to enable 
shareholders to gain more information about the business 
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5- Enhancing the timing in which shareholders can receive information, where 
shareholders can receive updates about the business in different periods and 
when considered necessary 
6- Enhancing shareholders engagement and activism in general meetings 
through encouraging proxy right which can make it easier to shareholders to 
appoint others to vote on their behalf in general meetings 
7- Ensuring transparency and institutional investors are effectively involved, 
through demanding institutional shareholders to disclose how they have 
voted. 
The Act has paid more focus on publicly listed companies then private 
companies in order to enhance shareholders activism and engagement. 
2.2.12. Walker Review (2009). 
The global financial crises in 2007/2008 have increased the debate about the 
excessive risk, which banks are taking. Concerns were raised about the effectiveness 
of the structure of corporate governance within these institutions, whether the 
corporate governance mechanisms have failed to provide effective risk control 
systems to tackle the culture of excessive risk, and therefore preventing the financial 
crises. The resignation of many Chairmen and CEOs on the aftermath of the crises 
was not enough to restore the public confidence in the corporate governance 
practices, and demands for change has increased. The UK authorities responded by 
commissioning a review of corporate governance UK banks and other financial 
institutions, to focus on institutional investors led by Sir David Walker. Sir Walker 
was asked to publish recommendations on: 
- The effectiveness of risk management at board level (including board 
incentives policies 
- Skills, experience, and independence of the board members in UK banking 
institutions 
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- The effectiveness of board practices and the performance of the different 
committees (such as audit, remuneration, and nomination committee) 
- The role and responsibilities of institutional shareholders in monitoring the 
board and actively engaged in the company. 
In terms of enhancing board effectiveness, the Review called for a behavioural 
change at a board level to achieve leadership that is more effective that work with the 
spirit of the Corporate Governance principles, rather than rigidly following rules and 
box ticking conformity. Walker Review addressed the role and composition of the 
board, and recommended for more board effectiveness, the board should be 
characterised by a blend of skills and experience in finance and/or other related 
expertise. Furthermore, the board should demonstrate: 
- Transparency 
- Challenge of risk based decision 
- Focus on long term performance 
- Effective risk management 
- Rigorous evaluation for the board performance 
The Review also recommends companies to focus on achieving the optimum 
board composition through appointing directors who are independent in mind rather 
than independent in form, and therefore the substance of independency, according to 
the Walker Review, is more important than formal independence. According to Hahn 
and Lasfer (2010), lack of commitment by non-executive directors carries a higher 
risk of board ineffectiveness. This was also addressed by the Walker Review in 2009, 
which recommended that a materially increased time commitment for non-executive 
directors must be given in order to practice their role effectively (minimum of 30 to 
36 days), combined with training and support.  
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1992 Cadbury Report: outlined a number of recommendations around balanced composition 
of the board, selection processes for non-executive directors, transparency of financial 
reporting and the need for good internal controls. 
1994 Rutteman Report: aimed to provide guidance to companies on how to comply with 
Principle 4.5 of the Cadbury Code ‘reporting on the effectiveness of the company’s system 
of internal control’. 
 
1995 Greenbury Report: recommended extensive disclosure in annual reports on 
remuneration and recommended the establishment of a remuneration committee comprised 
of non-executive directors. 
 
1996 Hampel Report: aimed to review the extent to which the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Reports had been implemented and whether the objectives had been met (mainly on 
reporting on internal control). 
 
1998 The Combined Code of Corporate Governance: integrates Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Hampel, and Turnbull reports. Covers areas relating to board structure and remuneration, 
accountability and audit, relations with institutional shareholders, and the responsibilities of 
institutional shareholders. 
 
Turnbull (1999) (also known as Internal Control): Guidance for Directors on the Combined 
Code (1999). Made by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) to provide guidance on the implementation of the internal control requirements of 
the Combined Code. 
 
2001 Myners Review: considered whether there were factors distorting the investment 
decision-making of institutions 
 
2002 the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations: introduced to, further, strengthen the 
powers of shareholders in relation to directors’ pay. 
 
2003 Higgs Report: on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors 
 
2003 Smith Report: Guidance on Audit Committees 
 
2004 Turnbull Review Group (to consider the impact of internal control): Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code 
 
2005 Operational and Financial Review (Repeal): provides information on the company’s 
current and prospective performance and strategy. 
 
2006 Companies Act: The Act was brought into force in stages, with the final provision came 
into effect on 1 October 2009. The Act provides a comprehensive code of company law for 
the United Kingdom, and made changes to almost every facet of the law in relation to 
companies. 
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Combined Code (2006) and Combined Code (2008): These revisions did not result in major 
substantive changes to the Combined Code.   
 
2010 The Stewardship Code (revised in 2012): directed at institutional investors who hold 
voting rights in United Kingdom companies, encouraging them to be more active and 
involved in corporate governance for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
 
2010 The UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code): covered financial, auditing and 
corporate governance matters, and provided recommendations regarding CEO and Chairmen 
duality, the importance of non-executive directors, and the audit committee. 
 
2012 Revised Code: dealt with the effectiveness of the board of directors and the importance 
of maintaining an effective board of directors with a balance between executive and non-
executive directors. 
 
2014 Revised Code: aimed to enhance the quality of information investors receive about the 
long-term health and strategy of listed companies, and improves risk management. 
 
Table 2.1 The major developments of the Corporate Governance Code in the United Kingdom 
from 1992 to 2014 
 
2.3. Chapter Summary 
Most of the corporate governance codes in the UK have concentrated on the 
board of directors maintaining good corporate governance practices. For instance, 
according to the Cadbury Report (1992) “the calibre and number of non-executive 
directors on a board is of special importance in setting and maintaining standards of 
corporate governance”. A considerable number of corporate governance reports in 
the UK, for example the Hampel Report, the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (2003), and the Higgs Report (2003), contain similar recommendations 
to those of the Cadbury Report (1992). Furthermore, the global financial crisis in 
2008 has confirmed the need for an effective board of directors, and which can be 
seen in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010, revised 2012). This continued to 
recommend an experienced board of directors that is made up of a balance between 
executive and non-executive directors, with a clear division of responsibilities where 
no one individual should have unfettered power of decision.  
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Moreover, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) stresses the 
composition of the board of directors and its independence, recommending a 
sufficiently large board size and an appropriate combination of executive and non-
executive directors, particularly independent non-executive directors.4 Therefore, the 
success and continuity of a corporation, according to the UK corporate governance 
codes, are based on the relationship between the shareholders and their agent (agency 
theory), where the board of directors plays an essential role in this success. The 
following chapter discusses the theoretical literature and empirical studies on 
Corporate Governance mechanisms, namely board structure, and ownership structure 
on firm performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 “The board should be of sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and that 
changes to the board’s composition and that of its committees can be managed without undue 
disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should include an appropriate 
combination of executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non- executive 
directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision 
taking. The value of ensuring that committee membership is refreshed and that undue reliance is not 
placed on particular individuals should be taken into account in deciding chairmanship and 
membership of committees.  No one other than the committee chairman and members is entitled to be 
present at a meeting of the nomination, audit or remuneration committee, but others may attend at the 
invitation of the committee” (The UK Corporate Governance Code. 2012, p 11). 
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3. Chapter three: Theoretical and 
Empirical Literature Review on 
Corporate Governance and Performance 
 
3.1. Introduction  
During the last two decades, corporate governance has gained a prominent 
position in the literature of finance and management across the globe, and has 
become the subject of a major debate on how corporations should be managed in 
different countries. The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms is largely 
dependent on the national business culture and systems in different regions (Pedersen 
& Thomsen, 1999). Such aspects of culture can influence a country’s economic and 
financial systems and can have a strong influence on how companies are governed 
and directed (Kuada & Gullestrup, 1998). They can also affect the ownership 
structure, corporate regulations as well as control systems and corporate structure 
(Moerland, 1995; Kim & Hokisson, 1997).  
It can be argued that an effective and successful feature of corporate 
governance mechanisms and practices in one country is not necessarily effective and 
successful in another. Since the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, Maxwell, and other 
high profile companies, there has been an increased demand for the features of 
corporate governance to be developed to prevent such crises from happening again. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 has also been the catalyst for investing more 
thought into enhancing corporate governance practices and roles about the 
effectiveness of boards of directors, effective internal control systems, and 
encouraging transparency and shareholder activism. 
Reviewing previous research and empirical studies on corporate governance 
reveals a wealth of literature, which has been produced in relation to the impact of 
corporate governance on corporate performance. In particular, this thesis examines 
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the association between the composition of the board of directors (board size, board 
independence) and ownership structure (managerial ownership structure, 
blockholders, and institutional large shareholders) with corporate financial 
performance (both accounting base and market base performance). In addition to 
these mechanisms, the thesis also deals with the influence of company size and age 
on performance. This chapter provides a review of the theoretical literature, previous 
and empirical studies on corporate governance and performance from the Agent-
Principal theory perspective. It starts with the definition of corporate governance, 
followed by a comparison between different theories/models of corporate 
governance, and previous debates and disagreements with their conclusions about the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms5 and firm performance.6 
 
3.2. Corporate Governance 
There is no generally agreed definition of corporate governance. A company’s 
practices depend on its constitution and bylaws as well as the legal framework in the 
countries in which it operates (Salacuse, 2002). For instance, the Cadbury Committee 
on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992, p, 4) defines corporate 
governance simply as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. 
However, this definition is broad and does not provide a clear explanation for 
corporate governance that shows the mechanisms, which constitute an effective 
corporate governance system.  
5 The corporate governance mechanisms studied in this thesis are board composition (board size, 
board independence), ownership structure (managerial ownership structure; blockholders, and large 
institutional shareholders), and company size and age.  
6 Two main types of measures of firm performance were used: accounting based performance (Return 
on Assets, Return on Equity, and Return on Capital Employed) and market based performance 
(Tobin’s Q). 
41 
 
                                                          
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2004, 
p. 11) provides a detailed characterisation of corporate governance when stated that: 
“corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance”. 
This definition focuses on the relationship between the different stakeholders in the 
corporation, which are the management, board of directors, shareholders, and others. 
To achieve success, corporations need to maintain good practice in relation to these 
parties. Scott (1999) added that corporate governance involves every force that bears 
on decision making in the firm including the control rights of stakeholders, and the 
contractual and insolvency power of debt holders.  
Good corporate governance practices should offer appropriate inducement for 
the board of directors and the management to follow the objectives that are of benefit 
to the corporation and its owners as well as to other stakeholders (McGee et al., 
2005). Other factors which can affect the corporation’s operations and its long term 
success can be classified as internal (such as corporate governance structure, board 
effectiveness, and internal control systems) and external factors (such as business 
ethics and corporate awareness of environment and social responsibilities), together 
with economic factors such as inflation rates, government policies and corporate 
taxes.  
There are many fundamental principles for good corporate governance 
practices, which can influence corporate performance. Some of the principles that 
can lead to appropriate achievement and effective corporate governance are trust, 
honesty, sincerity, mutual interest, and commitment to the corporation (Oso & 
Semiu, 2012). In addition to these elements, the OECD (2004) listed more principles 
that can result in good corporate governance practices. This includes, protecting 
shareholder rights; legal and lawful duties toward all stakeholders; Corporations 
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must respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate shareholders getting their rights; 
effective monitoring of managerial performance by board of directors; clear and 
visible responsibilities to management and board of directors in order to ensure 
shareholders’ confidence in the corporation. 
Corporate governance has been considered a wide field that covers almost 
every dimension of the corporation. The importance of corporate governance has 
been recognised significantly in both developed and developing countries. Many 
countries has their own codes and principles of corporate governance which have 
been drawn up by organisations such as stock exchanges, corporations, and 
institutional investors, and which get direct or indirect support from their 
governments and international institutions (Ahmed, 2006). For instance, listed 
companies in the United Kingdom are not legally required to follow the rules of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, however are encouraged by the requirement of the 
stock exchange listing agreement to comply or explain their practices. Although 
there are no obligations to comply with the rules laid down in the codes, corporations 
are still required to disclose proper documentation and explain their rules and 
practices. These disclosures are essential for listed companies for them to provide 
authentic information to their shareholders. 
Despite the continuous development and amendments of corporate governance 
codes and practices, and the increase attention it has been receiving, there is no 
unified or single model of corporate governance. In other words, there are different 
explanations or understandings of corporate governance depending on the 
perspectives and theories that it is explained by (Keasey et al., 1997). Thus, there are 
various types of issues within corporate governance, such as transparency and 
control (Polak et al., 2011), control effectiveness and maximising corporate value 
(Macey, 1998), and board of directors’ accountability to shareholders (Blair, 1995). 
Despite these different issues, the focus within the area of corporate governance 
research is based on agency theory and the mechanisms and practices, which enhance 
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corporate performance and reduce the conflict of interest between the managers and 
the shareholders. The following paragraph explains corporate governance from the 
perspectives of agency theory. 
 
3.3. Agency Theory 
Free market economists assume that the aim of any corporation is to maximise 
its shareholders’ wealth, which means that a firm should only make an investment 
based on sound financial decisions and with the goal of making an economic profit 
(Hill and Jones, 1992). Based on the corporate system in the United Kingdom and 
the United States, corporate governance mechanisms and features are managed in a 
manner that complies with the wishes of the owners, with a focus on the shareholders 
of listed corporations, who appoint a board of directors to manage the company’s 
resources to maximise their wealth (Nenova, 2003). This relationship, between 
shareholders and the board of directors is called the agent-principal relationship.  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agent-principal relationship 
exists when one party, who is the principal, engages another party, the agent, to 
perform some services on their behalf. Berle and Means (1932) stressed that a 
transfer of corporate control from individual owners to professional managers in 
companies has resulted from the dispersion of equity ownership. Berle and Means 
(1932) also argued that, when control is distinct from ownership, managers could 
deploy assets for their own benefit rather than the owner’s. However, Shleifer and 
Vishney (1997) stressed that the agency problem in large firms in most countries is 
not only the conflict of interests between outside investors and managers but also the 
conflict between outside investors and controlling shareholders. They suggested that 
this problem might also occur between shareholders and creditors, and between 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Therefore, ownership structure may be one of 
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the crucial factors in shaping corporate governance systems around the world (Aoki, 
1995).  
According to Chuanrommanee and Swierczek (2007), the significant aspects of 
corporate ownership are concentration and composition. The degree of concentration 
indicates the distribution of power within the corporation, whether it is concentrated 
or dispersed. La Porta et al., (1999) argue that, when ownership is dispersed control 
by shareholders tends to be weak because of poor monitoring; there will be a high 
cost of monitoring for a small amount of benefits in proportion to their shares. On the 
other hand, with concentrated ownership, shareholders have the incentive to monitor 
management decisions and to reduce agency costs (Shleifer & Vishney, 1997).  
Studies on ownership structure within an agency theory framework have found 
that concentration of ownership differs between countries, depending on the 
development level of these countries. For example, Shleifer and Vishney (1997) 
stressed that concentrated ownership is relatively more beneficial in less developed 
countries, where the system does not provide clear definition or well protection to 
property right. 
The proportion of shares held by managers is also being important. According 
to Berle and Means (1932), when managers hold a small percentage of equity in the 
corporation, and when shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value maximisation, 
the corporate assets may be deployed to the good of the managers rather than their 
shareholders because managers become “entrenched” by virtue  of their control of 
votes. Therefore, the separation between ownership and control can be considered 
the main problem that is analysed in agency theory. 
3.3.1. The separation between ownership and control (the 
principal-agent problem) 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), as mentioned earlier, defined the concept of 
agency costs by investigating the nature and relationship of agency costs to the issue 
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of the separation between control and ownership. The consequences and impacts of 
the separation between the ownership of corporations and management, in terms of 
achieving the objectives of modern firms, have been an important subject for many 
studies starting with Smith (1776), when he argued that this problem reduces the 
managers’ motivation to manage the companies professionally, unless they are the 
owners. Berle and Means’ work in the early 1930’s also argued that, when directors 
are stakeholders in the firm, and shareholders have been unsuccessful in improving 
value maximisation, then directors are more likely to manage the corporation’s assets 
for their benefit rather than for the benefit of the shareholders. However, the main 
issue for the shareholders is how to ensure the achievement of the company’s 
objectives.  
Bernnan (1995) declared that the cause of the agency costs is the impracticality 
of creating a full contract that applies to every single possible action of directors 
from which they may directly benefit, and which will protect the shareholder’s 
welfare throughout all these decisions. Furthermore, the increase of management 
enthusiasm to increase corporate value had led to diminished inefficiency for several 
corporations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Gillan & Starkes (2002) argued that an 
increase in agency problem could encourage shareholders to spend more time trying 
to control the company and using their voters’ rights in the Annual General Meeting, 
therefore, this could increase the possibility of the shareholders becoming more 
active. Morck et al., (1988) discussed the possibility that a decrease in financial 
performance could take place when there is an added equity ownership among 
managers. They clarified this conclusion by stating that managers with large shares 
can be very powerful, and this indicates that his/her behaviour may not add any value 
for shareholders. Moreover, directors may be very wealthy that they have no 
intention of maximising profits in the long term, because if the management team is 
satisfied then they are more likely to follow a specific goal, which if achieved will 
then keep shareholders satisfied, rather than following the more general target of 
maximisation.  
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Agency theory assumes that shareholders respond to the problems they face in 
two ways. Firstly, they may increase monitoring to reduce information asymmetry 
and to ensure that managers are making as great an effort as possible to maximise the 
company’s wealth. Secondly, they may introduce an incentive scheme for 
management that will align the interests of managers and shareholders and encourage 
managers to perform to their optimum as it in their best interests, which at the same 
time maximise shareholder wealth. In addition, there are many reports on the topic of 
corporate governance that aim to “monitor” the firms and therefore to promote the 
directors and make a number of recommendations which will force the management 
team to be more accountable (Nenova, 2003).   
Many published reports have suggested a number of ways to align the acts of 
senior management with the interests of shareholders. These acts include linking 
rewards to company profits by offering directors and other senior managers’ shares 
options (a method used extensively in UK companies). Another method is to remove 
directors, who will run the risk of consequences being imposed on them in the event 
of poor performance.7 Reports such as the Cadbury, the Greenbury and the Hampel 
reports on corporate governance include guidelines relating to relationships between 
directors and shareholders, designed to encourage directors to act in the 
shareholders’ best interests. These reports have aimed to develop accountability and 
transparency in corporations. In terms of corporate governance literature, many ways 
in which agency problem conflicts can be reduced, were suggested. According to 
Depken et al., (2005), agency problems can be mitigated through an internal and 
external mechanisms, where internal mechanisms includes compensation contracts 
and monitoring within the firm, and external mechanisms includes monitoring 
activities by representatives of the capital market, including legislators, investment 
professionals and investors. Despite these mechanisms being different in nature, they 
7 In the aftermath of the “Credit Crunch”, the remuneration of bank directors and senior employees 
has come under serious debate as not reflecting performance changes. 
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share a common objective, which is to align the utility and interests of the managers 
with those of the shareholders (Osterland, 2002).  
According to Monks (1998), shareholders can play an effective role in 
encouraging and/or pursuing managers to work in shareholders’ interests and 
maximise their wealth by actively monitoring the board of directors. Shareholder 
activism describes the actions taken by shareholders in order to put pressure on 
managers to work for the best interests of the company; one of the main tools used 
by shareholders to put into practice activism is by voting on proposals, or voting in 
and appointing new managers. Furthermore, large shareholders may interact directly 
with the Chairman and the board to improve the dialogue between the two parties.  
The board of directors can be also considered as one of the main effective 
mechanisms that can be used to reduce agency problems (Fligstein & Choo, 2005). 
This can be achieved by ensuring that the board includes independent, skilled, 
experienced, and committed non-executive directors who can effectively monitor the 
actions and decisions of executive directors and ensure that they are working in the 
interests of the shareholders. Therefore, it is debateable whether directors will do 
their best to maximise shareholders’ wealth.  This means that directors will act 
partially to keep the shareholder pleased because their capital is increasing, but at the 
same time will try to pursue their individual objectives.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that, if managers are involved in equity 
ownership, this helps to improve corporate performance and therefore reduces 
agency costs. Sultz (1988) predicted a relationship between managerial ownership 
and a firm’s value. In addition, Friend and Lang (1988) have suggested that debt 
ratios significantly decrease when there is more managerial ownership and increase 
when there is a large external ownership.  
However, the increase in the managerial ownership can also have negative 
impact on corporate performance (Demsetz, 1983). The findings of Demsetz (1983) 
48 
 
have been supported by further studies, such as those of Morck et al., (1988) and 
McConnel and Servaes (1990) who concluded that combining directors’ interests 
with shareholders’ interests and giving directors share ownership did not solve the 
problem of agency theory. Furthermore, corporate law and financial market 
regulation “make it possible for minority shareholders who have little access to the 
internal workings of the firm to gain knowledge of how firms are doing financially. 
In essence, these laws solve the agency problem by specifying rules governing the 
disclosures and governance of public corporation.” (Fligstein & Choo, 2005, p, 9). 
This means that regulations can solve the agency problem by specifying rules about 
governance and disclosures of public corporations. 
Other agency problems, and which are mainly caused by the separation 
between ownership and control, are the information asymmetry, moral hazard, and 
time horizon. Because directors, in particular, executive directors, are more involved 
in the daily operations and daily management of the corporation, it expected that they 
have more information, in particular private information, about the company than the 
shareholders do. Hence, the wider the separation between ownership and control, the 
greater is the problem of information asymmetry. According to this, potential 
investors face two major problems, which are moral hazards. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), moral hazard is the prospect that a party insulated from risk 
may behave differently from the way it would behave if it was fully exposed to the 
risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) view this issue by the assumption that a company 
is owned by a single investor and that this single investor has the motivation to 
pursue his/her own benefit over creating a positive net present value opportunity, and 
therefore achieving positive present value can be increased with the decline of shares 
ownership. This can be applicable to the UK model, where managerial ownership is 
relatively low, and therefore it is more likely that managers are isolated from risk and 
their decisions can be based on achieving private benefits over shareholders interest.  
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It is clear, according to Jensen (1993) that the problem of moral hazard 
increases in large firms where the level of managerial ownership is low. Hence, 
external monitoring mechanisms, such as outsiders’ activism, are very important in 
large companies in order to mitigate the problem of moral hazard. However, 
according to Denise (2001), the problem of moral hazard is least important in 
companies in comparison with the issues of time horizon and information 
asymmetry. Solomon (2010, p 9) stressed that executive directors have the tendency 
to maximise their own perceived self-interest, which can lead to decisions that aim 
only at achieving short-term profits rather than maximising long-term shareholders’ 
value. This means that executive directors are tempted to supplement their pay with 
as many perquisites as possible, such as holidays and office equipment, which also 
results in a negative impact on maximising shareholders wealth. In the UK, the 
agency theory model is largely applied since the main focus of corporate 
environments and culture, and the regulations on corporate governance practices, are 
largely centred around shareholders and  maximising their wealth.  
Therefore, and since this thesis uses the UK non-financial listed companies as 
the case to examine the impact of board characteristics and ownership structure on 
performance, the agency theory model was the main context of this thesis. 
3.3.2. Supporting and opposing theories of Agency theory 
In addition to the agency theory, there are other theories that support agency 
theory by presenting corporate governance and the role of the board of directors from 
shareholders’ perspective, such as stewardship theory, the transaction cost model, 
and the resource depending theory. On the other hand, other theories have opposed 
the agency theory, and discussed corporate governance from the perspectives of 
stakeholders rather than only shareholders, such as stakeholder theory and trusteeship 
model. 
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3.3.2.1. Supporting theories 
Stewardship theory: According to the stewardship theory, executive directors 
are stewards whose behaviour is linked to the interest of shareholders and they are to 
be viewed as being loyal to the firm and aiming to achieve good performance. 
Therefore, executive directors are trustworthy and should be given full authority and 
responsibility to manage the company’s resources to the interest of shareholders 
(Donaldson, 1990; Letza et al., 2004; Nicholosn & Kiel, 2007). The major similarity 
between the stewardship theory and agency theory is in their fundamental 
assumption that the company must be managed by executives on behalf and for the 
interest of shareholders. Another important assumption of stewardship theory, which 
complements agency theory, is that executive directors have the tendency to develop 
their skills, knowledge, and expertise in order to enhance their reputation, and since 
effective and successful decisions required better knowledge and expertise; therefore 
this can mitigate agency cost (Donaldson & Davis 1994). On the other hand, despite 
that both theories have common fundamental assumption that is shareholder focus; 
however, the stewardship theory differs from the agency theory in some assumptions. 
For instance, while agency theory assumes that executive directors are driven by self-
interest, the stewardship theory assumes that executive directors are not motivated 
not only by their self-interest, but also by their personal identification with the 
objectives of the corporation 
Transaction cost economics theory: According to the transaction cost 
economics theory, the firm is a governance structure that develops because it is 
cheaper to manage some classes of transactions internally to the firm rather than 
externally through markets (Williamson, 1975). Similar to the stewardship theory, 
transaction cost economics theory and Agency theory have some common 
assumptions, such as that both theories consider the role of the board of directors to 
be as an instrument of control over the management of the company. Both theories 
also mainly consider shareholders’ interests over other stakeholders’ interests, 
51 
 
transaction cost, risk neutrality of shareholders and managers, information 
asymmetry, and moral hazard. According to the transaction cost economics model, it 
is impossible to contract all the duties, responsibilities, and aspects of the 
relationship between the agent and the principal. Thus, because of incomplete 
contracts, specific mechanisms are needed in order to minimise conflict (Coase, 
1960; Williamson, 1991). On the other hand, the transaction cost economics theory 
takes the transaction cost as the main element of the analysis, while the agency 
theory takes the principal-agent contract as the main element of analysis. The 
transaction cost economics model has many differences from both classical and neo-
classical theories about the firm. For instance, the classical and neoclassical theories 
assume that all contracts can be specified as being between the agent and the 
principal. This suggests that conflicts and relationships between the firm’s parties 
can be easily settled based on the contractual relationship; whereas the transaction 
cost economics theory recognises that “setting up”, (e.g. recourse to the courts settle 
a dispute) may be costly. Thus, the main similarity between the agency theory and 
the transaction cost economics model is that both theories attempt to tackle the same 
issue, which is how to persuade company’s managers to work in the best interests of 
shareholders; however, they use different terminologies. 
3.3.2.2. Opposing theories 
Stakeholder theory: In contrast to the agency theory, stewardship theory, and 
the transaction costs economic theory, which all viewed corporate governance from 
the perspective of shareholder, the stakeholder theory approaches the theory of the 
firm from the stakeholders’ perspective rather than from the narrow concept of 
manager and ownership. According to the stakeholder theory, the managers of the 
firm need to balance the benefits and interests of all the firms’ stakeholders. The new 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance goes back to Freeman (1984), where 
the managers’ focus is shifted from that of acting in the interests of shareholders to 
ensure the interest of all other stakeholders is also achieved (Ayuso et al., 2012). 
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Hence, the stakeholder theory suggests that corporations must consider the interest of 
many stakeholders, and managers must direct and manage the company’s resources 
in order to balancing these interests. Based on this, Hill and Jones (1992) developed 
what they called the “stakeholder-agency theory” where stakeholders are those who 
are affected by the company’s achievements, and the agents are the managers of the 
company.  
The view of the stakeholder model on the firm considers the business as a 
transformation engine that transforms the input from different stakeholders (such as 
shareholders, suppliers, lenders, customers, employees, and managers) into an 
acceptable output for stakeholders. Donaldson (1996) views the firm as being a place 
where the stakeholders share the corporate surplus. This view differs from the 
investor model where only investors obtain the corporate surplus. There has been an 
increased development of the stakeholder focus due to the concept of the ethical and 
social responsibilities that the firm has toward its stakeholders and the increasing 
belief that corporations can perform better when aiming to act in the interests of a 
wider range of parties and not only in the interests of its shareholders alone8. In the 
current competitive market, corporate social responsibility has become more of an 
obligation than an option to corporations; instead, the level of a company’s social 
responsibility can influence the company’s reputation, brand value, stock value, 
customer relationship, and employee relationships (Naqvi et al., 2013).  
Corporations are required to go beyond the legal and the compliance 
requirements in order to be viewed by their stakeholders as responsible and 
legitimate actors. This means that with the lack of state control over the global 
8 Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (March 2003).: “There is growing acceptance of the 
view that organisations can create value by better managing natural, human, social and other forms of 
capital. Increasingly the performance of companies is being scrutinised from a perspective that 
recognises these other forms of capital”. 
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market, corporations are investing to increase their stakeholders’ trust and to gain 
legitimacy. Therefore, corporate social responsibility has become aligned to 
competitiveness since companies need to gain a different type of legitimacy from the 
public which can be referred to as a “social licence to operate” within the market 
(Sklair, 2001; Dickens, 2003). One of the latest cases that show the importance of the 
social license to operate is the case of Starbucks, which avoided paying tax in UK, 
and where the stakeholders added requirements beyond legal-compliance tax 
requirements to ensure the company continues to have a social license to operate in 
the UK. 
Freeman’s (1984) model of stakeholder theory aims to provide a strategy to 
develop effective stakeholder relationships, and suggests the corporation must make 
a trade-off between acting only in the interest of its shareholders through maximising 
value, and acting in the interests of the stakeholders. In order to assess effects of 
these trade-offs, a categorisation of stakeholder impact on the company’s success 
was proposed by Freeman (1984) using economic, political, environmental, and 
ethical categories. However, according to Key (1999), despite the efforts of Freeman 
(1984) and many scholars to provide a rich analysis and explanation for the 
stakeholders’ theory, this has yet to develop into a rich and complete theory. Key 
(1999, p. 321) summarised the main criticisms of the stakeholder theory as follows: 
“inadequate explanation of process; incomplete linkage of internal and external 
variables; insufficient attention to the system within which business operates and the 
levels of analysis within the system, and inadequate environmental assessment”. 
Trusteeship theory: According to the trusteeship model, the firm is considered 
as a social institution and not a private entity that has been established by a private 
contract between the agent and the principal (Kay & Silberston, 1995). The 
trusteeship model views the board of directors as trustees of the company’s assets 
(both tangible and intangible) and not solely as representing the shareholders’ 
interests. Hence, the role of the board of directors is to safeguard and enhance the 
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value of these assets and to provide a fair return from them. According to Learmount 
(2002), the trusteeship model identifies the responsibilities of the board of directors 
more precisely than economic theories such as the transaction cost economics model.  
The trusteeship model differs from the agency theory model in two main ways. 
Firstly, while the agency theory identifies the responsibilities of the board as being to 
work toward improving the share return, the trusteeship model gives the board of 
directors a wider responsibility that involves sustaining the assets of the company. 
This includes its employees’ skills and its reputation, as well as other intangible 
assets. Secondly, according to the agency theory, the responsibility of the trusteeship 
(the board) is to direct the company toward achieving the interest of the shareholders. 
In this respect, the trusteeship model is closer to the stakeholder theory in that it 
considers the responsibilities of the board of directors as being to balance the 
conflicting interests between the company’s stakeholders (Kay & Silberston, 1995). 
However, according to Learmount (2002), in order for the board of directors to play 
an effective role as stipulated by the trusteeship theory, a system of effective 
monitoring and surveillance is required in order to ensure that the board of directors 
is directing and managing the company assets in the best interest of the company and 
its stakeholders. In addition to these theories, corporate governance was viewed 
according to many other theories that differ mainly in their perspective as to whether 
governance is based more on acting in the interests of shareholders or of 
stakeholders.  
 
3.4. Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review on 
Corporate Governance and Performance 
The corporate governance literature, suggests that the agency problems can be 
reduced through good corporate governance mechanisms and practices. However, 
most of these studies investigated the correlation between corporate governance and 
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firm performance by examining each mechanism separately with isolation of the 
other mechanisms and with assumptions that there is not intervention and effect from 
outside mechanisms. In other words, investigating corporate governance mechanism 
in isolation of other mechanism suggests endogenous relationship between these 
mechanisms and firm performance (Danielson & Karpoff, 1998). This research 
examines the impact of different corporate governance mechanisms with a 
consideration of endogeneity issue. The following paragraphs provides a  review of 
the theoretical literature and various recent  empirical studies on corporate 
governance mechanisms, and finally setting up the hypotheses which can be 
developed, namely the characteristics of board of directors, the level of ownership, 
and their impact on corporate performance.  
3.4.1. Board of Directors 
The corporate board plays an essential role in mitigating agency costs, and in 
ensuring the persuasion of interests of shareholders and the obligations of the 
company toward those shareholders (Ho, 2005). Reducing agency costs, according to 
Brennan (2006), is achieved through effective monitoring of managers by the board. 
In addition, one of the major roles of the board of directors is to guide and advise 
managers on the corporate strategies that can enable them to use the resources of the 
company and its assets toward achieving the interest of their shareholders. The 
principles and features of an effective board of directors and its influence in 
enhancing firm performance attracted wide interest amongst scholars (Demsetz & 
Lehn 1985; Mehran 1995; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Ho, 2005; Pham et al., 2008; 
Tang et al., 2012; Moshirian et al., 2014). 
Banks (2004) defined a board of directors as: “a body entrusted with power to 
make economic decisions affecting the well-being of investors’ capital, employees’ 
security, communities’ economic health, and executives’ power and perquisites”. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, p 6), stressed that: “every company 
should be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for the long 
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term success of the company”. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), Gillan and 
Starks (2002), and Aguilera (2005) board of directors is the body which oversees 
managers’ performance and ratifies their decisions and ensures that executives are 
working in the interests of shareholders. Thus, board of directors, to be successful, 
needs to be collectively effective and responsible. Fama and Jensen (1983) identified 
the process of board of directors’ involvement in the corporation through four steps. 
Firstly, by planning and providing proposals about how the company’s resources can 
be utilised. Secondly, deciding on the decisions’ initiatives that need to be 
implemented, followed by implementing these initiatives, and finally monitoring the 
implementation process by measuring the controlling the performance and taking the 
corrective action.   In theory, board of directors must be active and all its members 
must participate in the decision making process.  
Similarly, Strebel (2004) argued that the role of board of directors is to ensure 
perfection. When the management of the company is not effective, the board’s 
responsibility is to coach the executives team and provide them with the strategies 
that can achieve the corporate goals in short term, as well as acting as guide to steer 
and direct them toward achieving the long term objectives of the firm. Hence, the 
involvement of the board of directors is a crucial element of corporate success. 
Additional elements are also deemed to be important and in which it influences the 
board effectiveness, such as board commitment (Klein, 2002), board diversification 
and background (Useem, 1993), skills and experience (Carter & Lorsch, 2013). 
However, it is important to note that the board process is beyond the area of this 
study, and since it involves board behaviour, it requires primary data that does not 
apply to this research.  
Borokhovich et al., (1996) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) argued that the 
board of directors is also an agent with wide authority in terms of the management of 
the company’s assets but that it does not necessarily use such authority to further the 
interests of the shareholders. So why do boards of directors exist and what is their 
57 
 
role in reducing agency problems? According to Bhagat and Black (1999), two 
approaches can be followed to examine the impact of board of directors on firm 
performance. The first approach is to identify the main tasks that the board of 
directors performs, and the second approach is to carry out an empirical research to 
find the level of association between the characteristics of the board and corporate 
performance. In a US context, Bhagat and Black (1999, 2001, and 2002) and 
Mantesaary (2010) have identified several tasks for the board of directors, for 
example responding to takeover bids, acquiring another company, and takeover 
defence.  
In addition to Bhagat and Black (1999), other studies have focused on CEO 
replacement as a major responsibility and task for the board of directors. According 
to the agency theory model, the board monitors the CEO and/or managers who 
exercise the power within the company; however, this derives from the US context. 
For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) stressed that the board of directors’ role 
is to decide if it is better for the firm to keep its CEO or to replace him/her. They also 
argued that an indicator for the board to take this decision can be provided by the 
firm performance, for example share price, return on assets, and market value. 
According to Bhagat and Black (2001), it is concluded that firing the CEO in most 
cases resulted in an increase in the total firm value. However, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2000) suggested that there is a negative association between firing CEO 
and stock prices when the CEO is fired based on private information; however, there 
is a positive association if firing CEO was based on public information.  
Previous research and empirical studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
board of directors, through investigating the influence of different variables that 
relate to board of directors on corporate performance, these include board size, board 
ownership, board independence, CEO duality, and board remuneration. The 
following paragraphs review in more detail the theoretical and empirical studies of 
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the association between the corporate board variables and firm’s performance 
followed by the hypotheses that are developed from this discussion. 
3.4.1.1. Board Size and Firm performance 
3.4.1.1.1. Theoretical literature 
The size of the board of directors is one of the major characters of the board 
that can be linked to the corporate performance (Coles et al., 2008). The main two 
roles of board of directors are the advisory role and the monitoring role (Lasfer, 
2006). Both roles can provide the CEO with sufficient information. Thus, in theory a 
large board of directors brings advantages to the company because it can provide 
more expertise and information, and so leads to better corporate performance (Dalton 
& Dalton, 2005). With the current recommendations of different corporate 
governance codes about having a balance between executive and non-executive 
directors in the board, larger the board size permits more non-executive directors 
with corporate or/and financial experience (Xie et al., 2003). This means that a large 
board of directors can play a positive role in evaluating management plans and 
preventing opportunistic behaviour such as executive compensation abuses. 
Moreover, from its role of monitoring management, and ensuring that the 
managers are pursuing the interest of shareholders, a large board of directors with a 
large proportion of non-executive directors can also provide information and 
resources that can enhance the effectiveness of management and improve the 
company’s performance. The two roles of the board (i.e. supervisory and monitoring) 
can be more effective with large board. According to Lehn et al., (2003), larger 
boards of directors can spread the power within the board reducing the potential 
influence of dominant members who might divert the decisions of the board to their 
own interest. They also suggest large board size may improve the efficiency of 
decision-making process because of sharing information. 
59 
 
On the other hand, large boards may have disadvantages, such as high cost, 
inefficient communication, higher likelihood of conflict and disputes within the 
board, and the free rider problem (Yermack, 1996). In terms of communication, it is 
more difficult to arrange and coordinate meetings of large boards, which has negative 
impact on the efficiency of the board process and its effectiveness in deciding on 
investment opportunities that might occur (John & Senbet, 1998). With large number 
of directors, it is more likely to have conflicts and disagreements between the 
directors, because they will be less likely to share a common goal and purpose and be 
ineffective in communication amongst themselves (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Thus, 
from the agency theory perspective, a large board of directors is likely to be less 
effective. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest the adoption of small boards, and 
recommend that board size be limited to seven or eight members. Jensen (1993, p, 
865) supported this and stressed, “Keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance. When boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to 
function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control”. 
According to Boone et al., (2007), another factor influences the determination 
of board size are the size of the firm and the complexity of the decision making 
process and the issues which face the firm. For instance, Bennedsen et al., (2008) 
suggested that for small to medium size firms with relatively simple objectives, the 
board size should not be more than five directors. However, the complexity of the 
operations in small to medium firms usually increases. Thus, continuous introduction 
of new corporate governance regulations and principles of best practices (such as the 
TIAA-CREF Policy Statement on Corporate Governance in 2007 USA; the 
Principles of Corporate Governance in 2012 USA, and the UK Corporate 
Governance Code in 2012), had a tendency to increase the size of boards. For 
instance the Principles of Corporate Governance in 2012 (USA) quotes that “Boards 
of directors of large publicly owned corporations vary in size from industry to 
industry and from corporation to corporation. In determining board size, directors 
should consider the nature, size and complexity of the corporation as well as its 
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stage of development” (p 13). However, it is important to note that despite that the 
UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 supports sufficient board size that can meet 
the requirement of the business, however the Code also suggests that the board 
“should not be so large as to be unwieldy” (The UK Corporate Governance Code 
2012, p 11).  
3.4.1.1.2. Empirical studies 
The extent to which board size is associated with firm performance has been 
the subject of inconsistent findings. A large number of empirical studies have 
focused on examining the relationship between the size of the board of directors and 
the firm performance. Table 3.1 presents some of the important empirical studies in 
relation to board size and firm performance. As can be seen from the table, much of 
the research has focused on the USA, and most of these studies reported a negative 
association between the size of the board of directors and firm value. For instance, 
Yermack (1996) examined the relationship between size and performance using 452 
large US companies for a period of 8 years (1984 till 1991), and concluded a 
negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and board size. Other studies, in the USA, 
also found a negative correlation between firm size and performance, such as, 
Goodstein et al (1994); Bhagat and Black (2002); Lee and Filbeck (2006); and Coles 
et al., (2008).  
Internationally, and as it can be noticed from Table 3.1, the conclusions are 
mixed, and in some cases within the same region. For instance, a study by Conyon 
and Peck (1998) examined the association between the board size and firm value 
(namely Tobin’s Q and Return on Equity) for different European countries including 
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Italy, for the period between 1992 
and 1995. They reported a negative relationship between firm performance and the 
size of the board, and suggested that in the UK and Netherlands, the increase in 
board size is strongly associated with the decrease in Tobin’s Q and Return on 
Equity. Conyon and Peck’s (1998) conclusion is consistent with the findings of  
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Eisenberg et al., (1998) who also examined the relationship between board size and 
Return on Equity using 785 small to medium sized companies in Finland concluded 
negative correlation between board size and profitability extends to small firms with 
small boards. Both studies conclusions, as it can be seen in the Table 3.3, are similar, 
to large extent to most of the US empirical studies that also concluded an inverse 
correlation between performance and board size. For instance, Lee and Filbeck 
(2006); Bhagat and Black (2002); Goodstein et al., (1994) found negative correlation 
between board size and performance in the US companies. These studies agree with 
Jensen (1993); Yermack (1996); Core et al., (1999); and Brick et al., (2006) who 
suggested that oversized boards leads to poor governance, and increase the risk that 
board members behaviour deviates from achieving shareholders’ interest.  
The negative association between board size and performance also was found 
in many empirical studies in other countries, such as, Malaysia, Singapore, and India 
(Maka & Kusnadi, 2005; Kumar & Singh, 2013). Maka and Kusnadi, (2005), 
examined the relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q for a total of 550 listed 
companies in Malaysia and Singapore (271 firms SGX and 279 firms listed on 
Malaysia and 271 listed in Singapore) for the period of 1999-2000, and found an 
inverse relationship between board size and firm value in both countries. Kumar and 
Singh (2013) examined 176 Indian listed firms and found significant negative 
association between Tobin’s Q and board size. Kumar and Singh (2013) suggested 
that the corporate governance structure in India was mandated for all companies in 
2005, and non-executive and independent directors were introduced on the company 
boards, and that the increase in number of non-executive directors in the board is 
resulting in negative firm value for larger boards. Kumar and Singh, (2013) did not 
provide explanation to why the increase in non-executives directors was resulting in 
negative impact on firm performance. They noted that the significance level of the 
negative correlation differs between small and larger firms. Both studies (Maka & 
Kusnadi, 2005; Kumar & Singh, 2013) results are also consistent with the 
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proposition of Jensen (1993) that large board size causes ineffective governance, and 
the empirical results of Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al., (1998).  
In the UK, in addition to Conyon and Peck (1998) which partially used UK 
data, Guest (2009) examined board size and performance relationship using a sample 
of 2746 UK listed companies with data covering the period 1981 to 2002. He 
reported a strong negative correlation between board size and firm profitability, in 
particular, in large firms with large boards of directors. Guest’s (2009) conclusion, 
disagrees with the study of Coles et al (2008) that reported a U-shaped relationship 
between board size and Tobin’s Q (i.e. negative performance is associated with very 
small or very large board of directors are optimal for better performance). On the 
other hand, Guest (2009) findings are consistent with the argument of scholars that a 
large board can suffer from ineffective communication and therefore poorer 
performance (John & Senbet, 1998; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) using US companies, and  Larmou and 
Vafeas (2010) found a positive relationship between board size and performance, 
which is inconsistent with other US studies who concluded negative association, 
such as Lee and Filbech (2006); Bhagat and Black (1999; 2002); Goodstein et al., 
(1994). Moreover, a study of German companies by Bermig and Frick (2010) 
concluded a significant positive relationship between board size (supervisory board) 
and performance (Tobin’s Q). Berger et al., (1997) found a positive correlation 
between board size and debt ratio which they explained by suggesting that with a 
large number of directors, the pressure on managers to pursue lower leverage and to 
increase firm performance, increases. Similarly, studies in Malaysia and India also 
reported that larger board of directors can result on improving the governance of the 
company, and reduces agency cost, and have a positive impact on firm performance 
(Dwivedi & Kumer 2005; ZainAlabidin et al., 2009). Barnhart and Rosenstein 
(1998), using sample of 321 companies from Standard and Poor’s 500, found no 
significant correlation between board size and Tobin’s Q, which is also consistent 
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with Di Pietra et al., (2008) study in Italy, who also concluded there is no evidence 
that board size has an impact on firm value. 
These studies are counter to other studies’ conclusions, such as Yermack 
(1996); Maka and Kusnadi, (2005); and Kumar and Singh, (2013) that board size 
impacts firms’ performance and that larger board imply less effective governance 
structures and therefore have a negative impact on performance. In addition to these 
empirical studies on the positive or negative relationship between board size and 
performance, other studies have suggested an optimal board size, where a medium 
sized board can be more effective, for instance Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) suggested an optimal board size of seven to eight members. Phan (2000) 
stressed that large boards are easier to be controlled by the CEO and therefore they 
become ineffective. 
Hence, the conclusions of different studies on the relationship between board 
size and performance remain inconsistent. This inconsistency can be referred to 
many factors, some that can be related to the characteristics of the companies, and 
others can be related to the country’s corporate governance structure and regulations. 
For instance, the board size impact on performance can also influence by the 
company size (Maka & Kusnadi, 2005; Guest, 2009; Kumar & Singh, 2013); 
company age (Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009); and the company type and industry 
(Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008). Guest (2009) stressed that the 
effectiveness of large board of directors can also relate to the institutional 
and legal environment of the country under study. The study by Bermig and 
Frick (2010), for instance, focused on the supervisory board in Germany, 
which has two tier systems of boards of directors. The existence of a 
supervisory and managerial board, can be considered as one of the possible 
explanations for their conclusions to be inconsistent with other studies in 
different region, such as in the UK and the USA. Furthermore, by observing 
the advisory and monitory function of the US and the UK board of directors, it 
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can be considered that they have very similar functions in both countries 
(Cadbury, 1992). However according to Guest (2009), the effectiveness of 
the UK monitoring function is weaker than that in the USA, because non-
executive directors in the UK are less legally responsible for failing to fulfil 
their legal duties then in the USA. UK non-executives view their role as 
supervisory rather than monitoring, while in the USA outside directors can be 
held responsible for not fulfilling their legal duties.  
Therefore, the following Hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1.0: There is no association between board size and performance 
H1.1: There is a negative Association between board size and performance 
H1.2: There is a non-linear association between board size and performance 
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 Author/s Research examines 
Region; Sample size; and  
Period covered 
Performance  
variable Results 
Eisenberg et al., (1998) The impact of board size on small and 
midsize firms 
Finland 785 small and midsize  
Companies  (1992 to 1994) 
ROA Negative association between board size and 
ROA 
Maka & Kusnadi,(2005) The impact of board size on small and 
midsize firms 
Singapore and Malaysia 271 firms 
SGX and 279 firms listed on the 
KLSE (1999 or 2000) 
Tobin's Q Negative association between board size and 
Tobin's Q in both countries 
Guest (2009) The impact of board size on firm 
performance 
UK,  2746 firms  (1981–2002) Tobin's Q; ROA,  and 
share returns 
Strong negative impact on TQ, ROA, and Share 
Return. The negative relation is strongest for 
large firms, which tend to have larger boards 
Barnhart & Rosenstein (1998) Board Composition, Managerial 
Ownership, and Firm Performance: 
An 
Empirical Analysis 
USA, Standard and Poor’s 500, 321 
firms (1990) 
 Tobin's Q No significant relationship with Tobin's Q. 
Larmou & Vafeas (2010) The relation between board size and 
firm performance in firms with a 
history of poor operating performance 
257 firms (1994-2000) Operating profit before 
Depreciation/book 
value of total assets 
Board size increases elicited a favourable 
market response while large board size 
decreases elicited an unfavourable stock 
market response for firms facing financial 
difficulties. 
Coles et al., (2008) The relation between firm value and 
board structure 
USA. 8,165 firm  (1992–2001) Tobin's Q and ROA U-shaped relationship between board size and 
Tobin's Q  suggesting that either very small or 
very large boards are optimal 
Di Pietra et al., (2008) The impact of board size on Italian 
firm value 
Italy 77 companies  (1992–2001) Share price No evidence that board size has an impact on 
firm value 
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Author/s Research examines 
Region; Sample size; and  
Period covered 
Performance  
variable Results 
Lee & Filbeck (2006) The impact of board size on firm 
performance in small companies 
US  1013 firms  (2000) ROA Negative relationship 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1990) Team size and performance US (1978-1985) Sales growth Positive relationship 
Bermig & Frick (2010) The effects of supervisory board size 
and composition on the valuation 
Germany  294 Firms (1998-2007) Tobin's Q, ROA, 
Share Return 
Significant positive relationship between board 
size and Tobin’s Q; Significant Negative 
relationship with share return; insignificant 
coefficients 
with ROA 
 Zainal-Abidin et al., (2009) Board structure and corporate 
performance 
Malaysia 75 companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia 
the value added (VA) 
efficiency of the firm’s 
physical and 
intellectual resources 
Positive relationship on firm performance 
Kumar & Singh (2013) Effect of board size and promoter 
ownership on firm value 
India 176 Indian firms listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (2008-2009) 
Tobin’s Q Negative relationship of board size with firm 
value 
Bhagat & Black (2001)  The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long Term Firm 
Performance 
USA 957 large U.S. public 
corporations (early 1991) 
Sales to Asset; Tobin's 
Q, and ROA 
Significant negative coefficient for 1991-1993 
for SAL/AST, a negative and marginally 
significant coefficient for Q, and is insignificant 
and of the opposite (positive) sign for 
ROA 
Dwivedi & Kumer (2005) Corporate Governance and 
Performance of Indian Firms 
India, 367 firms (1997–2001) Tobin’s Q and MVA Weak positive association between board size 
and both measures  
Goodstein et al., (1994) The Effects Of Board Size and 
Diversity on Strategic Change 
USA California 334 hospitals the 
State of California (1980-1985) 
Profit Margin   Negative correlation between board and 
performance 
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Author/s Research examines 
Region; Sample size; and  
Period covered 
Performance  
variable Results 
Conyon & Peck  (1998) Examines the effects of board size on 
corporate performance across a 
number of European economies 
Five European Economies (i.e. UK, 
France, Netherland, Italy, and 
Denmark) 1990 to 1995 
ROE,  
Market Value to Book 
Value 
Positive in UK and Netherlands, negative in 
others 
Table 3.1 Summary of the main empirical studies on Board Size and Firm Performance
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3.4.1.2. Board Independence and performance 
3.4.1.2.1. Theoretical literature 
The main corporate scandals for the past few decades, such as Enron, Polly 
Peck, and WorldCom, have dramatically changed the codes and the principles of 
corporate governance practices around the world. One of the main elements on which 
changes focused was the composition of the board of directors, in particular the 
importance of the presence of independent directors in the board as a tool for an 
effective control system to reduce the agency problems, especially the problem of 
information asymmetry. The Cadbury Report (1992) stimulated the debate about the 
main responsibilities and role of non-executive directors. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code recommends a balance between independent and non-independent 
directors within the board to ensure its effectiveness. Nowadays, there is wide 
agreement that independent directors make an important contribution towards the 
effectiveness of boards of directors and towards reducing the agency problems. 
Cadbury Report (1992, p 12) stated that independent directors “should bring an 
independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance and resources 
including key appointments and standards of conduct”.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code and the Australian Securities Exchanges 
(ASX), suggest that independent directors should not have any link, relation, or 
interest with any of the executive directors and senior managers within the company 
or any major shareholders. The independent directors are expected to be less biased, 
and have no preferences between the company’s stakeholders. From the agency 
theory perspectives, the role of the independent directors includes safeguarding 
against the self-serving behaviour of a dominant family-owner coalition, and 
preventing the eventual expropriation of minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004; Arosa et al., 2010). The influence of the board of directors’ decision-making 
depends largely on the board composition, where the level of inside to outside 
directors can affect the firm performance. The independent non-executive directors 
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are very important in influencing firm performance (Monks & Minow, 2004). This 
means that their main contribution (according to agency theory) is their ability to 
remain independent while overseeing operating matters, protecting the assets of the 
firm and holding the managers accountable to the firm’s various key stakeholders to 
ensure the future survival and success of the enterprise.  
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) suggests that the board and its 
committees should have balanced skills and independence in order to carry out their 
duties and responsibilities more effectively. Furthermore, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012) gives some examples where director can be considered as 
independent. This includes not being an employee for the company for the last five 
years; not receiving remuneration (except directors fees) from the company; having 
no close family ties to any of the company’s advisors or directors; and having not 
served in the board for more than nine years.  
Thus, independent directors are considered as the custodians of the governance 
process, and because they are disinterested, there is no conflict of interest between 
them and the shareholders, which means effective monitoring by independent 
directors is expected to lower the agency costs and increase firm performance (Fama 
1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lefort & Urzua, 2008 Duchin et al., 2010; Kumar 
2012). Rhoades et al., (2000) attribute this to the financial independence of the 
directors and their isolation from any conflict of interest with the shareholders. 
According to Belkhir (2009), independent directors can reduce the risk of moral 
hazard through their supervisory role on the executive directors, as well as mitigating 
the information asymmetry problem through ensuring wide disclosure of risk and 
relevant information to shareholders. Based on this, for an effective board of 
directors, a high proportion of independent non-executive directors must be 
appointed (Fama, 1980; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Jensen (1993) 
stressed that the independence of the non-executive directors makes them less 
hesitant to criticise the management with no threat of being fired.  
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In addition, Black et al., (2006) considered that appointing independent 
directors to the board gives a positive indication and credible signal to the market 
that the intention of the company is to minimise the agency problem and treat 
shareholders fairly. Fama (1980) argued that with less independent non-executive 
directors, it is more likely that executives will agree on decisions without challenging 
each other on the cost to the shareholder interest, and that the presence of more 
independent non-executive directors can reduce the risk of collusion by directors on 
the board.  However, some scholars argue that a board of directors dominated by 
independent non-executive directors can have a reverse impact of the performance of 
the company (Weir & Laing, 2000, Bozec, 2005). Independent directors mainly work 
part-time and their knowledge about the company and its operations is less than of 
the executive directors, which means less effective monitoring (Weir & Laing, 
2000). Furthermore, according to Nicholson and Kiel, (2007), executive directors 
have more access to information through informal sources that can positively 
contribute to their decisions and therefore give them advantages over the independent 
non-executive directors who cannot access such sources. Hence, boards dominated 
by independent directors are less likely to take quality decisions that can benefit the 
financial performance of the company. Despite these arguments, the observations 
from most of the scholars that a high proportion of independent directors in the board 
reduces the effect of agency problems, and thus the expectations are that empirical 
studies should conclude a positive correlation between board independence and firm 
performance.  
3.4.1.2.2. Empirical Studies   
Prior empirical studies on the impact of board composition on board 
performance indicate that the level of board effectiveness in monitoring managers 
depends largely on the level of the independence of the board. Zahra (2008) stressed 
that board independence has become an increasingly important monitoring tool to 
mitigate agency problems in terms of reducing information asymmetry problem and 
ensuring the interests of shareholders. Different empirical studies on board 
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independence and firm performance reached mix results. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2000) stressed that board composition matters, they concluded that having more 
outside directors improves corporate performance. Prevost et al., (2002) investigated 
the impact of independent directors on board effectiveness in New Zealand (sample 
of 607 firms) by testing the correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors in the board against capital expenditure (a proxy for growth and capital 
management). They found a negative association between the proportion of 
independent directors and the commitment to capital expenditure, and a positive 
correlation between the board independence and firm performance. Similarly, 
ZainAlabidin et al., (2009) and Noor and Fadzil (2013) studied the impact of board 
independence on Malaysian corporate performance, and found a positive association 
between outside directors and long term performance (measured by ZainAlabidin et 
al., 2009) as the value added efficiency of the firm’s physical and intellectual 
resources) as well as short-term performance (Noor & Fadzil, 2013).  
These previous studies in Malaysia and New Zealand follow and agree with 
similar prior studies in the USA that also found a positive correlation between the 
level of independent directors and firm performance. For instance, Schellenger et al., 
(1989) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) examined the correlation between the level 
of board independence and firm’s performance using a sample of 526 US companies 
and 266 US companies respectively, and also found a positive association between 
the proportion of outside directors and firm performance, in particular Return on 
Equity and Return on Assets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997), using a sample of 153 
US companies, found a positive reaction in the companies’ stock return when an 
outside director is appointed. Lin et al., (2009) confirmed these results, using a 
sample period between the year 1935 and 2000 and found a positive association 
between the proportion of independent directors in the board and Cumulative 
Abnormal Return.  
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Mura (2007) studied the relationship between board composition and Tobin’s 
Q using a sample of 1100 UK non-financial companies. He concluded that the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board has a positive impact 
on the company’s Tobin’s Q. According to Mura (2007) these results suggests that 
the after the recommendations of the Cadbury Report in Corporate Governance 
practices, the non-executive directors resulted in an effective board of directors with 
an effective monitoring role that can ensure that the interests of shareholders are 
safeguarded. In addition to Mura (2007), Dahya and McConnell (2007) tested the 
association between outside directors and firm’s accounting earnings and stock 
prices, and their results strongly supported those of Mura’s (2007) that outside 
directors leads to improved performance in UK firms and increases shareholders 
value. It has been also concluded by O’Sullivan (2000) that greater proportion of 
independent non-executive directors in the UK can have a positive impact on the 
audit quality and result in more extensive auditing, which can lead to more reliable 
financial statements and related disclosure, and therefore can reduce the problem of 
information asymmetry. In addition, Muravyev et al., (2014) studied the impact of 
appointing non-executive directors in another firm using the UK data, and found a 
positive association between the presences of non-executive directors in the 
performance on the firm in particular if they are executives in other firm that is 
performing well. These previous studies support the theoretical views that 
independent directors can provide an effective monitoring to lower agency costs and 
increase firm performance (Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Lefort & Urzua, 
2008). It also supports the view that appointing independent directors in the board 
can give a positive indication to the market that the intention of the company is to 
minimise the agency problem and treat shareholders fairly (Black et al., 2006). 
In contrast, several empirical studies disagree with the results that support the 
positive impact of independent directors on the effectiveness of the board and 
company’s performance. A study by Erkens et al., (2012) included thirty countries 
with a sample of 296 firms, concluded that firms with higher number of independent 
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directors in their board have experienced worse stock returns during the global 
financial crises in 2007/2008 than the firms with lower presence of independent 
directors. The study found a negative correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors and the buy-and-hold stock return. These findings are 
inconsistent with O’Sullivan’s (2000) conclusion that high proportion of an 
independent directors result in a higher quality audits and more reliable financial 
statements and related information. In the USA, a considerable number of studies 
concluded a negative association between independent directors and firm 
performance. Both, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); and Yermack (1996), examined 
the impact of board independence on Tobin’s Q and accounting performance 
measures, using a sample of 400 and 452 US listed companies respectively, and 
found a negative association between independent board of directors and Tobin’s Q, 
Return on assets, and Return on Equity. Agrawel and Knoeber (1996) refers this 
negative association to a possible political reasons, where independent non-executive 
directors were appointed to satisfy environmental activists, politicians, or consumer 
representatives, which made these additional independent directors less effective in 
monitoring management and therefore reduced firm performance. 
 Klein (1998) supports the findings of Argawel and Knoeber (1996) and 
Yermack (1996), when he studied a sample of the US companies and found a 
positive association between the proportion of insider directors and the firm’s market 
return and Return on Assets. Klein’s (1998) results are consistent with the theoretical 
views that insider directors are more effective than outsider directors are since they 
have the practical expertise, the knowledge about the company’s operations, and that 
their decisions can be based on facts rather than opinions. Another important study in 
USA which supports the negative association between board independence and firm 
performance is the study by Bhagat and Black (2001) who examined a sample of 957 
large US companies to test the correlation between board independence and firm 
long term performance. Their results reported a strong negative correlation between 
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board independence and firm performance, and that there is no evidence that 
independent directors increase firm performance.  
Abdullah and Page (2009) studied the corporate governance mechanisms in the 
UK using FTSE 350 non-financials and reported a significant negative association 
between independent directors and Sales to Assets ratio. However, they reported a 
positive relationship between board independence and performance when Tobin’s Q 
and Return on Assets measured the performance. Bhagat and Black (2001) suggested 
that having a reasonable number of insiders, even if they are not majority, could add 
an effectiveness and value to the board with high level of experience and expertise. 
Insiders can be motivated by seeing themselves in the CEO position in the future. 
Final possible explanation to the negative association between independent board 
and performance is the difficulty of finding complete independence by directors, for 
instance serving in the board for a long time can damage the independence of the 
director. However, these issues were raised by the recent developments of corporate 
governance codes, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), which 
recommended that to maintain independence, the director should not serve on the 
board for more than nine years. In contrast to the USA, few UK studies have found a 
negative association between board independence and corporate performance.  
In the UK, some studies have failed to report a significant relationship between 
independent board of directors and performance. For example, Weir and Laing 
(2001) studied 320 UK quoted companies to examine the extent in which these 
companies comply with the corporate governance structure recommended by the 
Cadbury Committee, including a significant representation of non‐executive 
directors, and the importance of non‐executive director independence. Their study 
reported that the companies have complied with the recommendations of Cadbury 
committee to large extent; however, they did not report a significant relationship 
between compliance with the recommendations and companies’ performance. This 
suggests that companies complied with the corporate governance best practices just 
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to “tick boxes” and not to be questioned by shareholders rather than believing that it 
can drive better corporate performance.. Furthermore, Weir et al., (2002) found no 
significant relationship between the number of non-executive directors and 
performance of the UK companies. 
El-Faitouri (2014) also investigated the characteristics of board of directors in 
the UK and the impact of these characteristics, including board independence and the 
proportion of non-executive directors in firm performance. He used data for the 
period 1999 to 2009 and a sample of 634 of the UK listed companies, and found that 
there is no relationship between board independence and firm performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q. These results are in consistent with the theory that independent board 
of directors can provide better monitoring mechanism to improve performance. The 
results also question the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014) that having a balance between executive directors and non-executive directors 
can result in an effective board of directors.  
In addition to the UK, many empirical studies on the impact of independent 
directors on firm performance were carried using data from different regions, such as 
US, Australia, and Portugal. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and 
Mehran (1995) studied US companies and found no relationship between the ratio of 
independent directors and the firms’ accounting performance measures, such as 
ROA. In addition to these studies, Zahra and Stanton (1988), and Gani and Jarmias 
(2006) also found no relationship between board independence and firm performance 
in the USA. Gani and Jarmias (2006) stressed that the recommendations of recent 
corporate governance codes are about that independent board of directors can 
enhance firm performance does not apply to all firms. They suggested that the impact 
of independent board of directors on the performance differ systematically between 
different strategies, and therefore management need to consider their firm's 
competitive strategy in determining the level of board independence. Similar 
conclusions were reported by empirical studies in Australia and Portugal. For 
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example, Pham et al., (2008) found no relationship between independent directors 
and Tobin’s Q by testing a sample of 150 top Australian firms. Examining the 
Portuguese stock market, Fernandes (2008) concluded that independent non-
executive directors have no strong monitoring role in Portugal, and that companies 
with no non-executive directors in their board have stronger alignment of interest 
between shareholders and managers.  
Thus, the following Hypotheses can be formulated: 
H2.0: There is no association between board independence and performance 
H2.1: There is a positive association between board independence and performance 
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 Author/s Research examines Region; Sample size; and Period 
covered 
Performance 
variables  
Results 
Erkens et al., (2012) The influence of corporate 
governance on financial firms’ 
performance 
during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis 
30 countries that were at the centre of 
the financial crisis, 296 financial firms 
Buy-and-hold stock 
returns 
Negative relationship between proportion of independent 
directors and firm value 
Fernandes (2008) The Role of 
Independent Board Members on 
performance 
Portuguese Stock Market, 58 
companies (2002-2004) 
Stock Return, and 
Book to Market Ratio 
Non-executive board members do not have a strong 
monitoring role.  companies with zero non-executive board 
members have a stronger alignment between managers and 
shareholders’ interests 
Guest (2009) The Impact of Board Size on Firm 
Performance 
UK, 2,746 listed firms (1981-2002) ROA, Tobin's Q, and 
Share Return 
Negative correlation between board size and performance 
Bhagat & Black 
(2001)  
The Non-Correlation Between 
Board Independence and Long 
Term Firm Performance 
USA 957 large U.S. public 
corporations (early 1991) 
Sales to Asset; Tobin's 
Q, and ROA 
Strong inverse correlation between firm performance in the 
recent past and board independence. However, there is no 
evidence that greater board independence leads to improved 
firm performance 
Coles et al., (2008)  The relation between firm value and 
board structure 
USA, 8,165 firm  (1992-2001) Tobin’s Q, and ROA Negative association between the fraction of independent 
directors and TQ 
Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) 
Mechanisms to control agency 
problems  
USA- Forbes 400 firms  1988 Tobin’s Q Negative correlation between Outsiders and Tobin's Q 
Yermack (1996) Board Size and Firm Value USA- 452 firms 1984-1991 Tobin’s Q and ROA Negative relationship between independent board and both 
performance measures 
 ZainalAbidin et al., 
(2009) 
Board structure and corporate 
performance 
Malaysia 75 companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia 
The value added (VA) 
efficiency of the 
firm’s physical and 
intellectual resources 
Positive correlation with long term performance 
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Author/s Research examines Region; Sample size; and Period 
covered 
Performance 
variables  
Results 
Noor & Fadzil (2013) Board Characteristics and 
Performance 
Malaysia 162 publicly listed non-
financial companies (2006 and 2008) 
ROA Positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance 
Prevost et al., (2002) Board composition and performance NewZeland 607 firm (1991-1997) Capital expenditure Positive relationship between the proportion of outside board 
members 
Lin et al., (2009) Size and composition of US boards 
and performance 
82 US companies that survived during 
the period 1935-2000 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
Positive relationship  
Dahya & McConnell 
(2007) 
Board composition and corporate 
performance 
UK 1,124 firms (1989 -1996) Accounting earnings 
and stock prices 
Strongly suggest that adding outside directors led to improved 
performance 
by U.K. firms and increased value for shareholders 
O’Sullivan (2000) The Impact of Board Composition 
and 
Ownership on Audit Quality: 
Evidence 
From Large UK Companies 
UK 310 firms (1992-1994) Transparency and 
disclosure  
Positive association between number of non-executive 
directors and extensive auditing 
Rosenstein & Wyatt 
(1997) 
Whether insider managers adds 
board efficiency or entrenchment 
purposes 
USA 170 non-contaminated’ 
announcements of the appointment of 
an inside director to the hoard of a 
NYSE 
or ASE corporation 
(1981- 1985) 
Average stock market 
reaction 
No stock market reaction when an insider director is 
announced appointed, while a positive reaction is observed 
when outside directors is appointed  
Schellenger et al., 
(1989) 
Board of directors, dividends 
policies and shareholders wealth 
526 US COMPANIES ROA, ROE, RET, and 
RET/STD 
Positive relationship 
Baysinger & Butler 
(1985) 
The effect of board composition on 
corporate performance 
US- 266 firms 1970 and 1980 ROE Positive Relationship 
Muravyev et al., 
(2014) 
Performance Effects of Appointing 
Other Firms' Executive Directors to 
Corporate Boards 
UK Operational Profit 
Margin; ROE, and 
Tobin's Q 
Positive Relationship 
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Author/s Research examines Region; Sample size; and Period 
covered 
Performance 
variables  
Results 
Mura (2007) The relation between firm 
performance and both ownership 
structure and board 
composition 
UK- 1100 nonfinancial firms 1991-
2001 
Tobin’s Q Positive Relationship 
Abdullah & Page 
(2009) 
Corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance in FTSE 350 
NON-FINANCIALS 
UK 363 companies 1999 to 2004 TQ, ROA, sales to 
assets 
Negative with Sales to assets ratio. Positive with TQ and ROA 
Pham et al., (2008) Corporate Governance mechanisms 
and alternative performance 
measures 
Australia top 150 Australian firms by 
market capitalisation from 1994 to 
2003 
Tobin’s Q and Stern 
Stewart’s EVA 
No relationship 
Weir et al., (2002) Outside directors and role duality UK sample of 311 non-financial listed 
UK 
companies 1994 to 1996 
Tobin's Q No relationship 
Weir & Laing (2001)   The extent of compliance with the 
governance structures 
recommended by the Cadbury 
Committee 
UK 320 quoted UK companies. 1995-
1996  
ROA The results suggest that the argument 
that non-executive directors may be less well 
informed about the business, is more 
persuasive than the one that regards them 
primarily as a monitoring mechanism 
Klein (1998) Board Committee structure and firm 
performance 
USA S&P 500 firms 
1992-1993 
ROA, market 
returns, and Jensen‘s 
productivity 
measures 
No systematic association between 
the two measures if directors are partitioned into insiders, 
outsiders, 
and affiliates 
Mehran (1995) Executive compensation structure, 
ownership, and firm performance 
US- 153 firms 1979-1980 Tobin’s Q and ROA No relationship between percentage of outside directors and 
performance 
Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1991) 
The Effects of Board Composition 
and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance 
USA - 134 firms 1971-1983 Tobin’s Q & ROA Insignificant relationship with accounting performance  
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Author/s Research examines Region; Sample size; and Period 
covered 
Performance 
variables  
Results 
Zahra & Stanton 
(1988) 
The implications of boards of 
directors composition for corporate 
strategy and performance 
US- 100 firms 1980 to 1983 ROA and ROE No Relationship 
Gani & Jarmias 
(2006) 
The effect of board independence 
on performance across different 
strategies 
USA 436 firm (1997-2001) ROE No Relationship 
El-Faitouri (2014) Board characteristics and Tobin’s Q UK, 634 UK listed companies (1999 - 
2009)   
TQ No Relationship 
Table 3.2 Summary of main empirical studies on Board Independence and performance 
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3.4.1.3. Board Ownership and performance 
3.4.1.3.1. Theoretical literature  
The main features of corporate governance, in terms of corporate ownership in 
the UK and the USA is a dispersed ownership, while in other developed economies, 
such as Italy, the equity ownership is concentrated in individuals and families. The 
dominant empirical research on corporate ownership and performance is mainly 
based on Berle and Mean’s (1932) argument that the agency problem increases with 
the increased level of dispersed ownership, where the separation between ownership 
and control is high, and where the executives have full control over the company’s 
resources and decisions.  
Recent studies in the UK and the USA challenged the argument of Berle and 
Mean (1932) by studying the impact of ownership structure on firm performance in 
economies with blockholders base (Holderness, 2003, Anderson et al., 2007; 
Agrawal & Knoeber, 2012). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency 
problems is not the shareholders’ problem but the managers’ problem, where 
managers need to implement effective governance mechanisms, otherwise no one 
would entrust funds to them. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argued that the 
problem of conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, which can be 
caused by the agency theory, could be mitigated by unifying the interests of 
shareholders with those of the managers. Scholars argued that one means of aligning 
the interests of management with those of shareholders is for management to hold an 
equity stake in the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fernandes, 2008; Carrillo, 
2007). Furthermore, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) unifying the interest 
of managers and shareholders can be achieved not only through financial incentives, 
but also through non-financial incentives. Hence, the expectation is that offering 
shares to insiders will align their interests to the interests of shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) assumed a linear relationship between insiders’ ownership and firm 
performance.  
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However, it has been suggested by Papanikolaou and Panousi (2012) that the 
higher the proportion of share ownership by managers, the more sensitive the firm’s 
equity and investment to the influence of specific risk, and that therefore the firm 
will be more risk averse. However, according to Jensen and Meckilng (1976) and 
Gugler et al., (2008), external shareholders become less effective monitors when the 
company has a widely dispersed ownership. When managers have large share 
ownership in the company they become very powerful, and therefore they dominate 
the board, and the risk of conflict between them and outside shareholders increases 
and they become difficult to remove (entrenched). 
Hence, from the agency theory perspective, in order to maximise shareholder 
value, it is essential to provide managers with an incentives in order to motivate them 
to increase their efforts and to enhance the firm’s performance, and to, therefore, 
increase financial returns for shareholders (Holderness, 2003, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Leblebici & Fiegenbaum, 1986). The theoretical framework of corporate 
governance identifies two main hypotheses that relate to the level of the impact of 
managerial ownership on corporate performance; these are the convergence of 
interest hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis (Fraile & Fradejas, 2013; Chen 
et al., 2012, Morck et al., 1998). The convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that 
firm performance (and hence market value) should increase along with an increase in 
managerial share ownership (Morck et al., 1998). This, according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), aligns the interest of managers (the agents) to the interest of the 
shareholders (the principals). In contrast, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that 
an increase in managerial ownership can have a negative impact on firm 
performance. In other words, as managerial ownership increases, firm performance 
deteriorates (Sultz, 1988; Morck et al., 1998) because it is hard for external 
shareholders to dismiss managers who hold a large proportion of equity.  
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3.4.1.3.2. Empirical literature 
There are various number empirical researches on managerial ownership and 
corporate performance in many different regions (Barnhart & Rosenstein 1998; 
Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Davies et al., 2005; 
Guedri & Hollands, 2008; Bos, et al., 2013). According to Sultz (1988), the 
performance of the firm can improve with a low proportion of managerial ownership. 
However, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance can 
become negative when the managers own a large proportion of the firm’s share 
capital. Sultz’s (1988) conclusion was confirmed by Morck et al., (1998) who 
concluded that a positive association between managerial ownership and firm 
performance exists when managers own less than five per cent of the firm’s share 
capital and between 25 per cent and 100 per cent of the share capital. While a 
negative correlation existed when managerial, ownership was between five per cent 
and 25 per cent of the total firm’s share capital.  
Hu and Zhou (2008) examined the relationship between the level of managerial 
ownership and corporate performance in China using a sample of 1500 non-listed 
Chinese companies. Their results indicated that the relation between managerial 
ownership and Return on Assets is a non-linear relationship, where the correlation is 
positive when the ownership is below 53% and negative when it exceeds 53%. In 
addition, Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) also examined the association between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance (measured by Tobin’Q), using 321 
US companies. They reported some support for the curvilinear association between 
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q, when they concluded a positive relationship 
with low and large proportions of managerial ownership, and negative relationship 
between intermediate level of managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. These results 
support the argument of Sults (1988), and it confirms the empirical findings of 
Morck et al., (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990).  
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) examined the relationship between insiders’ 
ownership and Tobin’s Q and concluded an evidence of U-Shaped association 
between the proportion of managerial ownership and corporate performance. This 
implies that at intermediate levels of ownership, the more managers are involved in 
the firm ownership, the more likely is they manage the firm’s resources to their own 
benefit interests and will neglect the interests of the firm in general, which can have a 
negative impact on firm performance overall (Morck et al., 1998). In addition to 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck et al., (1998), a considerable number of 
empirical studies on US companies concluded either non-linear association or no 
relationship between managerial ownership and performance. For instance, Wruck 
(1989), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al., (1999), and Holderness 
et al., (1999), studied the association between insiders’ ownership and firm 
performance, measured by Cumulative Abnormal Return (Wruck, 1989); Tobin’s Q 
and accounting performance measures such as ROA (Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness et al., 1999). All these three studies concluded a 
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and the performance measures 
used.  
However, the non-linear association conclusion is not consistent with many 
other studies in the USA. For example, Cho (1998) with a sample of 326 large US 
companies reported that there is no relationship between the level of managerial 
ownership and performance (measured by Tobi’s Q). Furthermore, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985); Denis and Denis (1994); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), also reported no association between managerial ownership 
and different accounting and market performance measures (such as Tobin’s Q; 
ROE; and ROA). These results are inconsistent with the solutions provided by 
different scholars, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), about mitigating agency 
theory problems, in particular the issue of linking the interest of board of directors to 
those for the shareholders.  
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In Europe, the empirical results on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance are mix. Kole (1996) interpreted the cross-sectional 
relation between management ownership and firm performance in different European 
countries, and found a negative association between managerial ownership at all 
levels and Tobin’s Q. However, another study by Thomsen and Pedersen (1999) 
sampled the EU countries and found that Return on Equity is insignificantly 
decreasing with managerial ownership concentration. On the other hand, recent 
studies by Guedri and Hollandts (2008); Schmid and Zimmermann (2008); and 
Singhchawla et al., (2010) in France, Switzerland, and Thailand respectively, 
supported the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance.  Guedri and Hollandts (2008), reported a positive correlation between 
very low proportion of managerial ownership (below 1.67 per cent), and Market to 
Book, as well as Return on Invested Capital, and a negative association at over 1.67 
per cent. Schmid and Zimmermann (2008), using a sample of Swiss companies, 
concluded a positive relationship between managerial ownership for a level between 
0% and 37.3%, and Tobin’s Q, and a negative association for a level of managerial 
ownership of more than 37.3%. Furthermore, Grosfeld (2006), tested companies 
listed in the Warsaw Stock Exchange and found a positive association between all 
levels of managerial ownership and performance. In contrast, some of the US studies 
concluded a positive association between insiders’ ownership and performance 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Bhagat & Bolton 2008) , which supports the argument of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managerial ownership can help in aligning the 
interest of board of directors to the interest of shareholders and therefore reducing the 
agency problem.   
Similar to the USA, many empirical studies in the UK reported either non-
linear correlation between managerial ownership and performance, or a negative 
association (Short & Keasey, 1999; Leech & Leahy, 1991; Curcio, 1994; Faccio & 
Lasfer, 1999; Davies et al., 2005; Pawlina & Renneboog, 2005; Florackis, 2005; Bos, 
et al., 2013). Short and Keasey (1999) concluded that there was evidence of 
86 
 
alignment behaviour at low levels of managerial ownership and entrenchment 
behaviour at intermediate levels. Davies et al., (2005) argued that there are three 
external factors, which influence the tendency of the management to satisfy 
shareholders and maximise their wealth. These factors are external market, internal 
control mechanisms, and convergence of interest. Davies et al., (2005) analysed the 
relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q using 802 UK companies, 
and they concluded firm performance, level of managerial ownership firm level of 
investment of investment, are interdependent variables. Furthermore, they concluded 
non-linear correlation between managerial ownership and firm performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q). In addition to Short and Keasey (1999) and Davies et al., 
(2005), many other UK empirical studies have supported the entrenchment 
hypothesis of managerial behaviour with the increase of their share ownership. For 
instance, Curcio (1994) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) reported a non-linear 
relationship. They concluded that profitability is significantly decreasing with board 
ownership in the 25-100% range of ownership with regard to Tobin’s Q. Pawlina and 
Renneboog (2005); Florackis (2005); and Bos et al (2013) studied the impact of 
managerial ownership on firm performance in the UK. They concluded that 
shareholder wealth is maximised when equity ownership by executive directors is 
below the 5% or above 15%. Share ownership by executives between 5% and 15% 
was found to lead to a declining firm performance. Florackis (2005) studied the 
impact of managerial ownership on Tobin’s Q using a sample of 962 UK non-
financial companies and concluded that managerial ownership work as substitutes in 
mitigating agency problems. In contrast, Leech and Leahy (1991, p 1418) stressed 
that “The structure of share ownership may have an important role in determining a 
firm's performance because if ownership is widely dispersed there is no individual 
(or group) with either the voting power or the incentive to exercise control and 
enforce profit maximisation”. They investigated the impact of managerial ownership 
concentration on Return on Equity and market value using a sample of 470 UK-listed 
companies from a wide range of industries, and found a negative association between 
managerial ownership and Return on Equity.  
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In summary, empirical studies on the relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance can be classified under three main categories. Category 
one are the studies which their results supported the Convergence of Interest 
Hypothesis, that with high managerial ownership, the interest of the board of 
directors will be aligned with the interest of shareholders. Therefore, the agency 
problem can be reduced, and therefore their findings were a positive linear 
correlation between managerial ownership and performance (such as Steer & Cable, 
1978; Crossan, 2011; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). The second category consists of 
studies that support a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance. Such non-linear association could be a quadratic relationship (Hu & 
Zhou, 2008; Barnhart & Rosenstein 1998; Guedri & Hollands, 2008; Singhchawla et 
al., 2010) or a cubic relationship (Bos et al., 2013; Belghitar et al., 2011; Cui & Mak, 
2002). According to these studies, managerial ownership can have a positive 
association with the performance when their ownership level is below a specific 
percentage (because of the convergence effect), and a negative association between 
managerial ownership and performance when the level of ownership is above a 
specific percentage (because of the entrenchment effect). The final category of 
empirical studies found a negative correlation between managerial ownership and 
performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999; Kole, 1996). Studies that support the 
negative relationship between managerial ownership and performance argue that 
managerial ownership cannot influence the performance of the company because it is 
determined endogenously. For example, company size and return on assets can 
influence the ownership structure (Demstez, 1985). Thus, the Hypotheses that can be 
developed here are as follows: 
H3.0: There is no association between the percentages of shares owned by insiders and 
performance 
H3.1: There is a positive association between the percentages of shares owned by insiders 
and performance 
H3.2: There is a non-linear association between the percentages of shares owned by insiders 
and performance.  
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 Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Barnhart & 
Rosenstein (1998) 
1990 Standard and Poor’s 500, 
321 firms 
Tobin's Q Curvilinear relation between managerial ownership and performance posited; Positive association 
with low and large proportions of managerial ownership….Negative association for intermediate 
proportions of managerial ownership 
Hu & Zhou (2008) China ROA Positive association at below 53% ….. Negative association at above 53% 
Guedri & Hollandts 
(2008) 
France Market to Book and Return on 
Invested Capital 
Positive association with very low proportion of managerial ownership (below 1.67%)….. 
Negative association at over 1.67% 
Schmid & 
Zimmermann (2008) 
Switzerland TQ Positive association for a level of managerial ownership between 0% and 37.3% Negative 
association for a level of managerial ownership of more than 37.3% 
Singhchawla et al., 
(2010) 
Thailand TQ Positive association with low proportion of managerial ownership…..Negative association with 
high proportion of managerial ownership 
Curcio (1994) UK (1972-1986) Tobin’s Q ; Total factor 
productivity 
Non-linear relationship 
Short & Keasey 
(1999) 
UK- 1988-1992 RSE and VAL Non-linear relationship 
Faccio & Lasfer 
(1999) 
UK- 1996-1997 Accounting rate, Tobin’s Q, and 
market to book 
Non-linear relationship 
Davies et al., (2005) UK- 1996-1997 Tobin’s Q Non-linear relationship 
Pawlina & 
Renneboog (2005) 
UK (985 firms) Investment cash flow sensitivity Significantly positive relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and insider 
ownership is S-shaped 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Bos et al., (2013) 
 
 
 
UK (held equity stakes by 
executive and non-executive 
directors for 
firms listed on the FTSE All 
Share Index of the London 
Stock Exchange and with 
financial 
years ending in 2004/2005) 
  Shareholder wealth is maximised when equity ownership by 
executive directors is below the 5%; or above the 15% equity; Share ownership by executives 
between 5% and 15% is found to lead to declining firm performance 
Florackis (2005) UK ( 962 non-financial UK 
listed firms) 
Tobin's Q Non-linear relationship 
Khurshed et al., 
(2011) 
UK (around 800 UK listed Companies  
of FTSE All Shares) 
Non-linear relationship 
Holderness et al., 
(1999) 
US- 1995 Tobin’s Q Non-linear relationship 
Wruck (1989) US- 1979-1985 Cumulative abnormal return Non-linear relationship 
Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1991) 
US- 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 
and 1983 
Tobin’s Q Non-linear relationship 
McConnell & 
Servaes (1990) 
US- 1976 and 1986 Tobin’s Q Non-linear relationship 
McConnell & 
Servaes (1995) 
US- 1977-1988 Tobin’s Q Non-linear relationship with insider and positive impact with external 
Himmelberg et al., 
1999 
US- 400 companies from 
1982-1992 Fixed effects- 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Non-linear relationship 
Belghitar et al., 
(2011) 
 
USA (NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ 
Total Stock Performance (TSP) Negative association with low and large proportions of managerial ownership….Positive 
association with intermediate proportions of managerial ownership 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Cui & Mak (2002) 
 
USA (NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ) 
Tobin’s Q Negative association with low and large proportions of managerial ownership...Positive 
association with intermediate proportion of managerial ownership 
Morck et al., (1988) USA 1980 Tobin’s Q and accounting profit 
ratios 
Non-linear relationship 
Nickell et al., (1997) UK 1985-1994 Productivity growth rate Positive relationship 
Keasey et al., (1994) 
 
UK small and medium sized 
UK firms. 
1986-88. 
Return on Assets. Positive relationship 
Pope et al., (1990) 
 
UK 82 large UK firms. 
15 in food, 8 in brewing, 12 in 
electrical, 23 in mechanical 
engineering and 19 in 
distributive trades. 1967-71. 
  Managers make abnormal returns when trading in their firm's stock. 
Steer & Cable (1978) UK 82 large firms. Return on equity. 2) Return on 
assets. 3) Return on sales 
Positive relationship 
Crossan (2011) UK 406  Listed companies Tobin’s Q Positive relationship 
Bhagat & Bolton 
(2008) 
 
US- 1990-2002; 1990-2003; 
1990-2004 
Risk-adjusted Shareholder 
Return and operating Rate of 
Return. 
Positive relationship 
Anderson & Reeb 
(2003) 
US- 356 US listed firms, 
1979-85 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Positive relationship 
Grosfeld (2006) 
 
Warsaw Stock Exchange Tobin’s Q Positive relationship 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Cho (1998) US- 1991 Tobin’s Q No relationship 
Holderness & 
Sheehan (1988) 
US- 1979-1980 Q and ROE No relationship 
Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) 
US- 1987 Tobin’s Q No relationship 
Mehran (1995) 
 
US- 1980 and 1981 Tobin’s Q and ROA No relationship 
Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) 
US- 1976, 1986, and 1988 Tobin‘s Q Accounting profit rate No relationship 
Loderer & Martin 
(1997) 
US- 1992-1999 Tobin’s Q No relationship 
Agrawal & 
Mandelker (1990) 
USA Cumulative abnormal return No relationship 
Eckbo & Smith 
(1998) 
 
Denmark (18,301 insider 
trades on Oslo Stock 
Exchange for 247 securities at 
197 firms) 
Average monthly abnormal 
return using equal weighted 
CAPM 
No relationship 
Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985) 
US- 511 companies, 1980, and 
1983 
Post-Tax accounting Profit/Book 
value of equity 
No relationship 
Denis & Denis 
(1994) 
 
 
US- 1985 ROE, ROA, Operating income 
to assets, Tobin’s Q, and market 
to book value. 
No relationship 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Thomsen & Pedersen 
(1999) 
 
EU (518 firms selected among 
the 100 largest non-financial 
companies in 12 EU 
countries) 
Return on equity. Negative relationship 
Kole (1996) 
 
Europe TQ Negative association at all levels 
Leech & Leahy 
(1991) 
UK Market value / Share capital;  
ROS; ROE 
Negative relationship 
Table 3.3 Summary of main empirical studies on managerial ownership and performance
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3.4.2. Blockholders and performance 
During the past years, typical ownership structure has been described as 
‘dispersed’ (Berle & Means, 1932). Recently, however, it has become more 
concentrated (Strivens et al., 2007). According to Dobson (1994), the transformation 
of UK institutional ownership has been appearing more clearly over the past 40 years 
where the proportion of institutional shareholding in UK listed companies has grown 
steadily to the point where they represent the dominant shareholder class.  
The importance of blockholding depends on the identity of the blockholders 
and their level of activism and involvement in controlling and monitoring the board 
of directors (Thomsen & Pederson, 2000). According to Holdernsess (2003) there are 
different factors influencing investors to hold significant equity in a company. This 
includes the benefits of having control (privately or jointly with other significant 
shareholders) and enjoying a large proportion of profits. According to Frank and 
Mayer (1997), blockholders can be classified into different categories based on their 
type (for example insurance companies, trusts, pension funds, banks, state, family 
group, and institutional investors) and/or the percentage of ownership. The increased 
development and importance of institutional investors is one of the most important 
factors in the global capital market since the middle of the twentieth century. This 
development has not only taken place in developed markets but also in the emerging 
countries (Khorana et al., 2006).  
In the United States there has been an increase in institutional investment from 
around 6 per cent in 1950 to over 50 per cent in 2002 (Mallin, 2006), and over 60% 
in 2013 (Investment Company Institute, 2013). In the European Union, the total 
financial assets held by institutional investors increased more than threefold between 
since 1992 till 2012. Individual ownership of shares in UK listed companies has 
declined from 54% in 1963, to less than 18% in 1993, and continued to fall  to reach 
around 4% in 2012 (Offices of National Statistics, 2013). On the other side, there has 
been a dramatic increase in institutional investment in the UK. For instance in 1998  
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“60% of the shares in listed UK companies are held by UK institutions - pension 
funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts. Of the remaining 40%, 
about half are owned by individuals and half by overseas owners, mainly institutions. 
(The Hampel Report, 1998, p. 40), while by 2013, around 90% of the UK publicly 
listed equities were held by institutional investors (Celik & Isaksson, 2014). This 
growth of institutional investors has created a new type of professional shareholder, 
who are capable to practice the functions of corporate governance as suggested and 
recommended by different corporate governance codes and reports, such as the 
Stewardship Code, and the Myners report9 (Davis, 2005).  
3.4.2.1. Theoretical literature  
Stapledon (1996) argued that monitoring by blockholders, in particular 
institutional blockholders, is one aspect of an extensive subject and there are market 
powers, which can be managed to diminish the variance between the interests of 
directors and shareholders. The importance of institutional blockholders in financial 
markets and in corporate governance has been developed over the last two decades. 
According to Bebchuck and Fried (2003), institutional investors as shareholders have 
changed from being a cause of agency problems to becoming a means of solving 
them, they are now in the best position to control the management of the company 
and aid in uniting the objectives of the directors with those of the shareholders.  
The effects of the role of institutional investors differ depending on the kind of 
the institution and the country. Davis (2005, p 1) stressed that “the behaviour and 
impact of institutional investors might differ in emerging market economies from 
advanced countries as well as policy issues”. Thus, the role of institutional 
shareholders in delivering good corporate governance practice is the subject of 
continuing debate. According to agency theory the board of directors is responsible 
for monitoring managers and their performance, and, according to Gillan and Starks 
9 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.6. 
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(2003), if the shareholders, including institutional shareholders, are not satisfied with 
the board’s performance, then practicing their voting rights and control capability 
effectively can impact on the effectiveness of the board of directors. For instance, 
Davis (2005) argued that due to the divorce between ownership and control in 
corporations, principal-agent problems arise because shareholders cannot completely 
control managers’ actions to pursue them to work for their interest.  
Executives have a good amount of information about the company and its 
business, and their compensation is linked to the level of the firm’s profitability. 
This, according to Davis (2005) gives the managers the incentive to direct the funds 
in many different ways away from the shareholders and leads to a low profitability. 
Institutional investors can play an important role in reducing such problems, because 
of their greater bargaining power over other individual shareholders. Roe (1991) 
argued that the causes of agency problems are not exclusively based on the 
separation between ownership and control, and, in corporations where the ownership 
structure is highly diffused, there are no incentives for small shareholders to be 
active in monitoring the board for better performance. This is because in the case of 
small individual ownership, the cost of monitoring the board will be expensive and 
the benefits will be shared with other shareholders who do not bear any extra costs 
(the “free rider” problem). In contrast, large shareholders bear similar costs in 
monitoring the performance of board of directors and can cheaply form coalitions to 
remedy the problems of separation of ownership and control identified by agency 
theory (Shliefer & Vishny, 1997). 
Institutional investors are now becoming more involved in decision making, 
and have all the support they need from the new codes to encourage them to be more 
active. Smith (1996) argued that the influence of institutional investors has increased 
and the increased level of monitoring they apply is one feature of ‘shareholder 
activism’. Solomon (2004) stressed that the monitoring role of institutional investors 
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is becoming increasingly important, as they have grown so large and influential, at 
the same time gaining significant ownership concentration. 
The ownership structure of a company can be influenced by different elements, 
such as capital market strength and legal framework and regulations. For example, a 
strong protection of minority shareholders’ rights can result on less concentrated 
ownership and more diffused based ownership structure, such as in the UK and the 
USA (Anderson et al., 2007). According to Berle and Means (1932), widely diffused 
ownership can have a negative impact on the firm performance because of the weak 
monitoring power that small shareholders have. Hence, concentrated ownership 
increases the incentives of the blockholders to seek information about the company 
and to monitor executives more effectively due to their large interest in in the 
company.  
According to Holdereness (2003), blockholders have an incentive to monitor 
and put pressure on the board of directors to increase the value of the firm since they 
have a large share of the company and therefore receive a large percentage of the 
company’s profit. Large shareholders, in particular institutional shareholders such as 
pension funds and mutual funds, have been viewed by many studies as effective and 
sophisticated investors who can promote and encourage good corporate governance 
practices across the corporation, due to their extensive experience in monitoring 
management (Hope, 2013). Large blockholders not only have low monitoring costs 
relative to the returns they receive, they also have low coalition costs for acting in 
concert with other blockholders because they are few in number. Shareholders expect 
long term benefits from their investments. Therefore, they seek to control the actions 
of directors who are managing their corporations poorly, and in such a case, the 
shareholders become more active than if the company is performing well (Gillan & 
Starkes, 2002). In other words, if the directors are performing in the shareholders’ 
interests, there will no reaction from the shareholders who will be passive in terms of 
their contribution to shareholder activism (Monks, 1998).  
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One of the main debates that have been held amongst scholars is that on 
shareholder activism and the essential role of the institutional investor in corporate 
performance in invested companies (Morck et al., 1988). According to Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), shareholder activism can reduce the agency problem and help 
achieve positive financial performance and bring financial rewards, so that 
monitoring a company’s management more efficiently can produce a good result in 
the company performance. In addition to this, Gillan and Starks (2003) argued that 
large investors also provide a credible mechanism for transmitting information to 
other investors. For instance, Chidambaran and John (2000) argued that large 
institutional investors play an important role in transmitting private information on 
corporate management to other shareholders. In another words, small shareholders 
can benefit from the presence of large institutional shareholders by obtaining a 
considerable amount of information on the managers’ practices and actions 
managing the firm, which would be very expensive for small individual shareholders 
but is relatively less so for large institutional investors and those of large non-
institutional blockholders. Institutional investors may not monitor the board perfectly 
due to their own agency problems, but because there are not enough large individual 
blockholders to provide a perfect, more efficient monitoring service, then monitoring 
carried out by institutional investors is welcomed by the shareholders (Gorton & 
Kahl, 1999).  
However, in some cases blockholders may not have positive impact on the firm 
performance, and the enough incentives to effectively and actively monitor the 
managers’ performance, and reduce agency cost. This can be due to the expensive 
monitoring cost, which also can create the problem of “free riding” for small 
shareholders. In addition, blockhoders can have a negative impact on the firm 
performance because of the entrenchment effect. For instance, blockholders can 
monitor the managers in the direction that they act for their interest rather than the 
other shareholders’ interest. According to Agrawal and Knober (2012), because 
blockholders can have more influence on the company’s monitoring activities due to 
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their expertise and interest, they can use their power in their own interests, and not in 
the interests of all shareholders.  
One of the issues related to agency cost is “tunnelling”, which is the transfer of 
firm resources by large and influential shareholders to another company that they 
have larger interest in, without considering the interest of minority shareholders. In 
addition, directors may only be concerned with providing something as a payback for 
the shareholders to secure their current job as well as trying to provide future 
benefits. Karpoff (2001) argued that increasing pressure on managers would not help 
in reducing agency costs, because this forces the managers to plan a strategy for the 
short term, which may affect negatively the financial performance of the company 
for the long term.  
3.4.2.2. Empirical literature 
The theoretical framework of the impact of blockholder ownership and 
corporate performance suggests that companies with more blockholders perform 
better than companies with small number of significant shareholders. However, 
empirical conclusions are not unified behind this suggestion, where some researchers 
suggests that institutional blockholders are not investing their own money and 
therefore there is no incentive for them to play an active role in monitoring, which 
suggests that there is no relationship between the level of institutional shareholders 
and corporate performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) studied a sample of 456 of 
the Fortune 500 firms and reported a positive association between block ownership 
and firm performance. They suggested that this positive relationship could be 
explained by that with a block ownership the incentives for the blockholder to 
actively collect information and effectively monitor the executives of the company 
are high. This means higher block ownership reduces one of the major problems 
identified by the agency theory, which is the problem of information asymmetry, and 
pursuing managers to work for the interests of shareholders.  
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In addition to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), other studies also studied the impact 
of the fractions of shares owned by institutional shareholders and firm performance. 
They found a significant positive association between institutional blockholding and 
different performance measures, such as McConnell and Servaes (1990) Tobin’s Q; 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) market-to-book value of equity, and ROA; Maury and 
Pajuste (2005), ROA and Tobin’s Q; Ibrahimy and Ahmad (2012) Tobin’s Q and 
ROE. The results of these studies confirmed the Grossman and Hart (1982) 
conclusion, who documented a positive relationship between external blockholding 
and firm performance due to the strong incentives that the blockholders have to 
control the opportunistic behaviour of the executive directors. Studies in Japan also 
found a positive linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, confirming that with higher concentration of equity ownership 
blockholders will be actively controlling managers’ behaviour, which can have a 
positive impact on performance (Cable & Yasuki, 1985; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
2002).  
La Porta et al., (2002) examined the sensitivity of Tobin’s Q to highly 
concentrated ownership based on the level of shareholder’s protection using a sample 
of 539 large companies from 27 wealthy economies, including the UK, the USA, 
Switzerland, and Germany, and found a positive association between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. In addition, they found that lower sensitivity of 
Tobin’s Q to ownership concentration in countries with poor investor protection. 
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) examined the impact of concentrated ownership on 
the monitoring role of shareholders using a sample of US companies, and 
documented a result that supports the positive linear correlation between 
concentrated ownership and performance, arguing that the increase in blockholding 
ownership can increase the effectiveness of the monitoring managers and therefore 
positively influencing firm performance.  
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Recent studies in UK concluded a positive impact of institutional blockholders 
on firm performance, and reducing the agency theory problems. For instance, 
Habbash (2013) studied the impact of blockhholder ownership on the audit 
committee effectiveness using the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 
2007 and concluded that effectiveness of the audit committee is moderated with the 
increase of blockholders ownership. In addition to Habbash (2013) study, Al-Najjar 
(2014) also examined the importance of blockholders ownership on the quality of the 
information disclosed in the annual reports. The study used a sample of 238 non-
financial UK listed companies (the original sample population comprised of the top 
500 non-financial UK-listed companies by total market capitalization). Al-Najjar 
(2014) concluded a positive association between the level of institutional 
blockholders ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure of forward-looking 
information, which means that the existence of institutional blockholdings reduces 
the issue of information asymmetry, which can be caused by the separation between 
ownership and control.  
On the other side, other empirical findings reported a negative association 
between the size of blockholdings and firm performance; suggesting that 
shareholders with large proportion of equity do not appear to, effectively, monitor 
management (Mudambi & Nicosia, 1998; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Hughes, 
2005; Mura, 2007). Tang et al., (2012) concluded that when large shareholders sell 
their majority assets in a listed company this improves the Tobin’s Q of the 
corporation, suggesting that the absence of large shareholders creates a positive 
impact on the company’s performance.  Maury and Pajuste (2005) stressed that the 
association between large shareholders and firm performance is largely influenced by 
the number of blockholders, and the type of those block holders and their identity.  
Similarly, Seifert et al., (2005) studied the impact of the proportion of equity 
owned by blockholders and firm performance using a sample from USA, UK, 
Germany, and Japan, and found conflicting results between blockholdings owned by 
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institutional shareholders and those owned by non-institutional shareholders. They 
documented a positive association between institutional blockholdings and firm 
performance, while they found a negative association between individual 
blockholders and performance in USA. However, their results regarding Germany 
reported no relationship between institutional shareholding and performance, and 
low significant positive coefficient between individual blockholding and 
performance. Regarding UK, Seitfer et al., (2005) found a significant negative 
impact on performance by outsider blockholders. These mixed findings by Seitfer et 
al., (2005), shows that blockholders effect on firm performance does not only depend 
on their type and identity (as reported by Maury & Pajuste, 2005), but also on their 
location.  
The Seifert et al., (2005) conclusions were also confirmed by Thomsen et al., 
(2006) who studied the effect of blockholders’ ownership on performance using a 
sample from largest companies in the European Union and the USA. They found no 
effect on firm value by blockholders in Anglo-American based economies, while a 
significant negative association between high proportion of blockholder ownership 
and firm value and accounting profitability in Continental Europe. Thomsen et al., 
(2006) stressed that their results do not necessarily suggest that blockholders in 
Continental Europe have less monitory effect on managers than those of USA and 
UK, but they suggest that the level of blockholders ownership in Continental Europe 
exceeded the optimal level of ownership that can provide effective monitoring to 
management and increase firm value.  
Many studies reported a non-linear relationship between blockholders and 
performance. For instance, a study in Spain by Miguel et al., (2004) predicted a 
quadratic association between ownership concentration and firm performance. Their 
results suggested that when a blockholder owns a low proportion of equity, the 
results shows a positive correlation between blockholdings and firm performance. 
Gugler et al., (2004) found a cubic association between blockholding and firm 
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performance, and argued that with a small ownership of shares, the monitoring 
incentives by the blockholder increase which result in increase in firm performance. 
When the blockholders ownership level exceeds a specific proportion, Gugler et al., 
(2004) study reported a negative association between the level of ownership 
concentration and performance due to the entrenchment effect, which can have a 
negative influence on blockholders’ activism, and their performance. However, a 
very high level of block ownership is positively associated with the firm 
performance. A study by Khurshed et al., (2011) examined the extent to which 
directors’ ownership and board composition affect the level of institutional 
blockholding in the UK, with a sample covering the FTSE All Shares Index. They 
reported consistent evidence of a negative association between institutional 
blockholding and insiders’ ownership, suggesting that institutional shareholders view 
higher insider ownership as an effective internal control mechanism, which can 
reduce the agency theory problem of conflict of interest between the agent and the 
shareholder. A recent study by Moshirian et al., (2014), involved 37 countries with a 
sample 20,883 firm-year observations for the period from 2006 to 2009 (1774 
observations from UK), concluded a non-linear association between blockholding 
and performance (U-shaped relationship). The study documented a negative 
association between firm performance and low level of blockholder control, and then 
a positive correlation with higher control rights. Hence, based on the previous 
theoretical and empirical literature the following hypotheses are developed: 
H4.0: There is no association between the percentages of shares owned by 
blockholders and performance 
H4.1: There is a positive association between the percentages of shares owned by 
blockholders and performance 
H5.0: There is no Association between the percentages of shares owned by 
institutional blockholders and performance 
H5.1: There is a positive Association between the percentages of shares owned by 
institutional blockholders and performance 
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 Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Shleifer & 
Vishny 
(1986) 
USA 456 of the Fortune 500 firms Profits Positive relationship between block owners and firm performance 
monitor managers 
La Porta et 
al., (2002) 
539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies 
including UK and USA 
Tobin’s q Positive relationship between equity concentration and firm performance 
Grossman & 
Hart (1982) 
USA widely held Corporations Quality of management Strong incentive for external block holders to control the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers 
Cable & 
Yasuki (1985) 
Japan  Tobin’s Q Positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
McConnell & 
Servaes 
(1990) 
(1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 
1986) 
Tobin’s Q Strong positive relation between Q and the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors. 
Thomsen & 
Pedersen 
(2000) 
435 of the largest European companies Market-to-book value of 
equity, and ROA 
Positive relation between firm performance and ownership concentration 
Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro 
(2002) 
Japan (334 listed Japanese firms ROA Positive linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. 
Agrawal & 
Mandelker 
(1990) 
356 US listed firms who announced 
adoption of antitakeover charter 
amendments. 
1979-85. 
Cumulative abnormal 
return 
Positive linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
 
Tang et al., 
(2012) 
China Tobin’s Q Assets injection by large shareholders is positively associated with Tobin’s Q 
Maury & 
Pajuste 
(2005) 
Finland ROA and Tobin’s Q Positive relationship to both performance measures 
Ibrahimy & 
Ahmad 
(2012) 
Malaysia Tobin’s Q and ROE Positive insignificant relationship to Tobin’s Q; 
positive significant to ROE 
Habbash 
(2013) 
 
UK (using the largest 350 UK firms for 
three years from 2005 to 2007) 
Audit Committee 
Effectiveness 
The monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with 
high blockholder ownership 
Al-Najjar & 
Abed (2014) 
UK, The sample was selected from the top 
500 UK- non-financial listed companies by 
total market 
ROA Positive association with the level of voluntary disclosure of forward-looking 
information 
Miguel et al., 
(2004) 
 
Spain (135 non-financial quoted 
companies) 1990 to 1999 
Market value Predict a quadratic relationship between (They indicate that when block 
owners hold a small amount of shares, there is a positive relationship between 
block holders and firm performance) 
firm performance and ownership concentration 
Moshirian et 
al., (2014) 
 
37 countries (use a sample of 20,883 firm-
year observations for the period from 2006 
to 2009 in 37 
countries; UK 1774 observations) 
Tobin’s Q Negative association with firm value at certain level of blockholding, after which 
blockholding is then positively related to firm performance.  Beyond the focus 
point of the U-shaped curve, the alignment between 
blockholders and firms is much higher 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Prowse 
(1992) 
Japan (734 firms) Accounting Rate of 
Return; Stock Market 
Rate of Return 
No significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and financial performance 
Mehran 
(1995) 
 
USA 153 randomly-selected manufacturing 
firms in 1979–1980  
Tobin's Q; ROA No significant relationship between firm performance (both Tobin’s q and return 
on assets) and outside blockholdings 
Zeckhauser & 
Pound (1990) 
USA P/E ratio No relationship between large shareholders and P/E ratio 
Karpoff 
(2001) 
 
USA Abnormal Return Found weak evidence of a relationship between holdings by institutional 
investors and corporate financial performance 
Mudambi & 
Nicosia 
(1998) 
UK fInancial services sector 111 Firms 
(1992-1994) 
Rate of Share Return Negative linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
Lehmann & 
Weigand 
(2000) 
Germany (361 corporations over the time 
period 1991 to 1996) 
ROA and ROE Negative linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
Hughes 
(2005) 
UK 
 
Tobin's Q, R&D stock, 
Dividends paid 
Negative linear relationship between institutional blockholding and firm 
Earle et al., 
(2005) 
 
Hungary (panel data for firms listed on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange 1996–2001) 
ROE The size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and 
monotonically, but the effects 
of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant 
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Author/s Region & Sample Performance variables  Results 
Seifert et al., 
2005 
 
 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Japan 
Tobin's Q, and Sale 
growth 
USA The OLS results suggest that institutions have overall a positive effect 
while blockholders have a negative effect…..  Germany There is some evidence 
that blockholders have a significant positive effect 
on performance while institutions do not have a significant effect........ UK 
Outsiders have a significantly negative effect 
Thomsen et 
al.,  (2006)  
 
European Union and the US (largest 
companies) 
Tobin's Q, and Sale 
growth, ROA, and Sales 
to Assets 
No relationship between performance and blockholdings in Anglo-American 
system, and significant negative association with accounting performance 
measures in continental Europe 
Khurshed et 
al., (2011) 
 
UK (FTSE All Shares Index (FTSEASI) 
firms during the years 1996, 1999, and 
2003) 
Dividend yield, ROA, 
Share turnover, Share 
return variance 
Institutional blockholdings are positively associated with board composition, but 
are negatively associated with directors’ ownership after controlling for firm 
characteristics 
Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach 
(2009) 
USA Tobin's Q and ROA Blockholder fixed effects also in firm performance measures, and differences in 
style are systematically related to firm performance differences 
Table 3.4 Summary of main empirical studies on Blockholders and performance
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3.5. Measuring corporate performance  
If the aims of corporate governance are to enhance corporate value and 
improve firm performance in the short and long term to maximise shareholder 
wealth, the wide variety of performance measures makes it a challenge for investors 
and researchers to use appropriate measures. Therefore, it is important to explain the 
difference between the types of corporate financial performance measures in order to 
decide on adequate and relevant performance indicators that can provide clear 
conclusions for this thesis. 
Performance measures provide an indication of the quality of work delivered 
by corporations to their customers (Tatikonda & Tatikonda, 1998). In addition, the 
managers and shareholders use performance measures as a tool for monitoring and 
control in order to drive performance to achieve the short and long-term objectives of 
the corporation (Eccles, 2012). Generally, corporate performance can be divided into 
three main categories: corporate effectiveness, which mainly reflects the non-
financial performance of the company; operational performance, which includes both 
financial and non-financial performance, and; financial performance, which reflects 
the financial success and position of the corporation and its ability to increase profits, 
the value of the firm, and shareholder value. 
Reviewing previous studies on corporate governance and corporate 
performance (see Tables, 3.1; 3.2; 3.3; and 3.5), reveals that most studies have 
focused on financial performance when examining corporate governance 
mechanisms. This overwhelming use of financial performance as a measure can be 
referred to the focus on shareholders as key stakeholders. It can be also referred to 
the extensive financial reporting available, particularly during the last decade with 
the high public demand for more transparency and disclosure of corporate 
information and financial data in order to reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry that is caused by the agent-principal problem. In addition, the fast 
development of information technology and on-line financial data resources has 
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made it convenient for researchers to obtain sufficient financial data. For a long time, 
mainly financial accounting measures were used as indicators of financial 
performance (Atkinson et al., 1997); however, according to Ghalayani and Noble 
(1996), these accounting based performance measures suffer from some limitations, 
particularly in the context of the current highly competitive market.  
Moreover, according to Euske et al., (1993), financial performance measures 
are based on historical information and provide adequate indication for short-term 
performance; however, largely they do not provide enough indication of long term 
and strategic performance. Hence, Waterhouse and Svendsen (1998) argued that 
corporations taking highly complex strategic decisions require long-term 
performance indicators. One of the most frequently used financial performance 
measures is Tobin’s Q, which includes elements of long-term performance calculated 
by dividing the current value of the assets by the cost of their replacement. 
Therefore, financial performance measures remain the most used and most 
satisfactory means to reflect and measure corporate performance. 
As mentioned previously, large amounts of research (particularly research on 
agency theory and performance) have used financial accounting measures.10 Table 
3.5 shows a number of these studies with the types of performance measures used. 
Studies on the impact of agency theory on corporate performance also used market 
based financial performance measures as well as accounting based measures in order 
to examine the long term and wider impact of agency theory on corporate 
performance. For example, according to Bacidore et al., (1997), financial 
performance measurement using share price can give indications of the increase in 
shareholder wealth. In addition, Tobin’s Q, as mentioned earlier, is a financial 
performance measure which gives an indication of the market value of the company. 
10 Accounting based performance is considered by Sloan (2001) as a product of corporate governance 
since it uses financial information which is reported according to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
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The most used accounting based financial performance measures are Return on 
Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE). 
Author/s and Year Research on Performance measure used 
Klein (1998) Board committee structure 
ROA, Jensen Productivity, Market 
Return 
Core et al. (1999) 
 
Chief executive officer 
Compensation, and firm 
performance 
ROA, Stock Return 
 
Brav et al. (2008) 
Hedge fund activism, and firm 
performance Tobin's Q. ROA, Cash to Assets 
Renders et al. (2010) 
 
Corporate-governance ratings and 
company performance Tobin's Q. ROA, ROE 
Ehikioya (2009) 
Corporate governance structure 
and firm performance Tobin's Q. ROA, ROE, PE Ratio 
Christensen et al. 
(2013) 
Corporate governance  
recommendations and 
performance of small listed 
companies ROA, Tobin's Q 
Wang and Sarkis 
(2013) 
Sustainable supply chain 
management with corporate 
financial performance 
ROA, ROE, EPS 
 
Table 3.5: Studies on corporate governance and corporate performance 
 
3.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an explanation to the agency theory and its main 
concepts and problems. The chapter also provided the main theories, which largely 
support the assumptions of the agency theory, as well as theories, which oppose these 
major assumptions. The main problems of agency theory are due to the separation 
between ownership and control, where the higher the separation is, the larger the 
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agency problems. According to the agency theory, the company’s resources should 
be managed by board of directors, which has a contractual agreement with the 
shareholders to manage the company on their behalf and for their interest. However, 
the separation between ownership and control causes two major problems, which are, 
conflict of interest between executive directors and shareholders; and the problem of 
information asymmetry where executives have more private information about the 
company than shareholders, which can give them advantages over those shareholders 
and therefore they can pursue their own interest. The chapter discussed different 
mechanisms that were recommended by different regulations and corporate 
governance codes, such as a balanced board of directors at least half of which are 
independent non-executive directors who have the appropriate experience and 
knowledge to monitor the executive directors. In addition, the chapter discussed how 
blockholders and institutional shareholders can play an effective role as external 
mechanism to monitor board activities. 
In addition to the agency problems, which can occur due to the separation 
between ownership and control, the chapter provided an extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature on the impact of board structure and ownership structure on firm 
performance. In summary, theoretically the effectiveness of board of directors can 
play a major role in mitigating agency problems and reducing its cost. For instance, 
in theory large board of directors can include directors that are more independent and 
provide more expertise and talents, however based on the assumption of the agency 
theory that board of directors is self-interest motivated, and therefore a large board 
can increase the agency problem, which can have a negative impact on performance. 
In addition, in order to reduce the problem of conflict of interest between executives 
and shareholders, theoretical literature suggests aligning the interest of executives to 
the interests of shareholders through managerial ownership and compensation. 
However, the empirical studies that can be summarised from this chapter are mixed, 
where some studies found a negative association between managerial ownership and 
performance and others found a non-linear association between insiders’ ownership 
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and performance where there is an optimum level of share ownership that can 
motivate employees to increase shareholders’ wealth. Furthermore, the chapter 
provided an insight to the importance of blockholders and their role in monitoring 
board of directors through shareholders activism using their expertise and interest in 
the company. 
The following chapter presents the research design and analysis types and 
models used in this thesis including the methods to test the basic assumptions of 
regression analysis and the methods to test the robustness of the model and the 
endogeneity problem. 
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4. Chapter Four: Research Methodology, 
Design, & Data Description 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the methods, type of research design, variables, data 
acquisition and the rationale for choosing the analysis in this thesis. The chapter also 
outlines the main regression models tested (both univariate and multivariate) and the 
additional robustness analyses that were carried out at different stages of this thesis. 
The chapter is structured as follows: the sample description and sample selection 
procedure; variables definitions; the design of the empirical tests; testing OLS 
assumptions; endogeneity and dummy variables analysis; chapter summary. 
4.2. The sample and sample selection procedure 
The sample consists of the largest listed UK companies (components of the 
FTSE All Shares Index) which were listed in the London Stock Exchange between 
1st January 2005 and 31st December 2010 inclusive. The rationale for choosing the 
FTSE All Shares Index is that it represents a large proportion of the UK market’s 
capitalisation and includes most of the large corporations that have an important 
influence on the UK economy and to an extent on the world economy. UK listed 
companies have been studied by many previous research on corporate governance 
(such as Short & Keasey, 1999; Weir & Laing, 2001; Florackis, 2005; Mura, 2007; 
Guest, 2009), and following the same path enables a sufficient and useful 
comparison between the findings of this thesis and such previous research. The FTSE 
All Shares index consists of 697 companies including all sectors and forms 98% of 
the total capital market of UK companies that are listed in the London Stock 
Exchange. The index does not include all listed shares as it name would seem to 
imply. The population of this research was the non-financial companies listed in the 
FTSE All Shares Index. The total number of companies before excluding financial 
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companies was 697. After excluding the companies that were classified within the 
financial sector, the number of companies counted to 566. However, the number of 
years which some of these companies survived during the period January 2005 to 
December 2010, varies between 1 year and 6 years11.   During the six-year period of 
2005 to 2010, a considerable number of companies were de-listed from the London 
Stock Exchange Market. The ideal sample would have included the companies that 
survived in the index for the entire six years period. However, excluding companies 
with a survival period of less than 6 years could have introduced survivorship bias 
and reduced the sample size (see table 4.1). In order to obtain a representative sample 
size, companies who survived in FTSE All Shares Index for a period of less than four 
years during the period 2005 to 2010, were dropped from the sample (see table 4.1).  
 
Number of 
companies  
Number of 
years 
survived 
Percentage out of total 
population (i.e. 566 
companies) 
Percentage out of sample 
size (i.e. 363 companies) 
277 6 years 48.94% 76% 
47 5 years 8.30% 13% 
39 4 years 6.89% 11% 
54 3 years 9.54%   
66 2 years 11.66%   
83 1 year 14.66%   
566   100.00%   
Table 4.1 Non-financial companies listed on FTSE All Shares between 2005 and 2010 for 
minimum of four years 
11 See Chapter 4 Appendices Table APEX4.1 for the list of the 566 companies with their survival 
period 
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 Financial companies were excluded because they are subject to regulations 
which are strict and different from those for other companies (Chen et al., 2008; 
Guest, 2009), and their financial structure and reporting rules are not easy to compare 
with those of other companies. Some financial institutions are governed through 
separate acts to those in other sectors and are subject to different forms of regulation. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom, banks are regulated and managed under the 
supervision of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Bank of England. In 
addition, financial firms have a highly geared capital structure, which can 
considerably influence their financial performance (Lim et al., 2007), and this can 
lead to confusion in the data analysis. Most of the previous research in the area of 
corporate governance and corporate performance have also omitted financial firms 
from their sample (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008), and by following the same method, 
a more effective and useful comparability between this thesis findings and these 
previous studies can be obtained. 
Generally, the data collected for this research is mainly classified into three 
categories. Data related to corporate governance mechanisms relevant to the board of 
directors and shareholders (independence, ownership, board size, and institutional 
shareholders), data related to the sector type and companies’ characteristics (such as 
company age and size), and data related to financial performance12. These data were 
collected from different sources. Data related to corporate board structure, board 
size, insider (directors’) ownership13 and shareholder diversity and ownership were 
12 More information about the variables is given in paragraph  4.3 
13 Many researches refer to directors’ ownership as ‘insider ownership’, and others refer to it as 
‘managerial ownership’. In this thesis the percentage of outstanding shares owned by board members 
are referred to as managerial ownership. 
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collected manually from each company’s annual reports for the relevant years.14 Data 
related to financial performance and company size was collected through Bloomberg 
DataStream provided by University of Portsmouth.  Table 4.2 presents a summary of 
the data sources. 
Data type   Source 
Ownership structure, board size and board 
composition 
Annual reports and Bloomberg 
 
Firm age and Firm size, Company sector, Firms’ 
financial performance 
 
 
Bloomberg  
  
  
Table 4.2 Data type and sources 
The information was re-arranged to serve the aims of this research, with all 
data transformed into series of data that can be statistically described and analysed. 
 
4.3. Variables and definitions 
The variables used in this thesis can be classified into three main types, 
independent, dependent, and control variables. The independent variables consists of 
the corporate governance variables related to the ownership structure and board 
characteristics; the dependent variables are the financial performance measures used 
14 Annual reports were accessed through Morningstars.com and Bloomberg Database provided by 
University of  Portsmouth Business School  
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for this study; and the control variables are related to the firm age, firm size, and 
industry type. More details about the variables and their measures and definitions are 
presented in Table 4.3. 
 
4.3.1. Independent (explanatory) variables 
4.3.1.1. Variables related to Ownership structure: 
Ownership structure is used as one of the independent variables in this thesis. 
Three types of ownership data were measured, which are:  
- Managerial ownership measured by the percentage of total shares held by 
members of boards of directors (directly or indirectly);  
- Blockholders ownership: measured by the percentage of total shares held by 
large shareholders (i.e. only shareholders who were disclosed by the company 
to be substantial shareholders, with share ownership of more than or equal to 
3% of the company’s total share capital, including individuals, institutions, 
trusts, trustees, and banks).  
- Active institutional shareholders Ownership: this was measured by the 
percentage of shares belong to the top-20 largest institutional shareholders. 
In summary, Managerial ownership, blockholders ownership, and the total 
share ownership by institutional investors who belongs to the top-20 institutional 
shareholders were used as a measure of ownership structure.  
4.3.1.2. Variables related to Board structure 
Board structure was used as one of the independent variables and was 
measured by the board independence ratio (number of independent directors 
compared to the total board size). Another measure for board structure was the board 
size (total number of directors in the board who were present throughout the financial 
year).  
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4.3.2. Dependent variables: Financial performance measures 
The empirical research on corporate governance mechanisms and their 
relationship to corporate financial performance shows that the three dominant 
performance measures used to test this relationship are Tobin’s Q as a market-based 
performance measure, and Return on Assets and Return on Equity, as accounting-
based measures (Tang et al., 2012; Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Ibrahimy & Ahmad, 
2012; Schmid & Zimmermann, 2008). Therefore, this thesis uses these three 
performance measures as the dependent variables. In addition to TQ, ROA, and 
ROE, we have also used Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Changes in Sales 
revenues as additional performance measures to report any interesting findings. The 
following paragraph explains the rationale for choosing the above performance 
measures for this study. 
4.3.2.1. Market based measure: Tobin’s Q 
It can be considered as the most used market based performance measure by 
previous empirical studies in corporate governance and firm performance (such as 
Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 
1998; La Porta et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Coles et al., 2008; Muravyev et 
al., 2014) . The common measurement of Tobin’s Q is market to book ratio, however 
the calculations of book value varies across empirical studies. For instance, Yermack 
(1996) divided the market value of assets by their replacement cost, while Booth and 
Deli (1996) used the total asset value as reported by the company. Thus, due to these 
differences in asset valuation and asset recognition, the value of Tobin’s Q can vary, 
and therefore possible different results can be obtained. High value of Tobin’s Q is 
an indication to effective management in terms of providing good indicators to the 
market about the performance and value of the company.  
Similar to any other financial performance measure, Tobin’s Q has been 
subject of many criticisms, for instance, it has been criticised by Chung and Pruitt, 
(1994) for involving large amount of data calculations, which means it is a costly 
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measure to obtain. Furthermore, Tobin’s Q is calculated using historical data, which 
make it, similar to the accounting, based performance measures, potentially subject 
to creative accounting and manipulation. However, according to Alexander et al., 
(2007) using fair value accounting limits these disadvantages of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s 
Q can also suffer from inaccuracy due to the impossibility of accurate valuation of 
some assets, in particular intangible assets, which are difficult to value (Beattie & 
Thomson, 2007).  
In addition, Henwood (1998) argued that Tobin’s Q might not provide accurate value 
of unobserved economic situations of a firm but by the level of investors’ confidence 
and speculations. However, this criticism can apply to the majority of performance 
measures and are not exclusive to Tobin’s Q. The popularity of Tobin’s Q amongst 
large number of well recognised empirical studies provides sufficient support for its 
validity and justifies its use in other studies, including this thesis. This thesis uses 
Tobin’s Q which was obtained from Bloomberg and computed as follows: 
(Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets 
 
4.3.2.2. Accounting based measures: ROA, ROE, ROCE, and Sales 
growth 
In addition to the market based performance measure, the thesis also uses 
different accounting based measures to investigate the correlation between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Accounting based measures are calculated using 
historical accounting data published by the firm. The measures used in this research 
are Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Return on Capital Employed, and Sales 
Growth. Similar to Tobin’s Q, Return on assets. A large number previous studies in 
the area of corporate governance and corporate performance have used these 
measures as proxy for the firm financial performance (such as Steer & Cable, 1978 
(ROA & ROE), Holderness & Sheehan, 1988 (ROE); Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990 (Sales Growth); Conyon & Leech, 1994 (Sales Growth); Kaplan, 1997 (Sales 
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Growth); Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000 (ROA); Bhagat & Black, 2001 (ROA); 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002 (ROA); Fan et al., 2007 (Sales Growth); Hu & Zhou, 
2008 (ROA); Guedri & Hollands, 2008 (ROCE); Anderson & Reeb, 2003 (ROA); 
Coles et al., 2008 (ROA); Muravyev et al., 2014 (ROE)).  
Definitions for these ratios are provided in table 4.3. The higher these ratio are, 
the more attractive the company to investors. Return on Assets (ROA) indicates the 
level of management effectiveness in using the company’s assets to generate profits, 
and is calculated by dividing operating profits by total assets. Regarding Return on 
Equity (ROE), it also provides indications to the level of management effectiveness 
and efficiency, in managing shareholder Equity to generate profits. ROE was 
calculated by dividing profits after tax divided by shareholders’ equity which reflects 
the accumulation over time of amounts received by the company from stock/share 
issues plus the profits/earnings retained by the company.  
Another important accounting ratio in which investors consider when deciding 
on their investment is the Return on Capital Employed ratio (ROCE), which can be 
also used as an investment appraisal techniques in which shareholders can use to 
evaluate the return on their investments. ROCE is a key indicator of efficiency in 
which the company utilize funds, and therefore higher ROCE indicates higher and 
more efficient utilization of the company’s capital, which can maximise shareholders 
wealth. The advantages of using these accounting based measures is that the use of 
ratio can reduce the impact of firm size, and thus providing better comparison 
between companies with different size of assets.  
However, the main criticisms in which these ratios are subject to, and which 
can apply to all accounting based performance measures, is that they use historical 
data which do not reflect current prices and can be subject to creative accounting and 
manipulation. Thus they do not give indications to future expectations (Ross et al., 
2003), and do not differentiate between different industries. However, such 
limitations can be compensated by using fair value accounting and by using control 
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variables including industry type. In terms of Sales Growth rate, it is a rate to 
measure the increase/decrease of company’s sales when compared to previous year. 
This measure is also used in this thesis since it provides a good indication to the 
effectiveness of management in sustaining revenues and consumer confidence, which 
can have a large impact on the firm value and shareholders wealth.  
One of the main criticisms of this measure is that the benchmarks for sales 
growth can vary between different industries, for example, companies in technology 
industry would be more likely to have higher rate of sales growth then companies on 
retails industry. However, despite the criticisms of these ratios, it is evident that such 
ratio remains popular amongst large number of previous empirical studies who used 
these accounting based measures, and therefore they are used in this thesis. 
All the five dependent variables were presented in three different ways as 
follows: 
- Yearly bases were the performance measure for each year was examined. The 
rational of using yearly measures is to observe whether the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on performance is consistent between each 
year. 
- Average performance measure for the period between 2005-2007, and 
average 2008-2010. The reason for adopting this average is to identify 
whether the impact of the global financial crises in 2007-2008 have changed 
the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
- The different between the performance measure for each company at time t, 
and the average performance measure for the relevant industry at time t. the 
rational for using this measure is to reduce the problem of that different 
industries have different benchmark. 
 
 
121 
 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Independent Variables   
Board Size BSZE Total number of directors in 
the board 
Board Independence BIND Percentage of independent 
directors to total number of 
directors 
Managerial ownership MGOW Percentage of total shares 
owned by members of board 
of directors (both executives 
and non-executives). 
Blockholders ownership BKOW Percentage of total shares of 
at least 3% to company's 
share capital owned by any 
outsiders (individuals, 
institutions, family, 
government ...). 
 
Institutional  ownership 
 
INSOW 
 
 
Total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional 
shareholders who have been 
classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to 
the total number of shares 
they own in the FTSE All 
Shares non-financial 
companies used in this 
thesis 
Dependent Variables     
Tobin's Q TQ Ratio of the market value of 
a firm to the replacement 
cost of the firm's assets (as 
defined by Bloomberg) and 
computed as follow: The 
ratio is computed as follows: 
(Market Cap + Liabilities + 
Preferred Equity + Minority 
Interest) / Total Assets 
 AvTQ Average TQ between 2005 
and 2007 and Average TQ 
between 2008 and 2010 
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Variable Symbol Definition 
  
∆TQ 
 
The difference between each 
company's TQ and Average 
Q for the relevant industry 
 
Return on Assets 
 
ROA 
 
(Net Income divided by 
Average Total Assets) 
multiplied by 100 
 AvROA Average ROA between 2005 
and 2007 and Average ROA 
between 2008 and 2010 
 ∆ROA The difference between each 
company's ROA and 
Average ROA for the 
relevant industry 
Return on Equity ROE (Net Income divided by 
Total Shareholders’ Equity) 
multiplied by 100 
 AvROE Average ROE between 2005 
and 2007 and Average ROE 
between 2008 and 2010 
 ∆ROE The difference between each 
company's ROE and 
Average ROE for the 
relevant industry 
 
 
Return on Capital Employed  ROCE Earnings before Interest and 
Tax divided by average of 
Capital Employed  
  
AvROCE 
 
Average ROCE between 
2005 and 2007 and Average 
ROCE between 2008 and 
2010 
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Variable Symbol Definition 
  
∆ROCE 
 
The difference between each 
company's ROCE and 
Average ROCE for the 
relevant industry 
 
 
Sales Growth 
 
 
SGRTH 
 
 
Sales' Growth calculated by 
total Sales for time t Less 
Total Sales for time (t-1), 
divided by Total Sales for 
time (t-1) 
  
AvSGRTH 
 
Average SGRTH between 
2005 and 2007 and Average 
SGRTH between 2008 and 
2010 
  
∆SGRTH 
 
The difference between each 
company's SGRTH and 
Average SGRTH for the 
relevant industry 
Control Variables     
Firm size FSZE Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets 
 
Firm Age 
 
FAGE 
 
Number of years since 
Incorporation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Industry Average Performance Measure INDTQ/INDROA/INDROE Average industry 
performance, is calculated 
by adding the total value of 
the relevant performance for 
each industry divided by 
number of companies 
classified under this 
industry. 
Table 4.3 Variables definition and symbols 
 
 
4.3.3. Control Variables 
The control variables were added to the model to reduce the problem of 
endogeneity and to take into account the impact of firm characteristics, which can be 
classified as non-corporate governance characteristics. This thesis uses three 
variables as control variables, namely firm size, firm age, and industry control (see 
Table 4.3 for definitions). Many studies have used these variables as control 
variables, and found a correlation between them and corporate governance 
performance (such as Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Xie 
et al., 2003; Bonn et al., 2004; Maka & Kusnadi, 2005; Brown & Caylor, 2006; 
Bonne et al., 2007). It is important to mention the reason for selecting the three 
control variables used in this thesis was based on the evidence from the theory and 
previous empirical studies (as it can be seen in the next paragraphs). It is possible 
that other non-corporate governance variables can influence the corporate 
governance mechanisms and the performance of the company. However, they were 
not used in this thesis because of luck of theoretical support, or were time consuming 
to obtain and calculate, or they were used in this thesis to conduct further analysis, 
such as the capital expenditure and debt to equity ratio, which were used to test the 
existence endogeneity problem. 
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Company performance can differ depending on the size of the company. Jensen 
(1986) and Beiner et al., (2006) suggested that firm size is likely to be positively 
correlated to corporate governance mechanisms because of the differences in the cost 
of compliance and the level of operations and responsibilities involved and expected. 
For instance, according to Dietrich (2012) and Nishihara and Shibata (2013), large 
companies are more likely to obtain cheaper fund from external sources then small 
companies, also their value can increase in higher proportion then smaller 
companies. These results support Hanifa and Hudaib (2006) conclusion that there is a 
positive association between firm size and firm performance. In contrast, according 
to Klapper and Love (2004) large companies have fewer margins of growth 
opportunities in comparison with smaller companies that require higher external 
funds and therefore higher cost. Hence, smaller companies need to obtain funds from 
investors and therefore they aim to, strictly, comply with the corporate governance 
codes to attract such investors. Therefore, it is expected that there will be a negative 
correlation between the firm size and firm performance, because the margin of 
profitability improvement in a young company can be larger than the margin of 
performance improvement in a mature company, which is at the top stages of its life 
cycle (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Maury & Pajuste, 2005). Thus, empirical results 
shows mix results in terms of the nature of the association between firm size and firm 
performance, however they agrees that such association exists. Many studies used 
firm size as control variables (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Short & Keasey, 1999; 
Yermack, 1996; Coles et al., 2008; Guest, 2009). Hence, firm size, measured by the 
natural logarithm of the company total assets, was used as control variable. 
A similar argument can be applied to firm age, where it is expected to have a 
negative association between firm age and firm performance. This because the older 
the firm the less the growth in its profitability because old firms are in a more mature 
stage of their life cycle and therefore older firms are less dynamic then younger firms 
(Maury & Pajust, 2005; Gutierrez & Pombo, 2009). 
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The third control variable, which was used in this thesis, is industry control 
measured by the (average performance for industries). Many previous empirical 
studies found differences in companies’ accounting returns according to their 
industry (Schmalensee, 1985; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1998). These studies 
reported that industry effect is a major factor when determining a company’s success. 
Furthermore, Lim et al., (2007) argued that the impact of corporate governance 
compliance on firm performance could vary between industries, where the impact of 
economic factors can influence some industries more than others. The classification 
of the industries was initially based on Bloomberg’s classification. However, the 
number of industries was around fourteen,15 which could affect the degree of 
freedom in the data estimation and model test. Therefore, the industries were 
regrouped into six categories using the Waterloo Stock Exchange Yearbook. The 
categories and their components are presented in following table: 
Industry  Company type No. of Companies Frequency 
Technology Communication, information 
technology, and technology 
73 20.11% 
Energy Energy, utilities, and materials 63 17.36% 
 Consumer services 
and goods  
 
 Retails, food products, and 
healthcare 
74 20.39% 
Leisure  Leisure, hotels and restaurants 25 6.89% 
Industrial Industrial 99 27.27% 
Others None of the above 29 7.99% 
Table 4.4: Industry Classification and Frequency 
15 The general industry types were: Others, Communications, Information Technology, Technology, 
Energy, Materials, Utilities, Food Products, Retail, Industrials, Healthcare, Hotels, Restaurants and 
Leisure. 
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4.4. The Design of the empirical test 
The thesis uses a panel dataset to test the hypotheses, which were developed 
for this study. Data from the same companies (i.e. companies that constitute the 
FTSE All share index excluding the financial sector) were collected over a period of 
six years (i.e. from 2005 to 2010 inclusive). There is considerable number of 
advantages for using a panel dataset. First, because the data collected include 
observations of several companies, therefore the problem of heterogeneity can be 
controlled. Second, according to Hsiao (2003), a panel dataset provides a more 
accurate inference of model parameters, where more degrees of freedom and sample 
variability due to large number of data points which, also according to Hsiao (2003), 
can reduce the collinearity between the independent variables, and therefore 
enhances the efficiency of the model estimates. A balanced panel dataset, i.e. having 
the same periods for each observation, can provide more clear outcomes. In addition, 
with a panel dataset, there is more of a possibility to investigate change in the 
observations over a period. For example, in this thesis, because we have data on the 
performance of each observation over a period of six years, we were able to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on sales growth. A panel 
dataset also can reduce the problem of bias in data (Wang, 2009). Therefore, in this 
thesis the same six years periods were used for all observations. 
Reviewing the previous empirical studies on corporate governance and 
performance it can be noted that most of these studies did not use data post 2007 
(such as Coles et al., 2008; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Lin et al., 2009; Bermig & Frick, 
2010; Guest, 2009; Larmou & Vafeas, 2010; Bos et al., 2013). Hence, this thesis uses 
a data set from a recent period, which distinguishes it from other studies. In addition, 
none of the previous studies investigated whether the corporate governance impact 
on performance changed during the financial crises, which this thesis does consider.  
In addition, most of the empirical studies used a single presentation of 
corporate performance measure (i.e. TQ, ROA, ROE, etc...), while in this thesis each 
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performance measure was presented in three different ways. For instance, in addition 
to the actual performance measure for each year, we have also used the difference 
between each performance measure and the relevant industry average performance. 
This is to reduce the problem of the industry impact on performance, and the average 
performance for the period between 2005 and 2007, as well as the average 
performance for the period 2008 to 2010 to identify any effect, which the global 
financial crises had on the corporate governance impact on performance. This 
allowed the analysis to observe any variations on the influence of the corporate 
governance mechanisms on performance before and during the global financial 
crisis.   
Hence, and according to the previous discussion, the following regression 
model formula used to test the developed hypotheses: 
 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽2 +  𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽3 +  𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽4 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽5+  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽6 +  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽7 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽8 +  𝜀 (1) 
i.e.  
Performance = β (Board Size + Board Independence + Managerial ownership + 
Blockholding + Institutional Blockholding + Firm Age + Firm Size + Industry 
Control) + Error term. 
The thesis also examined the ownership structure from the point of the 
relationship between insiders (members of boards of directors) and outsiders (outside 
shareholders). Ownership structure can create a conflict between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders, between large shareholders who aim to 
influence board directors’ decisions to their own interests, and the board members 
who aim to work for the interest of all the company’s shareholders. Therefore, a 
regression analysis has been carried out to investigate the existence and influence of 
conflict (tension) between insiders (directors) and outsiders (substantial 
shareholders), and the proportion of outsiders to insiders, on the performance 
measures of the companies. The level of tension between insider shareholders and 
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outsiders was measured using Abdullah and Page’s (2009) approach by multiplying 
the total percentage owned by substantial shareholders by the total percentage owned 
by directors. The hypothesis, which has been tested in this analysis, is that tension 
between insiders and outsiders has a negative impact on the firm’s performance. The 
following formula was examined: 
 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽1 + 𝐿𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝛽2 +  𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆𝛽3 + 𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽4+ + 𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽5 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽6 +  𝜀 (2) 
Where 
LGTENSION = Natural Logarithm for (percentage owned by directors multiplied by 
percentage owned by external substantial shareholders) 
INOUTS = the domination of ownership, calculated as total holdings by external substantial 
shareholders less total holdings by insiders).  
It is important to note that all the previous analyses of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance in this thesis were 
based on the assumption that the corporate governance mechanisms influence the 
performance. In other words, the performance measures used were explained by the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms (such as board independence 
ratio, board size, external shareholders, etc…). However, the question, which can be 
raised here and is worth examining, is whether the changes in the corporate 
governance mechanisms are influenced by performance itself; in other words does 
performance explain the changes in corporate governance characteristics. In order to 
examine this, we have tested whether the board independence ratio is influenced by 
the firm’s performance. The following formula is examined: 
 𝐶𝐻𝐺𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑇) =  𝛽0 +   𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽1(𝑇−1) +  BSZEβ2 +  MGOWβ3 + BKOWβ4+  INSOWβ5 +  FAGEβ6 + FSZEβ7 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹β8 +  ε (3) 
Where: CHGBND is changes in board independence calculated by subtracting the ratio of 
board independence of previous year from the ratio of board independence of the current 
year.  
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In order to ensure the appropriateness of the model and the data, various tests 
were carried out, including identifying and dealing with outliers, normality, non-
linearity, hetereoscedasticity, multicollinearity, and endogeneity. The following 
paragraphs explain these different additional tests, which were conducted, in 
particular, Outliers, Multicollenierity, Normality, endogeneity problem (2SLS), and 
Dummy variables.  
4.5. Testing OLS Assumptions 
Before running a multi regression analysis, there are many assumptions, which 
need to be confirmed in order to ensure that the regression outcomes are not 
misleading. This paragraph provides the results of testing these OLS assumptions, 
and the main regression diagnosis, namely: outliers; normality of residuals, 
multicollienrity; heteroscedasticity, and exploring the non-linearity of some 
variables.  
 
4.5.1. Diagnosing and dealing with Outliers 
The data was taken through different stages to obtain usable information that 
could be run and used in the model estimation and regression analysis. First of all, 
and after the data were collected from the different sources (see Table 4.2), a 
descriptive statistical analysis was generated for all selected variables using SPSS in 
order to identify incomplete information, missing values, mistyped observations, 
outliers and extreme values. During this process, a number of values were identified 
as mistyped and were therefore double-checked using the company’s relevant annual 
report to obtain the right values. For instance, two of the companies observed had a 
managerial ownership of over 100%16. Another example is where the board size of 
some companies was “zero” or “one”, which clearly suggested typing errors.17  
16 Companies were: Xstrata Plc and WPP Plc 
17 Companies were: Findel Plc, Associated British Foods Plc, & Pz Cussons Plc 
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One of the main diagnoses that need to be carried before running a regression 
analysis is identifying any outliers or extreme values. Outliers are extreme abnormal 
values that can shift the outputs of the analysis. Outliers can be defined as 
observations, which have a value of at least ± 3 standard deviation from the mean, 
which cause very high residuals. In addition to the Mean ± 3 standard deviation 
detection methods, another method is used in order to detect outliers, this method is 
the method used by Hoaglin et al. (1987) to label outliers. Hoaglin et al. (1987) 
define outliers as: 
�Q1 − K�Q3 −  Q1 �� >  𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟 > �Q3 + K�Q3 −  Q1 ��  
Where 
Q1 = lower quartile or 25th Percentile 
Q3 = Upper quartile or 75th Percentile 
K = 2.2 
These outliers can confuse the sample results and analysis outcomes by 
inflating the error variance, and increase the confidence intervals. The reason for 
choosing two methods to identify outliers is that the normality and linearity of some 
variables were better when different method was used. Outliers were dealt with using 
winsorising, which involves reducing/increasing the outliers’ values to values that 
are distributed in the lower/higher 5% tail of the normal distribution. Sales and Total 
Assets (Firm Size) were transformed into natural log values in order to improve their 
normality and linearity (Chapter 4 Appendices, Table APEX4.2 provides statistics on 
the number of outliers diagnosed for each major variable). 
Moreover, the data were checked for normality with histograms of frequencies 
and descriptive statistics, particularly using Skewness and Kurtosis indications, 
which assist in identifying the extreme abnormal variables. 
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4.5.2. Multicollinearity  
One of the important assumptions that need to be confirmed when running a 
multi-regression analysis is that high or perfect correlation should not exist between 
the independent variables. With a correlation of 0.9 and higher, this indicates the 
existence of multicollinearty, while if the perfect correlation exists (i.e. correlation = 
1), this indicates the problem of singularity, and therefore if they exist, action to 
correct the variables must be taken (see chapter 4 appendices, Tables APEX 5.16a & 
5.16b  for more information about the results of testing multicollinearity).  
4.5.3. Normality and non- linearity  
In addition to the outliers detection method (Skewness of less or is within 
±1.96 and standard kurtosis within ±3), several charts and plots were also generated 
to ensure that the data are normally distributed. In addition, plots checks were used 
for normality, while the others check the assumptions that there is a linear 
relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables (these charts, 
diagrams, and histograms are not presented here due to the large amount that was 
generated). 
4.5.4. Heteroscedasticity  
It is another assumption of OLS, which is that variance of the model variable, 
should be very close (which is also called Homoscedasticity). For this assumption to 
be met the model should have no pattern which is that its variables’ residuals plotted 
against the fitted data; otherwise the data must be corrected. One of the popular 
methods used to test for heteroscedasticity is the graphical method to use the 
residuals against the fitted plot, using a scatter diagram. Originally, the model 
showed a level of heteroscedasticity, and therefore corrective actions were taken, 
which are transforming the data on Firm size, Capital expenditure, Sales, to natural 
Logarithm values which improved the distribution of the residuals and reduced the 
level of heteroscedasticity to meet the assumption of OLS. 
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4.5.5. Endogeneity 
In this thesis, we took the regression analysis a step beyond the Ordinary Least 
Square analysis to the Two Stages Least Square regression and instrumental variables 
analysis, which is a regression model that explores the association between the errors 
in the dependent variables and the independent variables. In the case of the existence 
of correlation between the error in the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, then the estimates obtained from the Ordinary Least (OLS) regression do 
not provide the optimal model estimates. An endogeneity problem can exist, and in 
this case treatment of such issues is required. The endogeneity problem arises when a 
dependent variable is explained by a variable other than the explanatory variables 
included in the model.  
According to Barro (2008, p, 8) “the endogenous variables are the ones that we 
want the model to explain”, while the exogenous variables “are the ones that a model 
takes as given and does not attempt to explain”. When the case of endogenous 
variables exists, these results in a biased observation since the explanation of the 
dependent variable may indirectly relate to other variables, which are correlated with 
the explanatory variables. Based on this, and in order to ensure the appropriateness of 
our results, a Two Stages Least Square (2SLS) regression is applied, where additional 
variables from outside the model are used in order to test the nature of their influence 
on the model. These new external variables are called instrumental variables (IV). In 
other words, the appropriateness of the instrumental variables depends on their 
correlation with the 2SLS error terms from the predicted model, where appropriate 
instrumental variables are the variables that have no correlation with the error term of 
the predicted 2SLS model. 
The 2SLS was carried out in two ways; initially the two steps analysis using Ordinary 
Least Square was carried out by: 
Step 1- Predicting at time T endogenous variables (board size and board 
independence) using OLS 
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Step2- Predicting the independent variable (performance variable) using the predicted 
endogenous variables from step 1 as explanatory variables. The formulas for each 
step are: 
 
Step 1: (see Appendix chapter 4 table APEX 5.36a) 
 BSZE(T) = 𝛽0 + BSZE(T−1)𝛽1 +  BIND(T)𝛽2 + MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4+ INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7 + INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 (4) 
   
 BIND(T) = 𝛽0 + BSZE(T)𝛽1 + BIND(T−1)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4+ INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7 + INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 (5) 
Step 2: (see Appendix chapter 4 tables APEX 5.36b to APEX 5.36g) 
 
 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3+ BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 (6) 
 
In addition to this method of generating the outcomes of 2SLS regression, 
another method was also applied in order to confirm the findings of the previous 
method of calculating 2SLS (results are presented in Table 5.18 and 5.19) using 
SPSS (through 2SLS feature) using the lagged variables of the identified endogenous 
variables (board size and board independence ratio). The main reason for running the 
analysis using SPSS is to confirm the results of the previous method more accurately. 
As in the previous analysis, we have only regressed Tobin’s Q and ROA for each 
year’s measurement, and the average 3-year’s measurement. In addition, we have 
regressed ROE in order to report any interesting conclusions (Chapter 4 appendices 
table APEX 5.35). 
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4.5.6. Dummy variables analysis 
 
Additional variables were added to the regression model in order to examine 
the influence of industry variables on corporate performance and whether the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms (namely board composition 
and ownership structure) used in this research can also be determined by industry. As 
mentioned previously, the 363 companies, which represent the sample, were divided 
into six main industry categories, Technology, Energy, Consumer Services, Leisure, 
Industrial, and Others, as shown in table 4.5. Hence, OLS regression is carried out 
using the dummy variables instead of the average industry performance control 
variable. The technology sector was excluded from the regression. The regression 
formula tested is: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽2 +  𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽3 +  𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽4 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽5+  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽6 +  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽7 +  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦0𝛽8 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦2𝛽9+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦3𝛽10 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦4𝛽11 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦5𝛽12 +  𝜀   (7) 
 
Industry  Company type Code 
Technology Communication, information technology, 
 and technology 
 
1 
Energy Energy, utilities, and materials 2 
 Consumer services  
 
 Retails, food products, and healthcare 
 
 
3 
Leisure  Leisure, hotels and restaurants 
 
 
4 
Industrial Industrial 
 
 
5 
Others None of the above 0 
Table 4.5 Industry Codes 
136 
 
The outcomes of the regression analysis are expected to suggest a relationship 
between the industry control variable and performance measures. In this case, we 
further investigated such association to examine whether any significant association 
differ between industries; the analysis was conducted adding the industry proxy 
variables. ‘Technology’ was excluded from the model since there is the need for one 
fewer dummy variable than the number of industries. The reason behind excluding 
the technology industry is that this sector was the least affected by the global 
financial crisis and the average TQ was the highest among the industries. In addition, 
the changes in TQ between the period before the financial crisis and after the 
financial crisis were insignificant in comparison with the other industries; thus the 
results for the OLS and 2SLS regressions could be influenced by this industry. The 
new OLS regression, with the chosen dummy variables, was carried out.18 
 
4.6. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed description of the data and methodologies 
used in this research, together with the definitions of the main independent, 
dependent and control variables. The chapter also provided a description of the data 
arrangement process and the sources used to collect the data. The following chapter 
presents a detailed discussion of the results generated from the different correlation 
and regression analyses, with the aim of testing the main hypotheses developed and 
listed in the previous chapter. 
18 The industry variables were defined in the regression model as follows: If the firm is Tech, it equals 
to “1” when the company is classified in the technology sector or “0” if otherwise; if the firm is 
Energy, it equals “1” when the company is classified in the energy sector or “0” if otherwise; if the 
firm is Consumer Services, it equals “1” when the company is classified in the consumer services 
sector or “0” if otherwise; If the firm is Leisure, it equals “1” when the company is classified in the 
leisure sector or “0” if otherwise; if the firm is Industrial, it equals “1” when the company is classified 
in the industrial sector or “0” if otherwise. 
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5. Chapter Five: Empirical Results and 
Discussion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a description and explanation to the methods 
and data used in this thesis. This chapter presents the data results, description of data, 
univariate and multivariate Ordinary Least Square analysis for the relationship 
between the identified corporate governance mechanisms and the different measures 
of corporate performance. It is important to note that the cross-sectional statistical 
analysis for the variables has been performed based on the assumption that all the 
corporate governance mechanisms variables used are exogenous,19 and therefore the 
variables with other explanatory and control variables can provide estimates for the 
different corporate performance values. The chapter also includes the examination of 
the robustness of the results including the endogeneity20 of the corporate governance 
variables, the impact of performance on the corporate mechanism, and dummy 
variable analysis. 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics and sample management 
Tables 5.1a and 5.1b provides the results for the descriptive statistics of the 
dependent, independent and control variables, particularly Skewness, Kurtosis, 
Mean, and Standard Deviation. The figures presented include variables, which have 
been winsorized to avoid the influence of extreme values on the data results. In 
addition, values, which were theoretically incorrect, were excluded from the sample 
19 Exogenous variables “are the ones that a model takes as given and does not attempt to explain” 
(Barro, 2008). 
20 Endogenous variables are the ones that we want the model to explain (Barro, 2008). 
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(three values relating to managerial ownership, one to board size, and one to 
independence of directors).21 Beside descriptive statistics figures for the overall 
sample, comparative figures based on the industry type are also presented to identify 
any variations between different industries in terms of their corporate governance 
practices. Before explaining the general descriptive statistics figures for the sample, 
it is important to outline how the data were managed in terms of missing values; 
outliers; and normality, as well as how the final sample has been finalised.  
First, there were two options to deal with missing values, the first option was to 
include artificial values, while the second option was to keep the missing values and 
account for this issue in the analysis. Replacing the missing values with artificial 
ones was not applied for different reasons, such as it can cause incorrect 
representation to the population and therefore cause serious issues for the outcomes 
of the regression analysis. Companies with missing values were not excluded from 
the final sample in order retain a representative sample. Using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to run the analysis and generate the outcomes has 
minimised the issue of missing values since it can automatically account for these 
values, adjust the outcomes accordingly, and reduce the impact of the missing data 
on the model results and their interpretations. 
Secondly, for outliers, we have identified extreme values as the values which 
are greater or smaller than 3 standard deviation from the Mean (i.e. Mean ± 3SD). 
Such outliers can influence the outcomes of the analysis in many ways. For instance, 
extreme values can inflate the error variance, increase the confidence intervals, and 
bias the parameter estimates. In addition to the Mean ± 3 standard deviation 
detection methods, another method is used in order to detect outliers, this method is 
the method used by Hoaglin et al., (1987) to label outliers (See Chapter 4 appendices 
21 For instance values relating to managerial ownership were excluded when they exceeded 100% of 
the share capital, which suggests mistyping. The researcher was not able to check the figures directly 
from the company’s annual report due to the reports being unavailable.  
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Table APEX 4.2). Hence, in order to minimise such problematic impacts, many 
options were available. These options were deleting the extreme values (Trimming) 
or winsorizing these values. Deleting (Trimming) the extreme values was not the 
option used since new outliers can appear after trimming the initial outliers; also, 
outliers could include important observations, which can affect the model outcomes 
and its interpretations. Therefore, the winsorization method was used by reducing the 
extreme values (outliers) to the next value after/before the Mean ± 3SD. 
Finally, regarding the normality checks, different methods were used to 
identify any abnormality in the data for each variable, such as histograms, probability 
plots, and other descriptive statistics tools mainly Skewness and Kurtosis. To deal 
with abnormality, we transformed the values of identified variables into natural Log 
values to improve its normality (such as Total Sales, and Company Size). 
From tables 5.1a and 5.1b, the figures suggests that for all data, the normality 
assumption is achieved since all the variables Skewness are between -1.96 and 
+1.96; and the Kurtosis level is between -3 and +3. The results show that most of the 
variables are positively skewed which indicates that most of the observations are 
located to the right of the distribution, except for BKOW2010; ROA2007 and 2008; 
ROE 2009; and ROCE 2009, where the variables are negatively skewed. 
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  SKEW Kurt Mean STDV Min Max Medium N 
BSZE2005 0.82 0.90 8.55 2.54 3 19 8 335 
BSZE2006 0.84 0.58 8.61 2.57 4 18 8 347 
BSZE2007 0.94 1.18 8.59 2.42 4 19 8 363 
BSZE2008 0.97 1.25 8.65 2.39 4 19 8 363 
BSZE2009 1.08 1.35 8.44 2.28 4 17 8 358 
BSZE2010 1.09 1.98 8.39 2.38 3 17 8 345 
NID2005 1.08 1.22 4.16 1.78 1 11 4 335 
NID2006 1.08 1.15 4.29 1.74 1 10 4 347 
NID2007 1.17 1.66 4.40 1.75 1 11 4 363 
NID2008 1.14 2.25 4.50 1.78 1 13 4 363 
NID2009 1.13 1.68 4.45 1.76 1 13 4 358 
NID2010 1.01 1.36 4.39 1.85 0 11 4 345 
BIND2005 0.30 1.00 48.38 13.14 10.5% 100% 50 335 
BIND2006 0.56 1.73 49.64 12.20 11.1% 100% 50 347 
BIND2007 0.24 0.97 51.13 12.64 10.5% 100% 50 363 
BIND2008 0.07 0.85 51.90 12.83 10.0% 100% 50 363 
BIND2009 0.08 0.61 52.40 12.67 11.1% 100% 50 358 
BIND2010 0.06 1.29 51.85 14.68 0% 100% 50 345 
MGOW2005 2.73 6.73 4.96 10.31 0.0% 43.6% 0.53 336 
MGOW2006 2.74 6.75 4.87 9.96 0.1% 41.8% 0.57 350 
MGOW2007 2.55 5.68 5.01 10.19 0.0% 41.8% 0.47 361 
MGOW2008 2.50 5.42 5.08 10.17 0.1% 41.8% 0.57 362 
MGOW2009 2.40 4.70 4.89 9.86 0.2% 39.0% 0.50 355 
MGOW2010 2.46 4.98 4.78 9.82 0.4% 39.0% 0.47 339 
NBLKH2005 0.55 -0.06 4.84 2.38 0 12 4 333 
NBLKH2006 0.56 0.05 5.11 2.46 0 14 5 347 
NBLKH2007 0.26 -0.13 5.71 2.53 0 13 5 356 
NBLKH2008 0.21 -0.08 5.90 2.45 0 14 6 360 
NBLKH2009 0.15 -0.55 5.89 2.48 1 12 6 355 
NBLKH2010 0.14 -0.45 5.83 2.46 0 13 6 338 
BKOW2005 0.54 -0.01 35.29 18.80 0% 100% 32.9 332 
BKOW2006 0.45 -0.23 37.59 19.25 0% 99.31% 35.8 346 
BKOW2007 0.19 -0.35 41.05 18.43 0% 92.4% 40.6 355 
BKOW2008 0.08 -0.42 43.90 19.03 0% 94.36% 44.16 360 
BKOW2009 0.04 -0.44 43.58 18.27 3.98% 92.4% 43.66 355 
BKOW2010 -0.02 -0.56 43.80 18.64 0% 92.4% 44.43 338 
NINST2005 0.28 -0.46 3.44 2.19 0 9 3 332 
NINST2006 0.44 -0.18 3.55 2.24 0 10 3 346 
NINST2007 0.23 -0.46 4.19 2.41 0 11 4 355 
NINST2008 0.20 -0.33 4.23 2.41 0 13 4 360 
NINST2009 0.22 -0.61 4.23 2.42 0 11 4 355 
NINST2010 0.23 -0.53 4.18 2.46 0 11 4 338 
Table 5.1a: Descriptive figures for the main variables used in this thesis 
  SKEW Kurt Mean STDV Min Max Medium N 
INSOW2005 0.59 0.08 21.59 15.53 0.00 0.76 20 332 
INSOW2006 0.52 -0.22 22.41 15.23 0.00 0.71 20.15 346 
INSOW2007 0.30 -0.52 25.96 16.11 0.00 0.76 25.56 355 
INSOW2008 0.35 -0.19 26.74 16.64 0.00 0.87 26.29 360 
INSOW2009 0.26 -0.48 26.86 16.18 0.00 0.74 26.79 355 
INSOW2010 0.35 -0.57 27.06 17.13 0.00 0.78 25.015 338 
FSZE2005 0.53 0.24 6.40 1.72 1.57 11.90 6.21 338 
FSZE2006 0.63 0.17 6.47 1.65 2.94 11.75 6.25 353 
FSZE2007 0.68 0.16 6.65 1.62 3.11 11.82 6.35 358 
FSZE2008 0.68 0.25 6.83 1.64 3.16 12.17 6.50 357 
FSZE2009 0.73 0.39 6.83 1.63 3.08 12.11 6.48 355 
FSZE2010 0.69 0.42 6.87 1.67 2.86 12.24 6.58 344 
FAGE2005 1.16 0.74 56.39 52.37 0 238 33 361 
FAGE2006 1.16 0.74 57.23 52.38 0 239 34 362 
FAGE2007 1.17 0.74 58.07 52.40 0 240 35 363 
FAGE2008 1.17 0.74 59.07 52.40 1 241 36 363 
FAGE2009 1.17 0.74 60.07 52.40 2 242 37 363 
FAGE2010 1.17 0.74 61.07 52.40 3 243 38 363 
TQ2005 1.32 1.02 1.97 0.80 0.84 4.07 1.74 325 
TQ2006 1.25 0.88 2.12 0.90 0.85 4.51 1.86 342 
TQ2007 1.25 1.06 1.86 0.84 0.56 4.23 1.61 358 
TQ2008 1.23 1.18 1.30 0.52 0.43 2.76 1.18 358 
TQ2009 1.35 1.43 1.55 0.69 0.51 3.68 1.33 352 
TQ2010 1.10 0.58 1.62 0.72 0.53 3.58 1.40 335 
ROA2005  -0.16 1.14 7.04 7.55 -13.03% 24.75% 6.86 331 
ROA2006 0.43 0.81 7.63 7.03 -7.95% 25.02% 6.76 341 
ROA2007 0.29 1.35 8.31 7.50 -13.52% 27.99% 7.00 354 
ROA2008 -0.16 0.68 4.71 8.99 -17.14% 26.23% 4.68 357 
ROA2009 -0.22 1.05 4.21 6.42 -12.53% 21.08% 4.38 351 
ROA2010 0.18 0.92 5.82 6.61 -9.88% 24.21% 5.40 338 
ROE2005 0.23 1.16 20.01 21.12 -33.24% 70.82% 18.23 308 
ROE2006 0.44 0.59 20.88 18.89 -22.00% 64.74% 18.38 315 
ROE2007 0.40 1.29 21.22 18.83 -28.10% 68.01% 18.34 332 
ROE2008 0.03 0.60 16.67 20.10 -32.05% 63.67% 16.19 339 
ROE2009 -0.25 0.94 9.03 18.94 -39.33% 55.81% 10.34 329 
ROE2010 0.06 1.13 14.65 17.04 -29.16% 57.45% 14.16 322 
ROCE2005 0.37 0.86 35.25 43.41 -64.48% 130.33% 29.00 328 
ROCE2006 0.06 0.99 33.27 49.85 -81.93% 143.89% 27.23 337 
ROCE2007 0.17 0.82 36.43 49.41 -71.69% 143.62% 31.90 350 
ROCE2008 0.14 0.69 30.19 51.03 -77.17% 144.26% 27.41 357 
ROCE2009 -0.09 0.52 18.87 45.86 -78.84% 118.15% 18.09 351 
ROCE2010 0.03 0.88 24.73 45.87 -74.67% 131.63% 23.96 344 
Table 5.1b Descriptive figures for the main variables used in this thesis
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Table 5.1a indicates that the average board size across the period 2005 to 2010 
remains between 8 and 9 members (mean for the period 2005 to 2010 is 8.54 
directors). According to Thornton’s corporate governance report review (2012), the 
average number of directors in the board within FTSE 100 was 11 directors in 2012, 
and 8.4 directors in companies within FTSE 250, with a minimum board size of 4 
members. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, p 11), suggests that the board 
of directors should be “of sufficient size” and, therefore the code does not give a 
range of numbers which can be used to determine an effective board size. A study by 
Abdullah and Page (2009) reported that the average board size for FTSE 350 non-
financial companies between the periods 1999 to 2004 has declined from 10.11 in 
1999 to 9.08 in 2004. The overall sample used in this thesis indicates that the board 
size continued to decrease from 9.08 members in 2004 (as reported by Abdullah and 
Page, 2009), to 8.55 in 2005 and 8.391 in 2010.  
In addition to the board size, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, p 11) 
recommends an appropriate balance of independence in the board by having an 
appropriate number of independent non-executive directors. Thus, if there are more 
than 50% of dependent directors, it can be considered that the average board 
composition is to some extent dominated by them. Despite the increased number of 
independent directors between 1999 and 2004 from about 3 directors to 4 directors 
respectively (Abdullah and Page. 2009), the percentage of board independence 
remained low at 42%. Our sample results, shows that the number of independent 
directors continued to increase, from 4.15 in 2005, to 4.386 in 2010 (51.85% 
independent board of directors), which agrees with Mura’s (2007) findings on UK 
non-financial companies between 1991 and 2001, and Abdullah and Page’s (2009) 
for the period between 1999 and 2004 exclusively. This suggests an increased 
awareness of the recommendations on corporate governance which been developed 
between 1992 and 2012.  Furthermore, comparing the average percentage of 
independent directors’ between pre-financial crisis 2005-2007, and during the 
142 
 
financial crisis 2008-2010, it can be seen that the level of independent directors 
compared to the total board size, remained unaffected, with 49.717 % and 50.123% 
pre-financial crisis and post-financial crisis respectively. 
Another major corporate governance mechanism is the structure of corporate 
ownership and the concentration of such ownership, because this can relate to the 
way in which the corporation is controlled and the level of monitoring of the board of 
directors by blockholders who own significant shareholdings, particularly 
institutional shareholders. In this thesis, ownership structure was studied in three 
main categories. First, managerial ownership, defined in terms of the percentage of 
shares owned by board members of the company’s total share capital. Second, 
blockholdings, defined in terms of the total percentage of significant shareholdings 
owned by individuals (including directors and their partners) and institutions22. 
Finally, institutional blockholdings, defined in terms of the total percentage of shares 
owned by top-20 shareholders who have the highest total investment in the 363 
companies under study.  
In terms of ownership structure, as the statistics in table 5.1a show, the average 
managerial ownership remains around 5% (4.93%) for the period between 2005 and 
2010 inclusive, which is less than the mean average of the managerial ownership of 
6% for the period between 1999 and 2004 as reported by Abdullah and Page (2009). 
While the average number of substantial shareholdings (over 3% share interest) has 
increased between 2005 and 2010, from 35.29% to 43.80% respectively (the average 
over the six-year period is 40.87%). The figures show the average means for 
blockholdings for the periods before the credit crisis (2005 to 2007) and during the 
credit crisis (2008 to 2010), with an average mean of 37.97% and 43.76% 
respectively. These results show a considerable increase in blockholdings, not only 
from the period immediately before the financial crises on 2008, but also compared 
22 Significant shareholding is defined by ownership of at least 3% of the corporate share capital. 
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to the period between 1999 and 2004, where the average mean for this period was 
29.2% (Abdulla & Page, 2009). Also, the average number of blockholders has 
increased from 4.84 in 2005 to 5.83 in 2010, in particular the average number of 
institutional shareholders which increased from 3.44  in 2005 to 4.18 in 2010 (mean 
over the six year period for the total number of blockholders is 5.55 with around four 
of them institutional shareholders). Substantial shareholdings by institutions from the 
top-20 institutional shareholders have also increased during the period 2005 to 2010 
from 21.59% to 27.06% respectively (the average for the period 2005 to 2010 
inclusive is 25.1%).  
In addition to the corporate governance variables, it is important to explain the 
trends of the performance measures used in this thesis. The following table (table 
5.2) provides comparative trends for the industries identified for the sample. The 
clear observation, which can be made here, is that the average performance measures 
have declined for all industries during the financial crisis, regardless of the type of 
performance measure or industry. This can be explained by the effect of the financial 
crisis on financial markets particularly in the UK and USA. Amongst all the 
industries, the figures shows that the industrial sector had the highest ROE pre-
financial crisis, however between 2008 and 2010, the average ROE for the industrial 
sector dropped by around 40% (from 24.84% to 15.27%).  
In terms of Return on Assets, the figures shows that the energy sector was the 
highest performer during the period 2005 to 2007 (with an average industry ROA of 
9.21%) and remained the highest performer during the financial crises with 5.97%, 
followed by the technology industry at 5.62%. The average performance of the 
technology industry was the least influenced by the financial crises, where the 
industry average performance in ROA, ROE and ROCE have experienced the 
smallest drop compared to the other industries. This can be explained by the 
extraordinary developments in information technology, particularly mobile 
technology, between 2008 and the present. 
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Variable Sector 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
TQ Others 1.92 2.08 1.79 1.27 1.44 1.49 1.66 
  Technology 2.05 2.19 1.91 1.30 1.66 1.79 1.81 
  Energy 1.94 2.17 2.12 1.29 1.61 1.69 1.80 
  Consumer services  2.04 2.13 1.81 1.40 1.60 1.61 1.76 
  Leisure  1.84 2.19 1.72 1.28 1.48 1.48 1.67 
  Industrial 1.91 2.04 1.73 1.24 1.45 1.54 1.65 
ROA  % Others 8.64 9.06 7.75 2.61 4.31 6.27 6.44 
  Technology 6.10 7.10 7.87 4.82 4.99 7.04 6.32 
  Energy 8.74 8.57 10.34 7.01 4.19 6.70 7.59 
  Consumer services  5.81 6.37 5.74 3.00 4.04 4.85 4.97 
  Leisure  5.30 8.71 10.18 5.23 3.21 4.69 6.22 
  Industrial 7.51 7.70 8.97 4.95 3.98 5.27 6.40 
ROE % Others 24.45 23.03 23.55 8.08 7.68 13.64 16.74 
  Technology 15.15 16.04 16.83 13.05 8.39 14.69 14.03 
  Energy 23.21 22.08 23.93 22.59 8.38 17.36 19.59 
  Consumer services  17.81 15.99 14.22 13.16 9.27 13.23 13.95 
  Leisure  12.14 26.17 27.03 16.24 6.07 13.01 16.78 
  Industrial 23.44 25.19 25.89 20.38 10.83 14.61 20.06 
ROCE % Others 38.79 38.56 40.13 16.60 10.45 13.74 26.38 
  Technology 32.37 31.19 36.18 25.96 14.88 21.88 27.08 
  Energy 28.83 29.40 36.47 30.98 17.53 22.81 27.67 
  Consumer services  33.89 26.96 28.35 30.05 22.80 26.24 28.05 
  Leisure  23.48 17.49 16.30 23.33 7.03 17.36 17.50 
  Industrial 43.38 43.52 46.44 38.46 24.85 31.65 38.05 
Table 5.2 a comparison of performance between different industries 
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 Finally, many studies have suggested that the practices of corporate 
governance can vary between industries (such as Black et al., 2006 and Henry, 2008). 
Hence, we expanded the corporate governance variables according to the industries to 
enable a comparison between such industries and to assess whether such variation 
exists in our sample (table 5.3).  
 
Variable Sector 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
BSZE Others 8.50 8.31 8.48 8.41 8.18 7.96 8.31 
  Technology 9.06 9.09 8.85 8.84 8.50 8.33 8.78 
  Energy 9.09 9.40 9.21 9.37 9.25 9.34 9.28 
  Consumer services  8.30 8.79 8.45 8.35 8.16 7.91 8.33 
  Leisure  9.32 8.45 8.92 9.24 9.04 8.68 8.94 
  Industrial 7.91 7.82 8.05 8.19 8.03 8.25 8.04 
BIND Others 49.34 51.33 49.70 53.66 53.94 51.28 51.54 
  Technology 48.09 50.75 50.71 50.61 53.90 51.62 50.95 
  Energy 52.60 52.69 54.45 53.73 53.73 55.12 53.72 
  Consumer services  48.85 49.64 51.49 53.27 51.22 54.17 51.44 
  Leisure  43.73 48.65 49.68 49.77 50.24 46.51 48.10 
  Industrial 46.59 46.84 49.86 50.68 51.48 49.88 49.22 
MGOW Others 3.20 3.33 3.39 3.31 4.51 4.73 3.74 
  Technology 5.34 4.63 5.18 5.75 4.84 4.73 5.08 
  Energy 4.62 5.30 6.26 6.13 6.31 6.36 5.83 
  Consumer services  7.10 6.32 7.33 7.20 6.71 6.35 6.83 
  Leisure  7.67 6.98 2.93 3.06 2.86 1.66 4.19 
  Industrial 3.23 3.66 3.31 3.35 3.29 3.47 3.39 
BKOW Others 35.63 36.94 45.00 47.18 43.18 42.24 41.70 
  Technology 36.57 41.04 45.96 48.42 47.48 47.82 44.55 
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Variable Sector 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
  Energy 34.22 34.66 37.11 38.33 38.12 37.43 36.65 
  Consumer services  36.27 40.82 41.00 45.43 44.43 44.26 42.04 
  Leisure  37.19 38.09 43.33 46.39 46.00 43.98 42.50 
  Industrial 33.77 34.63 38.41 41.52 43.05 44.90 39.38 
INSOW Others 18.98 23.45 28.26 28.98 25.50 26.81 25.33 
  Technology 25.14 25.05 28.88 29.16 29.62 31.70 28.26 
  Energy 15.65 17.30 19.12 18.77 19.57 17.21 17.94 
  Consumer services  21.42 21.76 23.85 25.61 24.86 24.98 23.75 
  Leisure  22.52 20.96 25.22 21.14 24.25 23.37 22.91 
  Industrial 23.26 24.17 29.34 31.61 31.91 32.29 28.76 
         
FSZE Others 6.60 6.67 6.84 6.99 7.02 7.10 6.87 
  Technology 6.06 6.07 6.25 6.40 6.41 6.44 6.27 
  Energy 7.09 7.18 7.33 7.63 7.69 7.89 7.47 
  Consumer services  6.35 6.38 6.50 6.60 6.62 6.57 6.50 
  Leisure  6.93 6.90 7.14 7.28 7.14 7.18 7.09 
  Industrial 6.10 6.26 6.43 6.67 6.65 6.65 6.46 
Table 5.3 a comparison of corporate governance characteristics between different industries. Where BSZE 
is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of 
directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives 
and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned 
by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to 
the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; 
FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
 
In terms of board size, it can be noticed from table 5.3 that companies within 
the energy sector tend to have larger boards then those within the Technology, 
Consumer services, Leisure, and Industrials. In addition to the political visibility of 
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Energy companies, and their technical nature of activities, this can be due to that the 
size of Energy companies, are larger than the companies in other sector due to the 
nature of their products that they deliver. It can be also observed from the correlation 
analysis where a positive relationship was observed between the board size and 
company size (see Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient tables in Chapter 5 appendices, 
APEX 5.3). In respect to the board independence, the figures shows that all the 
industries, complies with the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code in relation to a balance between executive and independent non-executive 
directors. The mean board independence ratio for the Energy industry is the highest 
with 53.72%, which can be correlated with the board size. 
Regarding ownership structure, the figures indicated that managerial ownership 
in Consumer Services and Energy Industries are higher than other industries with 
mean of 6.83% and 5.83% respectively. However, the level of substantial 
shareholding (including institutional shareholding) are less in Energy companies then 
other sectors with average mean of 36.65%. This could be due to that aligning the 
interest of managers to the interest of shareholders through managerial ownership 
and/or the balanced corporate board with independent directors is viewed as a 
satisfactory monitoring mechanisms which also, as it will be seen later in this 
chapter, evident in the negative correlation between board independence and 
blockholding level. The following paragraph provides the results for the univariate 
and multivariate regression between the variables studied in this thesis. 
 
5.3. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient and Ordinary least 
Square regression  
The Pearson’s correlation, as well as the regression analysis, is an important 
step in data description and provides useful tool to test some of the OLS 
assumptions, in particular testing for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, which are 
essential steps before OLS analysis. Firstly, Pearson’s correlation analysis was 
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conducted between the explanatory variables, followed by testing the correlation 
between the independent variables, then the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and independent variables. In addition to the VIF analysis, Pearson’s 
correlation analysis will determine whether there is a high correlation coefficient 
between the explanatory variables, which can suggest a multicollinearity problem.  
 
5.3.1. Pearson’s Correlation coefficient analysis between the 
independent variables 
Chapter 4 appendices table APEX5.1 to APEX5.12 provides the results of the 
Pearson’s correlation analysis between the independent variables. The results suggest 
a very low and insignificant correlation between the board size and the level of board 
independence. The results also suggest a positive significant correlation between 
managerial ownership and block ownership, which indicates that with higher 
managerial ownership, a larger proportion of shares will be owned by blockholders23. 
This positive correlation can be explained by the fact that blockholders recognise the 
importance of aligning the interest of managers to the interest of shareholders through 
share ownership. In contrast, the results show a negative correlation between 
managerial ownership and institutional blockholders, which can be explained by the 
fact that having institutional shareholders from the top 20 institutional investors is 
considered as effective monitoring mechanism to control the agency theory problem 
in ensuring that the board is working for the interest of shareholders.  
The correlation analysis for the lagged variables of board size and board 
independence shows high significant positive correlation (significant at the 0.01 
level) as well as a positive correlation with each board structure variable and its 
23 It is important to note that managerial ownership (if >3%) was excluded when identifying block 
ownership because it could correlate managerial ownership block ownership. In other words, only 
outsider blockholders were included. 
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lagged variables.  Furthermore, examining the association between the board size 
(lagged variable) and current board independence level shows insignificant 
correlation except in 2009, where the results show a positive correlation between the 
board size in 2009 and the board independence ratio in 2010 at a significant level 
(0.183**). Generally, the results suggest that the board size has no relationship with 
the independence of the board.  
Examining the association across lagged values for the ownership structure 
revealed an extremely high positive correlation between the previous and current 
year’s values (almost perfect correlation) with a high statistical significance at the 
0.01 level, particularly for the percentage owned by directors (MGOW), where the 
correlation between previous and current years’ percentages was +0.97. In contrast, 
the results show a negative correlation between the total percentage owned by board 
members and the number of blockholders with a very high significance at the 0.01 
level (except in 2005, where the significance level is 0.05).  
In terms of lagged correlation, the results revealed a significant positive 
correlation between the percentage owned by board members and the percentage 
owned by blockholders at mixed significant levels (at the 0.05 level in 2005, and the 
0.01 level in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010). Similar findings were reported when 
examining the correlation between the variables within the same year’s values. 
Examination of the association between total percentages of shares owned by board 
members and the number of institutional blockholders from the top-20 shareholders 
(INSOW) shows a negative correlation between lagged ownership and the number of 
top-20 institutional shareholders with a high statistical significance at the 0.01 level.  
Regarding the relationship with the control variables, the results, shows an 
expected positive correlation between board size and company size, which can be 
explained by that the larger the company is, the more expertise and talents needed to 
manage the assets of this company, while in contrast the smaller the company the 
smaller the board needed. Similar findings are reported with respect to the 
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relationship between board size and board independence ratio, where a positive 
correlation found. However, a negative correlation was found between the ownership 
variables (i.e. MGOW, BKOW, and INSOW) and company size; however these 
negative correlation are low.  
Despite the statistical significant correlation between some of the explanatory 
variables, such correlations are not high enough to indicate the problem of 
multicollinerity. In addition, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), tolerance statistics and 
eigenvalues were tested to test for serious multicollinearity problem. The following table 
provides the value in which each tests indicates any existence of serious 
multicollinearity. 
 
Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) 
VIF statistic with less than the value of ten indicates non-
existence of severe multicollinearity problem 
Tolerance statistics 
 
 
Tolerance statistic close to one means that there is little 
multicollinearity, whereas a value close to zero suggests that 
multicolliearity may be a threat 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
Eigenvalues above the critical value of zero indicates that 
multicollineratiy may not be a problem 
Table 5.4 The values in which each measure indicates the existence of multicollinearity 
 
As it can be seen from chapter 5 appendices tables APEX 5.16a and 5.16b, The 
results indicates that  multicollinearity is not a serious problem between all the 
independent variables, since none of the variables has a VIF value of over ten, 
tolerance statistics close to zero, or eigenvalues bellow the critical value of zero. 
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Finally, regarding the Pearson’s correlation between the independent variables 
and dependent variables, the results did not report high correlation or sufficient 
evidence of significant correlation between the independent variables and the 
performance variables (See APEX5.13 to APEX5.15). Therefore, a multivariate 
regression test has been carried out to take this analysis a step further.  
5.3.2. OLS Results and discussion on the impact of corporate 
governance variables on current corporate performance 
This section provides and discusses the results of the OLS test to examine the 
impact of corporate governance variables on corporate performance using different 
performance measures (TQ, ROA, ROE, ROCE, and Sales Growth). The reason for 
using different performance measures is to expand the results to compare with 
previous studies who applied various performance measures, and to draw possible 
explanation for any conflicting results that might be concluded. The general 
regression model (Equation 1) which has been used to test the hypotheses, is as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽2 +  𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽3 +  𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽4 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽5 +  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽6+  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽7 +  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽8 +  𝜀   
Where: PERF  is the performance measure; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage 
of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of 
board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to 
company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total 
percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders 
according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this 
thesis; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; and INDPERF is the average industry 
performance. 
 
The following paragraphs discuss the results generated from testing the above 
model in respect to the market based measure (TQ) and the accounting based 
measures (ROA, ROE, ROCE, and Sales Growth) 
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5.3.2.1. Board Size impact on the Market performance measure (TQ) 
Table 5.5 presents the results generated from the model using Tobin’s Q (TQ) 
as the market performance measure. The results show that the F-statistics are positive 
and statistically significant at 0.01 levels. This suggests that the null hypothesis (that 
the coefficients of the corporate governance variables used in the model are jointly 
equal to zero) can be rejected. In other words, the general model description suggests 
that the coefficients of the corporate governance variables included in the model can 
jointly explain significant variations in the TQ of the sampled companies. The 
adjusted R² is between 10 and 14 per cent across the sample period, which means 
that at least 10 to 14 per cent of the variance in the sampled firms’ Tobin’s Q can be 
explained by the corporate governance variables. 
The results report a consistent and significant positive correlation between 
board size (BSZE) and Tobin’s Q (TQ) throughout the sample period at significance 
level of 0.01 (except 2008 and 2009 where the significance level is 0.05). This result 
supports the findings of previous empirical studies, such as Adams and Mehran 
(2005), Neeraj and Kumar (2005), Beiner et al., (2006); and Berming and Frick 
(2010). These studies also conclude that a significant positive association exists 
between board size and Tobin’s Q. Using ∆TQ and the average of TQ for the 2005-
2007 and the 2008-2010 period shows a similar positive association between Board 
size and TQ. However, the results are less significant with ∆TQ from 2008 until 
2010 this could be due to the global financial crises, which influenced the average 
TQ for some industries more than others, did. In contrast, the findings are 
inconsistent with many previous empirical studies which report that a large board 
size can have a negative impact on TQ, such as Yermach (1996), Conyon and Peck 
(1998); Guest (2009), Bhaghat and Black (2002), Lasfer (2004); Maka and Kusandib 
(2005), Kumar and Singh (2013). 
A possible explanation for the inconsistent results is that most of these studies 
have used a data set that covers a period prior to 2006, where some major changes to 
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the corporate governance codes were introduced (such as The Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance revisions 2006 to 2012). In particular, about the features of 
effective board of directors, this includes a sufficient board size that consists of a 
balance between executive and non-executive directors. The results are also 
inconsistent with the agency theory prediction, that a larger board of directors can 
have a negative impact on performance due to the increase of separation between 
ownership and control (thus higher conflict of interest). However, as mentioned 
previously, this can be explained by the revisions of the corporate governance codes 
since 2006. This highlighted the importance of skilled and experienced non-
executive directors as an effective mechanism to reduce the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers. The code has encouraged more companies to 
maintain balance between number of executive directors and skilled and experienced 
non-executive directors, and therefore, the larger the board the more independent 
directors, and therefore the less conflict of interest (which can positively influence 
performance). 
Theoretically, the result supports the argument that a large board of directors 
offers a good advantage to the company because it can provide a larger amount of 
expertise and information to the table. It enhances the performance of the firm and a 
large board of directors with a large proportion of non-executive directors can 
provide sufficient information that can be useful to enhance the effectiveness of the 
management and therefore the increase in the company’s performance (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005). In addition, the result supports Lehn et al., (2003) argument that a 
larger board of directors can spread the power within the board evenly and therefore 
reduces the risk of potential influence by dominant members and improves the 
efficiency of decision-making process because of information sharing. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2005 2005 2.209* 0.090*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.001 -0.00 -0.00* -0.23*** -0.08 0.134 7.179*** 
TQ2006 2006 2.216 0.091*** 0.014*** 4.985 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.26*** 0.200 0.107 6.045*** 
TQ2007 2007 0.972 0.073*** 0.009** -4.64 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.22*** 0.852*** 0.123 7.167*** 
TQ2008 2008 0.898 0.030** 0.007*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.11*** 0.782 0.120 6.993*** 
TQ2009 2009 1.137 0.046** 0.006** -2.35 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.12*** 0.633 0.052 3.388*** 
TQ2010 2010 0.634 0.058*** 0.005* 0.000 -0.00*** -1.10 -0.00 -0.13*** 0.906** 0.069 4.022*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052007 2005 3.021** 0.082*** 0.015*** 0.000** 0.002 -0.00 -0.00 -0.20*** -0.67 0.094 5.172*** 
AvTQ20052007 2006 2.739* 0.089*** 0.014*** 0.000 0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** -0.24 0.115 6.459*** 
AvTQ20052007 2007 1.800*** 0.075*** 0.005 3.210 0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.22*** 0.538* 0.119 6.942*** 
AvTQ20082010 2008 2.198*** 0.042** 0.009*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.16*** 0.012 0.100 5.911*** 
AvTQ20082010 2009 1.428** 0.052** 0.007** -7.00 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.15*** 0.461 0.075 4.566*** 
AvTQ20082010 2010 0.987 0.064*** 0.005* 5.214 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.12*** 0.528 0.059 3.593*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
∆TQ2005 2005 2.182 0.112*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.25*** -1.13 0.113 6.071*** 
∆TQ2006 2006 3.562** 0.093*** 0.014*** 8.776 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.27*** -1.45* 0.106 5.953*** 
∆TQ2007 2007 1.155* 0.076*** 0.010** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.23*** -0.26 0.093 5.513*** 
∆TQ2008 2008 1.008 0.022 0.002 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.08*** -0.20 0.065 4.054*** 
∆TQ2009 2009 1.099 0.044* 0.004 -2.70 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.10*** -0.42 0.009 1.401 
∆TQ2010 2010 0.914 0.058** 0.006* 0.000 -0.00** 0.000 -0.00 -0.13*** -0.31 0.026 2.104** 
Table 5.5 TQ measures regressed against the identified explanatory and control variables. Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's 
assets; AvTQ20052007 is the average TQ for the period 2005 to 2007; ∆TQ is the difference between each company's TQ and Average Q for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total 
number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of 
directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, 
family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total 
number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets. INDTQ is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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5.3.2.2. Board Size and accounting performance measures  
Board size was also tested against the accounting performance measures to 
identify whether the impact of this corporate governance variable varies between 
different performance measures. Table 5.6 provides the results for the regression for 
all the accounting based measures. Initial observations which can be made from the 
results suggest that, unlike the Tobin’s Q results, there are no significant indications 
that board size has any explanatory power over Return on Assets (ROA) during all 
the sample periods.  
The results suggest mixed observations across the sample period, where in 
some cases the relationship is positive, in particular pre-global financial crisis period. 
However, most of the results show a negative association between board size and 
accounting based measures, and such results are insignificant. For instance for 2005, 
2006 and 2010, the results suggest a positive association between board size and 
performance, while the correlation is insignificant. Regarding the period 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 the OLS results show a negative association between board size and ROA, 
however similar to the other years, the relationship is statistically insignificant. Using 
alternative accounting based performance measures (ROE and ROCE, as reported in 
tables APEX5.17; APEX5.18; APEX 5.19) shows similar results to those ROA. 
A possible explanation for these mixed results is that companies with larger 
board of directors were not efficient enough to respond to the challenges caused by 
the global financial crises. Theoretically, this is consistent with the argument that a 
large board of directors can suffer from lack of effective communication reduces its 
efficiency to respond to risk and challenges in which the company might face 
(Yermack, 1996).  
Empirically, the negative association between board size and the accounting 
based measures is consistent with many previous studies, such as Goodstein et al., 
(1994) who concluded a negative association with return on share; Bermig and Frick 
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(2010) who reported insignificant negative association with ROA; Lee and Filbeck 
(2006); Guest (2009); Eisenberg et al., (1998); Bozec (2005); Beiner et al., (2004). 
The OLS model at this stage was mainly based on the assumption of a linear 
association between board size and corporate performance; however many studies 
concluded that board size has a non-linear association with performance (Coles et al., 
2008). Therefore, in the following paragraph, we have examined the assumption of 
non-linear relationship between board size and firm performance. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2005 2005 -3.50 0.107 0.050 0.001 0.015 -0.03 0.007 -0.14 1.106*** 0.028 2.158** 
ROA2006 2006 -5.62 0.301 0.095*** 0.003*** 0.008 -0.04 0.009 -0.63* 1.320*** 0.064 3.803*** 
ROA2007 2007 4.950 -0.30 0.002 0.000 -0.01 -0.02 0.008 -0.30 1.047*** 0.048 3.223*** 
ROA2008 2008 6.098 -0.21 0.108*** 0.001 -0.04* -0.06* 0.009 -1.09*** 1.149*** 0.075 4.590*** 
ROA2009 2009 2.715 -0.05 0.043 0.000 -0.05** -0.03 0.004 -0.32 1.109 0.021 1.947* 
ROA2010 2010 4.442 0.000 -0.01 0.002** -0.04** -0.01 0.014** -0.25 0.921** 0.046 2.997*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052007 2005 -2.50 0.150 0.070** 0.002** 0.014 -0.00 0.009 -0.27 0.874*** 0.044 2.839*** 
AvROA20052007 2006 -3.17 0.037 0.056* 0.001* -0.00 -0.02 0.009 -0.32 1.296*** 0.039 2.722*** 
AvROA20052007 2007 4.115 -0.12 -0.00 0.001 0.001 -0.04* 0.009 -0.02 0.666*** 0.035 2.590*** 
AvROA20082010 2008 8.552*** -0.03 0.062** 0.001* -0.05** -0.05** 0.007 -0.82*** 0.459* 0.073 4.459*** 
AvROA20082010 2009 3.770 0.037 0.071** 0.001 -0.04** -0.04* 0.009 -0.62** 0.963 0.043 2.972*** 
AvROA20082010 2010 4.674 0.072 0.018 0.001 -0.05** -0.01 0.009 -0.40 0.569 0.020 1.881* 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROA2005 2005 -3.88 0.119 0.052 0.001 0.015 -0.03 0.007 -0.14 0.107 -0.00 0.786 
∆ROA2006 2006 -5.22 0.311 0.093*** 0.003*** 0.006 -0.04 0.009 -0.63* 0.270 0.041 2.788*** 
∆ROA2007 2007 5.128 -0.31 0.001 0.000 -0.01 -0.02 0.008 -0.29 0.054 0.003 1.136 
∆ROA2008 2008 5.923 -0.20 0.106*** 0.001 -0.04* -0.06* 0.009 -1.07*** 0.149 0.045 3.084*** 
∆ROA2009 2009 2.252 -0.07 0.043 0.000 -0.05** -0.03 0.004 -0.29 0.181 0.016 1.703* 
∆ROA2010 2010 4.440 0.002 -0.01 0.002** -0.04** -0.01 0.014** -0.22 -0.09 0.034 2.449** 
Table 5.6 ROA measures regressed against the identified explanatory and control variables. Where ROA Net Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; 
AvROA20052007 is the average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROA20082010 is the average ROA for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROA is the difference between each company's 
ROA and Average ROA for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; 
MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's 
share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been 
classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of 
years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROA is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively.
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5.3.2.3. Testing for Non-linearity assumption for the relationship 
between board size and performance 
In addition to the linearity assumption, we have also examined whether non-
linearity assumption for the board size exists and to compare with previous studies 
who observed a non-linear relationship (quadratic or cubic) with firm performance. 
Table 5.7 shows the outcomes of the OLS regression assuming non-linearity of board 
size where, in addition to the ordinary value of board size variable, the quadratic and 
cubic value are included in the model (i.e. BSZE; BSZE2; BSZE3), using the 
following equation: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸2𝛽2 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸3𝛽3 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽4 +  𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽5+  𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽6 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽7 +  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽8 +  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽9+  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽10 +  𝜀 (8) 
 
  TQ2005 TQ2006 TQ2007 TQ2008 TQ2009 TQ2010 
Const 3.263** 3.908* 1.715 1.266 0.665 0.956 
BSZE -0.22 -0.34 -0.17 -0.07 0.201 -0.03 
BSZE2 0.029 0.040 0.025 0.010 -0.01 0.008 
BSZE3 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 
BIND 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.005* 
MGOW 0.006 5.220 -4.86 0.00** 1.153 0.000 
BKOW 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 .-0.00*** .-0.00** .-0.00*** 
INSOW -0.00 .-0.00* .-0.00** .-0.00** .-0.00* 9.124 
FAGE .-0.00* -0.00 -0.00 .-0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
FSZE -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.11 .-0.12*** -0.13 
INDTQ -0.10 0.113 0.856** 0.763 0.634 0.898** 
Adj R2 0.131 0.106 0.119 0.115 0.046 0.063 
F-test 5.807*** 4.995*** 5.758*** 5.584*** 2.709*** 3.205*** 
Table 5.7 Regression with nonlinear assumption of board size in one-equation setting on TQ using OLS, 
and adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of board size. Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of 
a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BSZE2 
is squared value of the total number of directors in the board; BSZE3 is cubic value of the total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW 
percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); 
BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total 
number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is 
number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDTQ is 
the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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ROA2005 ROA2006 ROA2007 ROA2008 ROA2009 ROA2010 
Const -4.82 -8.48 -2.26 30.26** 3.737 15.80 
BSZE 0.815 2.006 2.567 -6.84 -0.15 -3.41 
BSZE2 -0.12 -0.25 -0.35 0.561 -0.01 0.330 
BSZE3 0.005 0.010 0.013 -0.01 0.001 -0.00 
BINDR 0.052 0.098*** 0.005 0.110*** 0.044 -0.01 
MGOW 0.059 0.003*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002** 
BKOW 0.008 0.000 -0.02 -0.05* -0.05** -0.05** 
INSOW -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 
FAGE 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.014** 
FSZE -0.08 -0.66* -0.28 -1.19*** -0.33 -0.29 
INDTQ 1.118*** 1.330*** 1.063*** 1.163*** 1.086 0.905** 
Adj R2 0.029 0.068 0.052 0.086 0.016 0.044 
F-test 1.952** 3.421*** 2.904*** 4.306*** 1.571 2.497*** 
Table 5.8 Regression with nonlinear assumption of board size in one-equation setting on ROA using OLS, 
and adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of board size. Where ROA Net Income divided by Average 
Total Assets multiplied by 100; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BSZE2 is squared value of 
the total number of directors in the board; BSZE3 is cubic value of the total number of directors in the 
board; BIND is percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW percentage of 
total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is 
Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, 
institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional 
shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of 
shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of 
years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROA is the 
Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
As it can be noticed from the above table, the results show that BSZE; BSZE2; 
BSZE3, have no systematic association with either the accounting performance 
measure (ROA), or with the market performance measure (TQ), across the period of 
the tested sample. Hence, it can be reported that despite the negative and positive 
coefficients, such association is not significant and therefore statistically there is not 
enough evidence to support the non-linear association (neither quadratic nor cubic) 
between board size and performance. These observations are inconsistent with the 
findings of Coles et al., (2008) who found a U-shaped relationship between board 
size and Tobin's Q. The results confirm the OLS regression and the hypothesis that 
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large board of directors can reduce the agency theory problem by minimising the risk 
of hiding information and reduce the problem of data manipulation. 
 
5.3.2.4. Board Independence and Market performance measure (TQ) 
The independence of the board of directors was also tested to examine whether 
such a mechanism can reduce the problem arising from the separation between 
ownership and control. Table 5.5 shows the results of the regression model for the 
independence of the board of directors against TQ. Theoretically, the expectations 
are that independent directors play a positive role in ensuring that executive directors 
are managing the company’s resources for the interest of shareholders, hence the 
expected hypothesis is that large proportion of independent directors in the board 
will have a positive correlation with the firm performance. It is important to note that 
the F-tests throughout the sample period are significant which indicates that the 
overall estimation of the model is good. The adjusted R2 is low; however this does 
not necessarily mean that such low R2 is not acceptable since the focus is on the 
coefficient sign (whether positive or negative) rather than the magnitude of the 
coefficient. In addition, reviewing previous empirical studies on corporate 
governance and firm performance can reveal that similar R2 values were observed, 
which suggests that our model R2 is acceptable. 
The results in table 5.5 show a consistent positive coefficient between the ratio 
of independent directors in the board and TQ. This positive correlation is statistically 
significant at 0.01 levels. Similar observations are also reported when using the 
average TQ for the periods before and during the financial crisis, as well as ∆TQ. 
Theoretically, the results are consistent with the hypothesis and the view that 
independent directors can provide an effective monitory tools to reduce the agency 
problem (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), and that the presence of independent directors 
can provide an effective mechanism to pursue executive directors to work for the 
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interest of shareholders. The results are also in line with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012), that independent directors increase the effectiveness of 
board of directors. Thus, the hypothesis in this case is accepted. On the other hand, 
the results are inconsistent with some views, which argue that independent directors 
might cooperate with the executive directors on return of private benefits, higher 
compensations, or re-elections (utility maximises) and therefore this can have a 
negative impact on the performance of the company. In addition, the results disagree 
with the views that higher shareholders protection makes higher independent board 
unnecessary (La Porta et al., 2000).  
Empirically, the results are consistent with some previous studies that 
concluded a significant positive correlation between board independence and firm 
performance Tobin’s Q, such as Mura (2007) and Muravyev et al., (2014), which 
both used UK listed companies. However, the results are inconsistent with many 
prior studies that found a negative relationship between board independence and 
Tobin’s Q, such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Yermack (1996); Bhagat and Black 
(2002); Guest (2009); Coles et al., (2008). The results also disagree with other 
empirical studies that reported no relationship between independent directors and 
firm’s market performance measures, such as Mehran (1995); Weir et al., (2002); 
Gani and Jarmias (2006); Pham et al., (2008). A possible reason why our results are 
inconsistent and in contrast with these previous studies is that all of these studies 
have used data related to the period before 2002 (Guest 2009 sample period was 
1981-2002; Coles et al. 2008, sample period was 1992-2001), where the 
independence of board of directors was not clearly defined. The Combined Code in 
2003 highlighted this issue when the circumstances in which the independence of a 
director could be influenced were clearly listed, and clearly suggested that at least 
half of the board of directors should consist of independent non-executive directors.  
Thus, our sample supports the recommendations of the UK Corporate 
Governance code and suggests that companies are recognising the importance of 
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independent non-executive directors in monitoring executives  and ensuring that the 
interest of shareholders are protected. In addition, before year 2002 (where most of 
the previous studies covered), the importance of skilled and experienced independent 
non-executive directors was not clearly suggested by the corporate governance 
codes, and since the Combined Code in 2003, these two characteristics were clearly 
highlighted. 
The relationship between board independence and firm performance was also 
examined using different accounting based measures (ROA, ROE, and ROCE) and 
changes in Sales. The coefficients generated from the OLS regression for all these 
performance measures are all similar to the coefficients of TQ which also suggests a 
positive relationship between board independence and performance, however the 
significance of the relationship vary between the different measures used. In regard 
to the ROA measure, as presented in Table 5.6, the coefficient of the independent 
directors is highly significant in 2005 with the average ROA 2005-2007 (at 0.05 
level); and statistically significant in 2006 and 2008 with ROA measures (ROA, 
average ROA and ∆ROA), with Average ROA in 2009, and a negative but 
insignificant coefficient with ROA and ∆ROA in 2010.  
Regarding the other accounting based performance measures, the results 
(presented in tables APEX 5.17; APEX 5.18; APEX 5.19) shows a positive 
relationship between independent directors and Return on Equity. The relationship is 
significant at 0.1 level from the period 2008 to 2010. The results show an 
insignificant relationship between board independence and Return on Capital 
Employed. These findings are consistent with many previous empirical studies that 
also reported a positive association with mixed significance levels between board 
independence and the accounting based measures used in this study. This includes 
Noor and Fadzil (2013) who found positive relationship between board independence 
and ROA, Schellenger et al., (1989) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) who also found 
positive relationship between board independence and ROE; Dahya and McConnell 
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(2007) concluded positive association with accounting earnings; and ZainalAbidin et 
al., (2009). However, the results are inconsistent with the findings of Guest (2009); 
Bhagat and Black (2002); Yermack (1996) who found a negative relationship 
between the proportion of non-executive independent directors and ROA. In 
addition, it is inconsistent with the results of Zahra and Stanton (1988); Mehran 
(1995); and Weir and Liang (2001) who found no relationship between the number 
of independent directors and ROA.  
The positive association between the proportion of independent directors and 
firm performance can be due to directors that are more independent. This means that 
there is more transparency and disclosure of information since they have no interest 
in keeping or hiding such information from shareholders, and this supports the 
agency theory view that with independent directors in the board more monitoring to 
executive directors can be achieved, and information asymmetry problem can be 
reduced. Empirically, this was supported by O’Sullivan (2000) who concluded that 
with more independent directors in the board more extensive auditing can be done. It 
was concluded there was a positive relationship between the number of independent 
non-executive directors and the level of transparency and disclosure in the firm. 
Another explanation to the positive association between board independence and 
firm performance is that with more skilled and experienced independent non-
executives more effective monitoring and advisory tool can be provided to the 
executive directors to manage their capital more efficiently and therefore increase 
return on capital.  
 
5.3.2.5. Managerial Ownership vs Market performance measure 
From the previous literature, it is evident that the conclusions on the 
relationship between directors’ share ownership and corporate performance are mix. 
Many studies supported the non-linear relationship between the proportion of shares 
owned by insiders and firm performance (Morck et al., 1988; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
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1991; McConnell & Servaes, 1990 & 1995; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Florackis, 
2005; Khurshed et al., 2011), while others supported the linear relationship (such as 
Kole, 1996; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999; Crossan, 2011). Others found no significant 
association between the two variables (Mehran, 1995; Eckbo & Smith, 1998; Cho, 
1998). Hence, this thesis examined the coefficient between the proportion of 
insiders’ ownership and corporate performance, by testing the non-linearity 
assumption by including the squared value of the managerial ownership variable. 
Using the market based performance measure Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable, the results of the OLS regression in Table 5.5 shows a positive coefficient 
prior credit crises, while a negative coefficient during the credit crises. This supports 
the alignment of interest hypothesis for the first period and the entrenchment 
hypothesis for the period during the credit crises, however these coefficients are 
statistically insignificant (except in year 2008) and therefore there is not enough 
statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that managerial ownership align the 
interest of directors to the interest of shareholders. The statistically significant and 
negative correlation between insiders’ ownership and Tobin’s Q supports the 
entrenchment hypothesis (Leech & Leahy, 1991; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999; Kole, 
1996; Short & Keasey, 1999; Beiner et al., 2006).  
A further test was also completed to test whether there is any cubic relationship 
between insiders’ ownership and performance by including MGOW, MGOW2, and 
MGOW3 in the regression model, using the following equation: 
 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽2 + 𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽3 + MGOW2𝛽4 + MGOW3𝛽5+  𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽6 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽7 +  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽8 +  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽9+  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽10 +  𝜀 (9) 
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TQ2005 TQ2006 TQ2007 TQ2008 TQ2009 TQ2010 
Const 2.117* 2.505 1.119* 1.124* 1.275* 0.807 
BSZE 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.076*** 0.031** 0.049** 0.065*** 
BIND 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.006*** 0.005* 0.005* 
MGOW -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04** -0.06 -0.06* 
MGOW2 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002* 0.004 0.003 
MGOW3 -5.10 -2.35 3.770 -4.84* -6.75 -4.31 
BKOW 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** 
INSOW -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 
FSZE -0.23*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.16*** 
FAGE -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
INDTQ 0.016 0.193 0.851*** 0.714 0.680 0.949** 
Adj R2 0.133 0.113 0.123 0.126 0.058 0.078 
F-test 5.902*** 5.267*** 5.894*** 6.100*** 3.145*** 3.766*** 
Table 5.9 Regression with nonlinear assumption of managerial ownership in one-equation setting on TQ using OLS, and 
adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of managerial ownership. Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a 
firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BSZE2 is squared 
value of the total number of directors in the board; BSZE3 is cubic value of the total number of directors in the board; 
BIND is percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors; MGOW2 percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared; 
MGOW3 is percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors cube; BKOW is Percentage of total 
shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government 
...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDTQ is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
As it can be seen from Table 5.9, the results show a consistent negative 
association between Managerial Ownership and T Q, a consistent positive 
association with the MGOW2, and a consistent negative association with MGOW3. 
This supports the curvilinear relationship, where the entrancement hypothesis is 
supported at low and high level of ownership, while the alignment hypothesis is 
supported at medium level of insiders’ ownership. However such coefficients are 
statistically insignificant (except in 2008, where a curvilinear association was 
statistically significant), hence, alignment of interest and entrenchment hypotheses 
are not statistically supported in this thesis.  
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Concerning the significant curvilinear association identified in year 2008, this 
is consistent with many previous empirical studies such as Barnhart and Rosenstein 
(1998). The theoretical implication of this observation is that with a low and high 
proportion of directors’ ownership, directors tend to maximise their own benefits 
over shareholders’ benefits, while at an intermediate level of ownership, the 
alignment between ownership and control is achieved. This can be explained by that 
at a low level of ownership, the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
directors is wide, and therefore low proportion of shares is not enough to align such 
interests. Similarly, with high proportion of shares ownership, directors have high 
voting power to reduce the impact of shareholders activism and to reduce the 
monitoring power in which outsiders can have.  
The positive and negative significant coefficients for the squared and cubic 
managerial ownership support the findings of Morck et al., (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), and the entrenchment hypothesis, that at a very high percentage 
of ownership directors tend to be less likely to manage the company’s assets and 
operations toward the benefits of shareholders. However, it is important to restate 
that, the results across most of the sample period are not statistically significant and 
therefore the hypothesis of a relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s 
Q cannot be supported. 
In relation to the accounting measures, the same procedures as TQ were carried 
using the accounting performance measures. The results are inconsistent with the 
findings observed from using TQ. As it can be noticed, the coefficient between the 
managerial ownership is positive with all the accounting measures used. However, 
these coefficient are not statistically significant in most of the observations 
(significant at 0.01 level with ROA in 2006, and 0.05 level in 2010, at 0.05 and 0.1 
level with average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007, and significant at 0.1 level with 
ROE in 2006).  
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The significant results support the alignment of interest hypothesis that with 
more share ownership, directors have more incentives to increase the performance of 
the firm and therefore maximising shareholders’ wealth. However, the coefficients 
are not significant enough to support such hypothesis. In addition, we have tested for 
possible linear, non-linear, and cubic relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance by including MGOW, MGOW2, and MGOW3. The following table 
presents the results using ROA. The results show a curvilinear relationship however 
with mix relationship. For 2005 and 2006, the results suggests that with a low and 
high managerial ownership (MGOW and MGOW3), the alignment of interest 
hypothesis is supported, while with intermediate proportion of ownership, the 
entrenchment hypothesis is supported. However, for the period between 2007 and 
2010, the results shows that with low and high proportion of insider ownership, 
negative association with ROA can be found, and with intermediate proportion of 
ownership a positive coefficient is concluded.  
These coefficients are only statistically significant at 0.1 levels in 2010, which 
suggests that such relationship observations are not strong and evident enough to, 
empirically, support the curvilinear relationship between ownership and 
performance. Generally, the lack of statistical significance of negative coefficient of 
the managerial ownership does not provide enough empirical evidence to support the 
entrenchment hypothesis. Similarly the lack of statistical significant for the 
entrenchment hypothesis, also the lack of statistical significance of the squared and 
cubic managerial ownership does not provide sufficient support for neither the 
alignment of interest hypothesis, nor the entrenchment hypothesis with all types of 
performance measures used in this thesis.  
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ROA2005 ROA2006 ROA2007 ROA2008 ROA2009 ROA2010 
Const -6.50 -5.78 4.875 7.558* 3.851 6.262* 
BSZE 0.100 0.301 -0.31 -0.18 -0.02 0.069 
BIND 0.059* 0.096*** 0.000 0.102** 0.035 -0.01 
MGOW 0.777 0.076 -0.10 -0.22 -0.42 -0.86* 
MGOW2 -0.05 -0.00 0.011 0.010 0.025 0.055* 
MGOW3 0.000 0.000 -0.00 -8.49 -0.00 -0.00* 
BKOW 0.012 0.007 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05** -0.04* 
INSow -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07** -0.03 -0.02 
FSZE 0.031 -0.63* -0.28 -1.22*** -0.47 -0.56* 
FAGE 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.013** 
INDROA 1.169*** 1.329*** 1.056*** 1.151*** 1.245 1.076*** 
Adj R2 0.04 0.058 0.044 0.072 0.022 0.065 
F-test 2.321** 3.035*** 2.603*** 3.753*** 1.789* 3.286*** 
Table 5.10 Regression with nonlinear assumption of managerial ownership in one-equation setting on ROA 
using OLS, and adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of managerial ownership. Where ROA Net 
Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; BSZE is Total number of directors in the 
board; BIND is percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW percentage of 
total shares owned by members of board of directors; MGOW2 percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors squared; MGOW3 is percentage of total shares owned by members of board 
of directors cube; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by 
any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned 
by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total 
number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is 
number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROA 
is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
5.3.2.6. Blockholders, Institutional blockholders and performance 
In addition to the directors’ ownership and its impact on corporate 
performance, the thesis also examined the impact of blockholders and institutional 
blockholders on corporate performance. Table 5.5 and 5.6 presents the results of the 
regression used to test this relationship between the two categories, blockholders and 
institutional shareholder on corporate performance. The expectation is that 
blockholders can act effectively as a monitoring tool to control and monitor 
executives to minimise the problem of conflict of interest, and therefore the expected 
results is that with large number of shares owned by blockholders, the better the 
corporate performance is. In addition, concerning the institutional shareholders (and 
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due to their expertise, incentives and knowledge) the theoretical expectation is that 
with more shares owned by institutional investors, the higher the shareholders 
activism is and therefore the better the corporate performance. 
Looking at the results presented in table 5.5, a consistent negative coefficient 
between the proportions owned by blockholders and the TQ measures across all the 
periods of the sample. The negative coefficient is statistically insignificant during the 
period pre 2008, but highly significant for the period during the global financial 
crisis (i.e. after 2007) at significant level of 0.01. This high statistically significant 
and negative coefficient suggests that with more substantial shares ownership, board 
of directors become less effective.  
The theoretical implications of this finding are that there is a conflict of interest 
between large external shareholders and other shareholders. In addition, the results 
are in line with the view that with high-dispersed shareholdings, the risk can be 
shared more efficiently across individuals and small shareholders that have control 
rights to the firm based on their share stake in one share one vote rule. The 
significant and negative coefficient can also suggest that the increase of 
blockholdings. This can result on decrease in the corporate value because of possible 
private benefits and interests in the significant shareholders aims to achieve 
individually or by collusion with other blockholders who have similar interests to 
control the firm to their own benefits. This results in a different type of agency 
problem and increases the necessity of investors’ protection, in particular minority 
shareholders protection as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997); and La Porta et 
al., (2000).  
Empirically, the statistically significant coefficient between the proportion of 
blockholding and firm performance is consistent with the findings of Lehmann and 
Weigand (2000); Hughes (2005), and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998); Seifert et al., 
(2005) who reported a negative linear relationship between blockholding and 
performance. In contrast, our results are inconsistent with many empirical findings, 
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who concluded a positive coefficient between blockholding and performance, such as 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1982); McConnell and Servaes 
(1990); Agrawal and Mandelker (1990); Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002); Maury and 
Pajuste (2005); and Tang et al., (2012). 
Many previous empirical studies concluded a non-linear relationship between 
blockholdings and firm performance, such as Miguel et al., (2004) who reported a 
quadratic relationship between the proportion of shares owned by blockholder and 
firm value using data of 135 Spanish non-financial quoted companies for the period 
between 1990 until 1999. In addition, a recent study was carried out by Moshirian et 
al., (2014) and used a sample of 20,883 firm-year observations for the period from 
2006 to 2009 in 37 countries including the UK. The study concluded a U-shaped 
curve relationship between the level of blockholding and Tobin’s Q where at low 
proportion of ownership, the relationship was negative, and then turns into positive 
relationship, and after certain level of blockholding, the alignment between 
blockholders and firms is much higher.  
Therefore, we have tested the non-linearity assumptions using BKOW, 
BKOW2, and BKOW3 in the regression, to identify any possible quadratic or cubic 
relationship, using the following equation: 
 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝐵𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷𝛽2 + 𝑀𝐺𝑂𝑊𝛽3 + 𝐵𝐾𝑂𝑊𝛽4 + BKOW2𝛽5+  BKOW3𝛽6 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂𝑊𝛽7 +  𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸𝛽8 +  𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸𝛽9+  𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝛽10 +  𝜀 (10) 
 
The results in table 5.11 and 5.12 do not show any significant association at any level 
of blockholding, which do not provide strong evidence to, empirically, support non-
linear relationship between the level of blockholding and performance. 
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  TQ2005 TQ2006 TQ2007 TQ2008 TQ2009 TQ2010 
Const 2.018 1.876 0.764 1.271* 1.223 0.883 
BSZE 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.074*** 0.027* 0.044** 0.057** 
BIND 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.009** 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005* 
MGOW 0.000 6.724 -3.59 -0.00*** -2.71 0.000 
BKOW 0.029 0.017 0.013 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 
BKOW2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 0.000 
BKOW3 4.578 2.036 2.500 -9.13 2.818 -1.54 
INSOW -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 0.000 
FSZE -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
FAGE -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
INDQ -0.13 0.228 0.872*** 0.733 0.626 0.881** 
Adj R2 0.135 0.105 0.119 0.122 0.051 0.064 
F-test 5.966*** 4.943*** 5.752*** 5.920*** 2.901*** 3.241*** 
Table 5.11 Regression with nonlinear assumption of Blockholdings in one-equation setting on TQ using OLS, and 
adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of level of blockholdings. Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm 
to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is percentage of 
independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW percentage of total shares owned by members of board of 
directors; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); BKOW2 is BKOW squared; BKOW3 is BKOW cubed; INSOW is total 
percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders 
according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; 
FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDTQ is the 
Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
  ROA2005 ROA2006 ROA2007 ROA2008 ROA2009 ROA2010 
Const -5.71 -8.21* 7.037 13.54** 8.612* 7.367 
BSZE 0.124 0.321 -0.31 -0.27 -0.09 -0.02 
BIND 0.051 0.099*** 0.000 0.102** 0.038 -0.01 
MGOW 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002** 
BKOW 0.203 0.223 -0.12 -0.51** -0.39* -0.15 
BKOW2 -0.00 -0.00 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.000 
BKOW3 2.470 3.439 -4.78 -5.82 -3.72 2.782 
INSOW -0.04 -0.05* -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 
FSZE -0.14 -0.64* -0.35 -1.19*** -0.41 -0.29 
FAGE 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.014** 
INDROA 1.113*** 1.324*** 1.062*** 1.131*** 1.058 0.885** 
Adj R2 0.026 0.062 0.046 0.081 0.028 0.047 
F-test 1.847* 3.184*** 2.665*** 4.080*** 1.990** 2.607*** 
Table 5.12 Regression with nonlinear assumption of Blockholdings in one-equation setting on ROA using OLS, and 
adding ordinary, quadric and cubic values of level of blockholdings. ROA Net Income divided by Average Total Assets 
multiplied by 100; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is percentage of independent directors to total 
number of directors; MGOW percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors; BKOW is Percentage 
of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, 
government ...); BKOW2 is BKOW squared; BKOW3 is BKOW cubed; INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of 
shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since 
Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROA is the Average industry 
performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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5.3.3. Further analysis of ownership structure, and examination of 
the influence of performance on corporate governance 
mechanisms 
This thesis also examines the ownership structure from the perspective of the 
relationship between insiders (members of boards of directors) and outsiders (outside 
shareholders). Ownership structure can create a conflict between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders, between large shareholders who aim to 
influence board directors’ decisions in their own interest, and the board members 
who aim to work for the interest of all the entity’s stakeholders. Hence, a regression 
analysis has been carried out to investigate the existence and influence of conflict 
(tension) between insiders (directors) and outsiders (substantial shareholders), as 
well as the proportion of outsiders to insiders, on the performance measures of the 
companies. The reason for such further analysis is to examine whether the level of 
shareholdings by directors and large shareholdings by externals can result in a 
negative impact on firm performance due to the tension, which can be created 
between insiders and outsiders.  We have removed managerial ownership and total 
shares owned by blockholders from the original model and replaced it with the level 
of tension and the domination levels of external blockholders using the following 
regression model: 
 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽3𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐴𝐺𝐸+ + 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑣𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓 +  𝜀   (11) 
 
Where 
LGTENSION = Natural Logarithm of (percentage owned by directors multiplied by percentage owned 
by external substantial shareholders) 
INOUTS = the domination of ownership, calculated as total holdings by external substantial 
shareholders less total holdings by insiders). 
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  CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2005 2005 1.522 0.097*** 0.011*** -0.04* -0.00 -0.00 -0.27*** 0.547 .126 6.876*** 
TQ2006 2006 3.012* 0.106*** 0.012*** -0.08*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.35*** 0.161 .122 7.041*** 
TQ2007 2007 0.909 0.085*** 0.007* -0.04* -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** 0.959*** .111 6.773*** 
TQ2008 2008 1.666** 0.037** 0.006*** -0.07*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.15*** 0.410 .140 8.629*** 
TQ2009 2009 1.912** 0.052** 0.004 -0.07*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.18*** 0.471 .074 4.774*** 
TQ2010 2010 1.058 0.060** 0.005* -0.05** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.18*** 0.920** .086 5.082*** 
  CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052007 2005 2.535* 0.085*** 0.012*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.21*** -0.23 .066 3.905*** 
AvTQ20052007 2006 3.186* 0.096*** 0.013*** -0.05** -0.00** -0.00 -0.31*** -0.15 .106 6.161*** 
AvTQ20052007 2007 1.801** 0.081*** 0.002 -0.04* -0.00* -0.00 -0.25*** 0.691** .090 5.596*** 
AvTQ20082010 2008 2.805*** 0.053*** 0.007*** -0.08*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.20*** -0.24 .112 6.870*** 
AvTQ20082010 2009 2.080*** 0.057*** 0.006** -0.07*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.20*** 0.298 .090 5.686*** 
AvTQ20082010 2010 1.131* 0.068*** 0.005* -0.04** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.15*** 0.600* .077 4.663*** 
  CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
∆TQ2005 2005 1.532 0.115*** 0.012*** -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.28*** -0.54 .100 5.534*** 
∆TQ2006 2006 4.310** 0.098*** 0.013*** -0.08*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.35*** -1.44* .114 6.589*** 
∆TQ2007 2007 0.964 0.086*** 0.008** -0.03 -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** -0.11 .074 4.717*** 
∆TQ2008 2008 1.817** 0.028* 0.001 -0.07*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.12*** -0.59 .076 4.821*** 
∆TQ2009 2009 1.868** 0.053** 0.002 -0.07*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.15*** -0.58 .030 2.465** 
∆TQ2010 2010 1.304 0.065** 0.006* -0.05** -0.00** -0.00 -0.18*** -0.28 .042 2.888*** 
Table 5.13 TQ measures regressed against LGTENSION and INOUTS. Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; 
AvTQ20052007 is the average TQ for the period 2005 to 2007; ∆TQ is the difference between each company's TQ and Average Q for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; LGTENSION is natural logarithm for (percentage owned by directors multiplied by 
percentage owned by external substantial shareholders); INOUTS is the domination of ownership, calculated as total holdings by external substantial shareholders less total holdings 
by insiders).   FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDTQ is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * 
denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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   CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2005 2005 -5.93 0.150 0.045 0.179 -0.01 0.010 0.037 1.194*** .029 2.212** 
ROA2006 2006 -1.37 0.366* 0.073** 0.074 -0.04** 0.009 -0.77* 1.048** .031 2.360** 
ROA2007 2007 6.947 -0.25 -0.01 -0.30 -0.02 0.007 -0.45 0.997*** .040 2.907*** 
ROA2008 2008 9.962** -0.07 0.086** -0.58** -0.07*** 0.007 -1.64*** 1.253*** .081 5.141*** 
ROA2009 2009 3.412 0.080 0.028 -0.47** -0.05*** 0.005 -0.64* 1.404* .029 2.401** 
ROA2010 2010 9.158** 0.024 -0.02 -0.45** -0.07*** 0.011* -0.71* 1.047** .054 3.495*** 
  CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052007 2005 -1.60 0.159 0.057* 0.061 -0.01 0.011 -0.26 0.909*** .036 2.525** 
AvROA20052007 2006 0.435 0.097 0.043 -0.12 -0.03* 0.009 -0.57 1.157*** .027 2.229** 
AvROA20052007 2007 4.685 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.008 -0.00 0.570** .011 1.507 
AvROA20082010 2008 12.70*** 0.083 0.043 -0.62*** -0.07*** 0.006 -1.35*** 0.538** .083 5.227*** 
AvROA20082010 2009 6.680 0.123 0.056* -0.48** -0.07*** 0.008 -1.00*** 1.077 .052 3.634*** 
AvROA20082010 2010 6.747* 0.177 0.010 -0.40* -0.06*** 0.009 -0.79** 0.761* .035 2.580** 
  CGV Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROA2005 2005 -6.19 0.159 0.048 0.182 -0.01 0.010 0.039 0.194 -.006 0.766 
∆ROA2006 2006 -0.95 0.378* 0.071** 0.062 -0.04** 0.009 -0.76* -0.00 .017 1.743* 
∆ROA2007 2007 7.216 -0.27 -0.01 -0.31 -0.02 0.007 -0.44 0.002 -.002 0.898 
∆ROA2008 2008 9.880** -0.07 0.084** -0.59** -0.07*** 0.007 -1.61*** 0.254 .051 3.524*** 
∆ROA2009 2009 2.808 0.062 0.028 -0.45** -0.05*** 0.006 -0.59 0.464 .020 1.936* 
∆ROA2010 2010 9.117** 0.029 -0.02 -0.44* -0.07*** 0.012* -0.68* 0.030 .040 2.792*** 
Table 5.14 ROA measures regressed against LGTENSION and INOUTS. Where ROA is the Net Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; AvROA20052007 is the 
average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROA20082010 is the average ROA for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROA is the difference between each company's ROA and Average 
ROA for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; LGTENSION is natural 
logarithm for (percentage owned by directors multiplied by percentage owned by external substantial shareholders); INOUTS is the domination of ownership, calculated as total 
holdings by external substantial shareholders less total holdings by insiders).   FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total 
Assets. INDROA is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
175 
 
The level of tension between insiders and outsiders was measured using the 
approach of Abdullah and Page (2009) by multiplying the total percentage of shares 
owned by directors by the total percentage of shares owned by outside blockholders. 
The results of the regression are presented in Tables 5.13 and 5.14, as well as tables 
APEX5.20; APEX5.21; and APEX 5.22. The results generally support the 
expectations that the tension between insiders and outsiders can have a negative 
impact on firm performance. For instance, the results show a high negative 
significant coefficient between TENSION level and TQ measures, in particular in the 
period during the credit crises (i.e. 2008 to 2010).  
Similarly, the results shows a statistically significant negative coefficient 
between the domination level of external shareholders (INOUT) and TQ measures, 
especially after the period 2007. In respect to the outcomes of the regression using 
the accounting based measures, the results also suggest a negative coefficient 
between the TENSION and corporate performance. Theoretically, this negative 
association can be referred to the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders. 
Empirically, the negative coefficient between INOUTS and performance supports the 
findings of Demsetz and Villalonges (2001), who concluded that outsider 
shareholders with stakes of more than three per cent of the company’s share capital 
can have a negative impact on performance.  
Regarding the two ways impact of the variables, and in order to examine 
whether the performance is influencing the corporate governance practices of a 
company, the following model was tested: 
 
 𝐶𝐻𝐺𝐵𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑇) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 𝐴(𝑇−1) +  β2BSZE + β3 MGOW + β4BKOW+  β5INSOW + β6FAGE + β7FSZE +  ε (12) 
 
Where CHGBIND is Changes in the ratio of the board independence.  
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The results of this analysis are presented in table 5.15. The results generally 
report a negative coefficient between the change in board independence ratio and 
previous corporate performance measures. However, the estimated coefficient is 
statistically insignificant which does not provide a strong empirical evidence to 
support a hypothesis that firm performance influences the corporate governance 
practices in a company. Empirically, our findings are consistent with those of 
Abdullah and Page (2009), who found an insignificant negative association between 
changes in board independence and firm performance. A possible explanation for our 
findings is that, since 2006, the corporate governance code has recommended a 
balance between independent and dependent directors for an effective board of 
directors, which may have led to the companies responding to these recommendations 
regardless of their performance in previous years. 
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  CGV Year TQ Year Const TQ BSZE MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE Adj R2 F-test 
CHBIND2006 2006 2005 0.032 -0.02 0.000 1.136 0.001 0.001 -0.00 0.000 0.007 1.346 
CHBIND2007 2007 2006 0.171** -0.01 0.001 7.742** -0.00*** 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 0.021 2.062** 
CHBIND2008 2008 2007 -0.02 0.028** -0.00 2.901 0.000 -7.93 0.000 0.003 -0.00 0.716 
CHBIND2009 2009 2008 0.043 -0.00 -0.00 -6.64* 0.001** -0.00** 0.000 0.001 0.005 1.261 
CHBIND2010 2010 2009 0.028 0.001 -0.01* -7.86 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 0.014 -0.00 0.974 
  CGV Year ROA Year Const ROA BSZE MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE Adj R2 F-test 
CHBIND2006 2006 2005 0.032 -0.00* -0.00 6.259 0.001 0.000 -8.36 0.004 0.000 1.017 
CHBIND2007 2007 2006 0.084 -0.00 -0.00 6.654** -0.00** 0.001 -0.00 0.004 0.010 1.513 
CHBIND2008 2008 2007 0.033 0.003** -0.00 1.103 -0.00 8.162 5.039 -0.00 -0.00 0.991 
CHBIND2009 2009 2008 0.034 -0.00 -0.00 -6.41 0.001** -0.00** 7.740 0.001 0.005 1.282 
CHBIND2010 2010 2009 0.030 -0.00 -0.01 -5.97 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 0.015 0.001 1.061 
  CGV Year ROE Year Const ROE BSZE MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE Adj R2 F-test 
CHBIND2006 2006 2005 0.016 -0.00** -0.00 1.089 0.001 0.000 -2.58 0.006 0.008 1.353 
CHBIND2007 2007 2006 0.102 -0.00 -0.00 6.603** -0.00** 0.001 -0.00 0.003 0.011 1.523 
CHBIND2008 2008 2007 0.077 0.000 -0.00 1.255 0.000 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.545 
CHBIND2009 2009 2008 0.044 -0.00 -0.00 -6.81* 0.001** -0.00* 5.518 0.002 0.004 1.214 
CHBIND2010 2010 2009 0.028 -0.00 -0.00 -1.73 -0.00 9.832 -0.00 0.013 -0.00 0.792 
  CGV Year ROCE Year Const ROCE BSZE MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE Adj R2 F-test 
CHBIND2006 2006 2005 0.011 -3.81 -0.00 2.498 0.000 0.000 -0.00 0.004 -0.01 0.515 
CHBIND2007 2007 2006 0.099 -0.00 -0.00 5.770* -0.00** 0.000 -0.00 0.003 0.007 1.342 
CHBIND2008 2008 2007 0.084 0.000** -0.00 9.007 4.415 -0.00 6.177 -0.00 -0.00 0.817 
CHBIND2009 2009 2008 0.056 -0.00 -0.00 -6.42 0.001** -0.00** 7.662 0.001 0.011 1.569 
CHBIND2010 2010 2009 0.033 -0.00 -0.00 -8.16 -0.00 0.000 -0.00 0.014 0.004 1.211 
  CGV Year SGRTH Year Const SGRTH BSZE MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE Adj R2 F-test 
CHBIND2007 2007 2006 0.133* -0.00 0.003 9.308*** -0.00*** 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.033 2.344** 
CHBIND2008 2008 2007 0.073 -0.01 -0.00 1.225 -5.09 0.000 7.215 -0.00 -0.01 0.360 
CHBIND2009 2009 2008 0.018 0.011 -0.00 -0.00** 0.002** -0.00* 0.000 0.001 0.013 1.583 
CHBIND2010 2010 2009 0.011 0.018 -0.00 -5.06 2.102 -0.00 -0.00 0.017 0.005 1.150 
Table 5.15 Change in Board independence ratio Regressed against lagged variables of the performance, board size and ownership. Where CHBIND Changes in Board independence ratio from previous 
year; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of 
directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); 
INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares 
non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of the firm's assets; ROA Net Income divided by Average Total Assets) multiplied by 100; ROE is (Net Income divided by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; ROCE is 
Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by average of Capital Employed; SGRTH is Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided by Total Sales for time (t-1) 
***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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5.3.4. Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables, the results are mixed depending on the type 
of the performance measure used. In respect to the firm size, the results show a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient (at sig level of 0.01) between firm 
size and market based measure TQ. This result is inconsistent with the theoretical 
prediction that firm size is positively related to firm performance. The theoretical 
implications of this is that smaller firms have more growth and development 
opportunities that can results in a higher increase in the value of their assets. In 
addition, the higher growth opportunity, which characterises smaller firms, requires 
more external financing, and in order to attract external investors, such companies 
are more likely to comply with the corporate governance practices. This can explain 
the negative association between firm size and performance.  
Our results do not support the view of Jensen (1986) and Beiner et al., (2006) 
that large companies have sufficient resources and have the affordability to comply 
with market regulations and corporate governance practices, and therefore increase 
their market value. In addition, our results are inconsistent with Botosan (1997) 
view that large firms are more capable of obtaining external finances at lower rates 
that can contribute to higher firm value. Empirically, the negative and significant 
association is consistent with the results of previous empirical studies, such as 
Argawal and Knoeber (1996), and Durnev and Kim (2005) who reported a negative 
relationship between firm size and TQ.  
In contrast, our empirical findings are inconsistent with the findings of many 
previous empirical conclusions that reported a positive association between firm 
size and firm performance, such as Weir and Liang (2000) and Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006). In relation to the accounting based performance measures, our analysis 
reports mix results, where negative but statistically insignificant coefficients were 
found between firm size and ROA (except in 2008 where positive and significant 
coefficient at level 0.01 has been found). Concerning the other accounting 
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performance measures, the results do not provide strong empirical evidence to 
support either positive or negative association between firm size and ROE and 
ROCE.  
However, the results show a positive and highly significant coefficient (at sig 
level of 0.01) between firm size and sales measures (including sales growth). The 
positive and significant coefficients are consistent with Jensen (1986) Beiner et al., 
(2006) that a large firm performs better than smaller firms are. Empirically, a 
positive and significant result coefficient between firm size and sales growth 
supports the findings of Weir and Liang (2000), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). 
Regarding firm age, the results of the regression model using TQ as the 
dependent variable shows a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient, 
except in year 2005 and 2008 where the coefficient is significant at a level of 0.1 
and 0.05 respectively. The insignificant coefficients is not theoretically explained, 
and do not provide strong empirical evidence to support a relationship hypothesis 
between firm age and performance. The significant and positive coefficient in 2005 
and 2008 are consistent with the theoretical expectations that older firms have less 
potential growth opportunities then smaller firms, and therefore the growth in their 
assets value is less (Maury & Pajust, 2005; and Gutierrez & Pombo, 2009).  
In respect to accounting based measures, the results show a positive 
coefficient with all the performance measures, however with mixed statistical 
significance. For example for ROA, ROE, and ROCE most of the observations are 
statistically insignificant, which cannot provide enough empirical support of the 
relationship between firm age and performance. However, in some periods, the 
results show some statistical significance and positive coefficients. For instance, the 
coefficient is significant in 2006 with ROCE; in 2007 with ROE, and in 2010 with 
ROA and ROCE. The positive and significant association supports the theoretical 
view that older firms have the excessive experience to manage its resources and the 
experience gained over the years by its employees reduces the cost of development, 
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which therefore can have a positive impact on the firm accounting profits (Fowler 
& Schmidt, 1989).  
Finally, regarding the impact of the industry, the results shows a positive and 
significant coefficient with Tobin’s Q and all the accounting based measures used. 
More discussion about the impact of the industry type in the regression model is 
provided in paragraph 5.5). 
 
Control Variable Performance variable Coefficient sign Significant? Exceptions 
Firm Size 
    
 
TQ ̶ Significant 
 
 
ROA ̶ Insignificant 2008 significant 
 
ROE + Insignificant 
 
 
ROCE ± Insignificant 
 
  CHSALES + Significant   
Firm Age 
    
 
TQ ̶ Insignificant 2005 and 2008 significant 
 
ROA + Insignificant 2010 
 
ROE + Insignificant 2007 
 
ROCE + Insignificant 2006 and 2010 significant 
  CHSALES + Significant   
Industry 
    
 
TQ + Insignificant 2007 and 2010 
 
ROA + Significant 2009 Insignificant 
 
ROE + Significant 
2009 and 2010 
Insignificant 
 
ROCE + Significant 
 
  CHSALES ̶ Significant   
Table 5.16 Summary for the regression results on relationship between the control variables and 
performance measures. 
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5.4. Testing for endogeneity 
The ordinary least square analysis does not consider the assumption of 
possible endogeneity or interdependence between the explanatory variables and 
other non-corporate governance variables. In this section, we consider such 
assumption by testing whether the problem of endogeneity exists in our model. In 
this thesis a two least square regression was carried out with alternative variables 
were included to the model (Instrumental variables).  
Many previous empirical studies examined the existence of endogeneity 
problem in their model using different methods, for instance Argawal and Knoeber 
(1996) used 3 stages least square (3SLS) and reported non-existence of this 
problem in their model. On the other hand, Cho (1998) considered both methods 
two stages least square (2SLS) and 3SLS; however he only reported the results of 
the 2SLS because they considered that 3SLS would give the same quantitative 
results. Cho (1998) main conclusion was that endogeneity affects the results of the 
OLS regression. Similar to Cho (1998), many studies also used 2SLS method to test 
for endogeneity problem but reported non-existence of this problem in the model 
(such as Lasfer, 2006; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999; Demstez & 
Villalong, 2001; and Abdullah & Page, 2009).  
A study by Larcker and Rusticus (2010) on examining effective methods to 
deal with endogeneity problem (in particular the use of Instrumental Variables) 
suggests five main steps to ensure adequate estimation of instrumental variables. 
These steps were quoted as follows: “Use economic theory to select and justify the 
choice of instrument; evaluate the first stage results and diagnostics; evaluate the 
second stage results and diagnostics; run a sensitivity analysis on the choice of 
instruments; compare and contrast the estimates from OLS and 2SLS methods” 
Larcker and Rusticus (2010, p 58).  Larcker and Rusticus (2010) suggests using 
logic beside the economic theories to select the endogenous and exogenous 
variables; and to explore alternative methods to solve any existing endogeneity 
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problem; and to ensure that the instrumental variables are adequate. By ensuring 
that the instrumental variables are not correlated with the second-stage error term; 
and finally compare the 2SLS analysis outcomes with the OLS outcomes to identify 
any consistent differences between them. 
 
Author year Method Instrumental Variables used 
Argwal & Knoeber (1996) 3SLS Firm Performance and Control Mechanisms 
 
Cho (1998)  
2SLS & 3SLS Lagged value of leverage and lagged Q 
 
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) 
 
2SLS 
 
Lagged Managerial ownership; lagged ownership 
concentration; Lagged Q 
 
Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) 
 
2SLS  
 
Lagged value of management ownership 
 
Eisenberg et al., (1998) 
 
2SLS 
 
Firm age, membership in group 
 
Bhagat & Black (2002) 
 
3SLS 
 
EPS, board independence ratio; insiders' shareholdings  
 
Barnhart & Rosenstein 
(1998) 
 
2SLS 
 
Independent outside directors; Tobin's Q; Managerial 
Ownership, and board composition 
 
Himmelberg et al., (1999) 
 
 
 
2SLS 
 
Log sale, log sale squared, standard deviation and standard 
deviation dummy 
Abdullah & Page (2009) 2SLS 
 
 
Lagged values of Independence ratio and Board size 
 
Lasfer (2006) 
 
2SLS 
 
Company size ;growth opportunities; Research and 
development to sales; fixed assets to total assets; and 
standard deviation pf stock return 
Table 5.17 list of research in corporate governance who considered endogeneity problem. 
 
For this thesis, we examined two sets of variables in order to identify an 
appropriate set that could be used as instrumental variables. The number of 
instrumental variables must match the number of the variables, which are identified 
as endogenous in the model. For our model, we have identified the variables of 
board composition (board size and managerial ownership) as potentially 
endogenous variables, and thus at least two instrumental variables, which are not 
correlated with the error term of the predicted model, are required. Reviewing the 
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literature on corporate governance and corporate performance reveals that a 
considerable number of studies considered the variables of board composition and 
board ownership as endogenous variables, and therefore many sets of variables were 
tested to identify the appropriate instrumental variables (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2000; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Lasfer, 2006). Most of these studies have 
identified the lagged variables of the identified endogenous variables as the 
appropriate instrumental variables. Hence, the two sets of variables, which were 
tested in this thesis for their appropriateness as instrumental variables, are:  
1.1 - Natural Logarithm of Capital Invested in Time T, and Debt to Equity ratio  
2.1 - Lagged variables for Board Size, and Board Independence ratio 
The reason for choosing the lagged variables of the endogenous variables is 
the nature of the data sample under study, where the observations used belong to 
different years for a large number of companies. In addition, our OLS model 
assumes that the observations of the explanatory variables (board size, board 
independence, managerial ownership, and blockhodings) are totally independent of 
previous values, which can be to some extent unrealistic. 
In order to identify the appropriate instrumental variables for the model, a 
correlation analysis was carried out to test the association between the different 
variables in set 1 and set 2, and the error term of the 2SLS. As mentioned 
previously, the acceptable instrumental variables are the ones that have no 
correlation with the error term.  
The results shows that the LGCapital invested and Debt to Equity ratio are 
correlated with the error term, while lagged variables of the endogenous variables 
are not correlated (Appendices chapter 4 tables APEX 5.23 to APEX5.31 inclusive). 
Hence the two instruments variables used for the 2SLS were the lagged variable for 
Board size and the lagged variable for Independence ratio. 
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  CG IV Cons 
BSZE 
(Endog) 
BIND 
(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-Test 
TQ2006 2006 2005 3.250* 0.104*** 0.025*** 9.884 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.29*** -0.47 .099 5.462*** 
TQ2007 2007 2006 0.995 0.101*** 0.013** -5.74 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** 0.669** .103 5.829*** 
TQ2008 2008 2007 0.857 0.045** 0.007** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.12*** 0.764 .113 6.608*** 
TQ2009 2009 2008 1.120 0.066** 0.010** 1.316 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.15*** 0.538 .053 3.443*** 
TQ2010 2010 2009 0.620 0.056** 0.008* 0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.14*** 0.877** .062 3.696*** 
AVTQ20052007 2006 2005 3.806** 0.111*** 0.025*** 0.000* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.28*** -0.94 .106 5.826*** 
AVTQ20052007 2007 2006 1.778*** 0.095*** 0.013** 2.116 0.001 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.25*** 0.321 .102 5.791*** 
AVTQ20082010 2008 2007 2.181*** 0.049** 0.008** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.16*** 0.025 .086 5.133*** 
AVTQ20082010 2009 2008 1.411** 0.062** 0.012*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.18*** 0.367 .073 4.444*** 
AVTQ20082010 2010 2009 0.983 0.052** 0.009** 4.850 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.12*** 0.489 .047 3.052*** 
              
Table 5.18 Tobin’s Q regressed against lagged variables (Board composition variables). Board 
Composition variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where TQ is the Ratio of the market 
value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; AvTQ20052007 is the average TQ for the 
period 2005 to 2007;  AvTQ20082010 is the average TQ for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total 
number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of 
directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives 
and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital 
owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders 
according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used 
in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company 
Total Assets. INDTQ is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 5.18 shows the 2SLS results, where the variables of board composition 
(i.e. Board size and Board independence ratio) were considered as endogenous 
variables. The instrumental variables used are the lagged values for those 
endogenous variables. The overall results for the regression where TQ measures are 
used as a dependent variables show that firm size is constantly influencing TQ 
measures with high statistical significance at 0.01 level, which is similar to the 
observations obtained from the OLS analysis (see table 5.5).  
This significant coefficient between firm size and TQ was expected since the 
same values were used in both equations (OLS equation and 2SLS equation). In 
terms of the board size, the sign of the coefficient and the significance level 
remained the same as the OLS results. However, for the board independence, and 
despite that the sign of the coefficient remained unchanged (i.e. positive 
coefficient), the number of years in which the significance level of the coefficient is 
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dropped from three years to one year. The same results were also obtained by the 
two steps ordinary least square analysis (see APEX5.36a to APEX5.36b). 
 
  CG IV Const 
BSZE 
(Endog) 
BIND 
(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE AvIndQ Adj R2 F-Test 
ROA2006 2006 2005 -8.80* 0.318 0.158*** 0.003*** -0.00 -0.03 0.011 -0.76* 1.426*** .064 3.774*** 
ROA2007 2007 2006 0.280 0.030 0.067 0.000 -0.00 -0.02 0.010 -0.67 1.065*** .043 2.890*** 
ROA2008 2008 2007 8.133* 0.003 0.031 0.001 -0.05** -0.04 0.010 -1.08** 1.125*** .054 3.493*** 
ROA2009 2009 2008 2.519 -0.25 0.082* 0.000 -0.05** -0.04 0.003 -0.27 1.038 .030 2.311** 
ROA2010 2010 2009 2.225 0.108 0.050 0.002** -0.04* -0.02 0.014** -0.53 0.901** .049 3.101*** 
AvROA20052007 2006 2005 -6.07 -0.03 0.107** 0.002** -0.01 -0.01 0.011* -0.30 1.406*** .057 3.453*** 
AvROA20052007 2007 2006 1.293 -0.00 0.040 0.001 0.014 -0.05** 0.009 -0.24 0.727*** .038 2.641*** 
AvROA20082010 2008 2007 9.665*** 0.035 0.024 0.001* -0.05*** -0.04* 0.008 -0.78** 0.447* .061 3.874*** 
AvROA20082010 2009 2008 3.791 -0.12 0.093** 0.001 -0.04** -0.05** 0.009 -0.55 0.929 .042 2.908*** 
AvROA20082010 2010 2009 3.661 -0.11 0.073* 0.001 -0.04** -0.02 0.009 -0.42 0.572 .028 2.204** 
Table 5.19 ROA regressed against lagged variables (Board composition variables). Board Composition 
variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where ROA Net Income divided by Average Total 
Assets) multiplied by 100; AvROA20052007 is the average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007; 
AvROA20082010 is the average ROA for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in 
the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW 
Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); 
BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total 
number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is 
number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROA 
is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Regarding the accounting based measure ROA, the results of the 2SLS as it 
can be noticed from the above table, and the observations of the OLS in table (5.6), 
shows a high similarity. Furthermore, regarding the firm size, the results are also 
also similar to those obtained by the OLS with a statistically insignificant negative 
coefficient, except in 2007 and 2008, where the significance level decreased to 0.05 
level in comparison to the 0.01 level from the OLS. However, despite this 
insignificant difference, it is not evident that the 2SLS results have changed the 
observations of the OLS concerning Firm Size and ROA. In respect to the two 
endogenous variables, it can be also noticed that no considerable change can be 
observed between the 2SLS outcomes and the OLS outcomes, where the coefficient 
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between the board size and ROA remained statistically insignificant (the sign of the 
coefficient is positive in all years except 2009). In addition, the coefficient of the 
board independence remained positive with small changes in the significance level 
from statistical significance at 0.01 level in 2006 and 2008 to insignificance; while 
it changed from statistically insignificance in 2005 to significance at 0.01 level. 
These results contrasts with the findings of Abdullah and Page (2009), who reported 
changes in the coefficient for board size when lagged variables were used in the 
equation. Possible explanation to these differences can be referred to the different 
period for the sample used, as well as more control variables are used in this thesis 
then Abduallah and Page (2009) study.  
The results in regard to the 2SLS regression using ROE as dependent variable 
(Appendix chapter 5 APEX5.32) can be outlined as follows: 
- No significant association with board size 
- Moderate significant positive association between ROE and board 
independence in 2006 and low positive association with board independence 
in 2009, which to some extent matches the outcomes for the regression with 
TQ 
- High significant negative association between ROE and the level of 
blockholdings in 2009 and 2010 
- No significant association between institutional ownership, FAGE, FSZE, 
and ROE 
- High positive association can be reported between ROE and the INDROE 
before the global financial crisis, while no statistically explained association 
can be reported after 2007. 
These results suggests that there are no endogeneity issues with the initial 
regression models when the variables of board composition are considered as 
endogenous variables, since the results for the regression of the different dependent 
variables (performance variables) with the instrumental variables of board 
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composition (lagged values) are similar to those for OLS. Thus, since the results of 
the 2SLS are similar to the outcomes of the OLS, then the same theoretical and 
empirical implications, which were discussed for the OLS outcomes in chapter 
four, can be used to support the findings of the 2SLS observations. 
5.4.1. Ownership Structure variables as Endogenous  
In addition to the variables of board composition, we have also tested the 
regression using the lagged variables for the board ownership variables (in this 
scenario the variables of the ownership structure are also considered as endogenous 
variables), and then 2SLS regression was carried out using SPSS (see table 5.6).  
Many previous studies on corporate governance and corporate performance 
have examined their models for endogeneity by considering ownership structure 
variables as endogenous variables (Cho, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Barnhert & Rosentein, 1998; Lasfer, 2006). However, 
according to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), most of these studies do not deal with 
the issue of endogenous ownership structure properly, particularly regarding the 
measurement of ownership structure.  
In this theis we have considered ownership structure variables as endogenous 
variables (MGOW; BKOW; INSOW), and we used their lagged variables as 
instrumental variables. 
The overall results of the 2SLS for the endogenous variables of the ownership 
structure, as can be seen from the following table, show high similarity between the 
2SLS regression and the OLS regression carried in chapter four, with the exception 
that BSZE becomes more significant in 2010, and BIND is more significant in 2008 
in relation to ROA.   
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Thus, the conclusion, which can be drawn from the endogeneity analysis in 
this section, rejects the hypothesis that the model results are biased because of 
endogeneity issues. 
5.5. Dummy variables analysis: industry control variables 
Additional variables were added to the regression model in order to examine the 
influence of industry variables on corporate performance and whether the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms (namely board composition 
and ownership structure) used in this research can also be determined by industry. 
As mentioned previously in this thesis (chapter three), the 363 companies which 
represent the sample were divided into six main industries categories, Technology, 
Energy, Consumer Services, Leisure, Industrial, and Others, as shown in table 5.20. 
 
Industry  Company type Code 
Technology Communication, information technology, 
 and technology 
 
1 
Energy Energy, utilities, and materials 2 
 Consumer services  
 
 Retails, food products, and healthcare 
 
 
3 
Leisure  Leisure, hotels and restaurants 
 
 
4 
Industrial Industrial 
 
 
5 
Others None of the above 0 
Table 5.20: Industries components and codes (industry types are based on Bloomberg Industry 
Classification)  
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The outcomes and observations of the regression analysis carried out in this 
chapter suggest that the industry control variables (which are represented by the 
average industry performance TQ, ROA, ROE, and ROCE) are closely associated 
with all the performance measures used (see Tables 5.5 & 5.6). Thus, in order to 
investigate such association in more detail, and in order to examine whether the 
significant association with TQ can differ between industries, the analysis was 
conducted adding the industry proxy variables. ‘Technology’ was excluded from 
the model since there is the need for one fewer dummy variables than the number 
of industries. The reason behind excluding the technology industry is that this 
sector was the least affected by the global financial crisis and the average TQ was 
the highest among the industries. In addition, the changes in TQ between the period 
before the financial crisis and after the financial crisis were insignificant in 
comparison with the other industries. Thus, the results for the OLS and 2SLS 
regressions could be influenced by this industry. The new OLS regression, with the 
chosen dummy variables, was carried out.24  
5.5.1. Regression results in relation to Tobin’s Q measures 
The Ordinary Least Square regression, which included five industries out of 
the six industries categorised previously (‘technology’ was excluded), was carried 
out to test the influence of any of the industry membership on the OLS results. The 
dummy variables, together with the other explanatory variables (board composition 
variables and ownership structure), were examined against TQ and Average Q for 
the two periods (pre- and post-global financial crisis).  The results show a high 
similarity to the results observed from the OLS analysis in chapter four.  
24 The industry variables were defined in the regression model as follows: If the firm is Tech, it 
equals to “1” when the company is classified in the technology sector or “0” if otherwise; if the firm 
is Energy, it equals “1” when the company is classified in the energy sector or “0” if otherwise; if 
the firm is Consumer Services, it equals “1” when the company is classified in the consumer 
services sector or “0” if otherwise; If the firm is Leisure, it equals “1” when the company is 
classified in the leisure sector or “0” if otherwise; if the firm is Industrial, it equals “1” when the 
company is classified in the industrial sector or “0” if otherwise. 
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The original OLS analysis in chapter four reported insignificant association 
between TQ and Average industry Q, which suggests a lack of any statistically 
significant relationship between the industry type and the Tobin’s Q. The OLS 
regression using the dummy variables shows almost the same results as were 
obtained in chapter four, except for a moderate negative association in 2007 and 
2010 for the energy industry and TQ, and lower significant positive association 
with AvTQ20052007 in 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, the results indicate a negative 
association between all the dummy variables and TQ for the period 2009 analysis, 
implying a positive association for technology companies. However, these results 
are statistically insignificant. Full results are available in chapter 5 Appendices 
table APEX 5.37. 
5.5.2. Regression results in relation to Return on Assets (ROA) 
measures 
Return on Assets was also regressed against the independent variables 
including the dummy variables in order to identify any differences from the OLS 
regression.  The results generally show a mixed but insignificant relationship 
between the board size and ROA, which mirrors the previous results in chapter 
four. In regard to the AvROA, the results also show mixed results, where the 
variable representing the energy industry is positively associated with ROA during 
the first period of the sample, 2005 to 2007 (with significance level at 0.1 from 
2005 to 2006) and significant at less than the 0.05 level for the consumer services 
industry variable.  
It also shows a significant association for the consumer service companies 
and ROA (at 0.1 significance level in 2007, 2008, and 2010), and moderate 
negative association for the industrial sector.  Furthermore, there is no significant 
association between the industries’ dummy variables and AvROA for both periods 
(before and after 2007), except in 2005 where a high significant association can be 
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identified with the ‘Energy’ companies, (Full results are available in chapter 5 
Appendices table APEX 5.38). 
5.5.3. Regression results in relation to other measures (ROE, ROCE, 
and Changes in Sales) 
An analysis also was carried out to test against the other performance 
variables, ROE, ROCE, and Changes in Sales.  The overall results show that all the 
industry dummies are positively associated with the performance measures used 
with different levels of significance (see the table below), except for SGRTH where 
it shows a low significant negative association for consumer services and leisure 
industries in 2006 and 2010.  Moreover, results indicate that value for the industrial 
sector is positively associated with ROE and AvROE before the global financial 
crisis with high statistical significance of 0.01, which matches the results of the 
OLS analysis in chapter four. Moreover, results from regressing ROCE show 
insignificant association with any of the industry dummies. Finally, the analysis for 
the energy companies and industrial companies shows positive associations with 
moderate to high statistical significance with the log change in sales revenues (Full 
results are available in chapter 5 Appendices table APEX 5.40 and APEX5.41) 
5.6. Chapter Summary 
The chapter provided the results and discussion of the univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis in order to test the hypotheses that were developed 
in chapter three. This includes investigating the impact of the structure of board of 
directors on corporate performance, and the impact of insider’s ownership and 
outsider blockholders on firm performance. The sample of this thesis is the UK 
FTSE All Share Index excluding the financial companies and companies who were 
present in this Index for less than three years. The importance of board of directors, 
in particular independent non-executive directors, and their role in mitigating 
agency problems and maximising shareholders wealth, adds an importance to this 
analysis. The extensive research on ownership structure, especially managerial 
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ownership to align executives’ interest to shareholders interest, as well as the 
importance of blockholders and institutional shareholders as external monitoring 
mechanism to reduce agency problems, was one of the motivations for this analysis. 
The analysis initiated with a descriptive statistics to understand the overall 
features of the sample and trends for the major variables. The results of the 
descriptive statistics generally shows the continues increase in complying with the 
practices of corporate governance recommendations, in particular in terms of 
balanced board of directors with the presence of independent non-executive 
directors. The results, also confirms the negative impact of the global financial 
crisis on company’s accounting and market performances, and that different level 
of decline in firm performance between industries. 
The descriptive statics analysis was followed by the Pearson’s correlation 
analysis to investigate the nature of relationship between all the variables included 
in the analysis. The results reported some expected coefficients between different 
independent directors, such as the negative correlation between board size and 
managerial ownership. This suggests that with larger board of directors the level of 
managerial ownership declines; and the positive correlation between board size and 
board independence, which can be explained by that the larger the board the higher 
the number of independent non-executive directors. However, none of the 
correlations between the independent variables were significant, which suggested 
the non-existence of a multicollieanrity problem. The statistically insignificant 
Pearson’s correlation between the independent variables and the performance 
measures used demanded the use of regression analysis in order to observe 
outcomes that are more adequate. An ordinary least square analysis was carried out 
in order to test the hypothesis identified in chapter three.  
The following tables (table 5.21 and 5.22) provides summary of the outcomes 
for the regression analysis to test the major hypothesis.
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     TQ ROA 
Hypothesis related to 
(independent variable) 
Expected sign Actual sign Significant? Accept/Reject Actual sign Significant? Accept/Reject 
BSZE NEGATIVE POSITIVE *** YES 1% REJECT POSITIVE before 
2008/NEGATIVE after 
NO REJECT 
BSZE2 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE POSITIVE NO REJECT NEGATIVE before 
2008/POSITIVE after 
NO REJECT 
BSZE3 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO REJECT POSITIVE before 
2008/NEGATIVE after 
NO REJECT 
BIND POSITIVE POSITIVE*** YES 1% ACCEPT POSITIVE***  YES 1% ACCEPT 
MGOW POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO REJECT POSITIVE YES in 2006 and 
2010 
ACCEPT 
MGOW2 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE POSITIVE NO REJECT POSITIVE NO REJECT 
MGOW3 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO REJECT NEGATIVE NO REJECT 
BKOW POSITIVE POSITIVE before 
2008/NEGATIVE post 2008 
NO REJECT NEGATIVE YES from 2008 REJECT 
BKOW2 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE NEGATIVE EXCEPT 2008 
AND 2010 
NO REJECT POSITIVE  NO REJECT 
BKOW3 NEGATIVE/POSITIVE POSITIVE EXCEPT 2008 AND 
2010 
NO REJECT NEGATIVE NO REJECT 
INSOW POSITIVE NEGATIVE YES (except 2005 
and 2010) 
REJECT NEGATIVE YES with 
avROA2008 2010 
ACCEPT 
Table 5.21 Summary of the Hypotheses outcomes
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     ROE ROCE SGRTH 
Hypothesis 
related to 
(independent 
variable) 
Expected sign Actual sign Significant? Accept/Reject Actual sign Significant? Accept/Reject Actual sign Significant? Accept/Reject 
BSZE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NO REJECT mix NO REJECT POSITIVE 
(except 2008 
and 2010) 
NO REJECT 
BIND POSITIVE POSITIVE NO REJECT Majority 
POSITIVE 
NO REJECT Majority 
POSITIVE 
NO REJECT 
MGOW POSITIVE POSITIVE YES in 2006 
and 2010 
ACCEPT Majority 
POSITIVE 
NO REJECT POSITIVE NO (except 
2006*) 
REJECT 
BKOW POSITIVE NEGATIVE YES after 
2008 
REJECT NEGATIVE YES REJECT NEGATIVE YES after 2008 REJECT 
INSOW POSITIVE NEGATIVE NO REJECT NEGATIVE YES 2008, 
2010 
ACCEPT NEGATIVE NO REJECT 
Table 5.22 Summary of the Hypotheses outcomes 
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As it can be seen from the summary results presented in table 5.21 and table, 
5.22 most of the hypotheses were rejected. The results of this thesis suggests that the 
size of board of directors have significant explanatory power to the market 
performance measure TQ, however it has no significant association with the 
accounting based measures. In addition, the results shows a significant positive 
association between the level of board independence and all the performance 
measures, which can be due to the clear recommendations by the corporate 
governance codes since 2006 on the importance of independent non-executive 
directors, and the clear identification to the characteristics of effective non-executive 
directors, such as skilled, experience and commitment. 
In addition to the ordinary least square analysis, the chapter provided the 
results for the two stages least square analysis and instrumental variables analysis in 
order to examine the robustness of the analysis. The results did not suggest the 
problem of endogeneity, which increases the reliability of the results generated. The 
following chapter provides wider summary and conclusion to the main empirical 
studies and empirical results concluded in this thesis, as well as the main 
implications and contributions in which this thesis provides, ending with the 
possibility of further research. 
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6. Chapter Six: Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The thesis tested the association between board composition, ownership 
structure and firm performance. A summary of the results and findings are presented 
and discussed in this chapter. The chapter also provides the main contributions this 
thesis made to the theoretical and empirical literature of corporate governance and 
performance. This is followed by the implications of the findings; the research 
limitations and finally suggestions about areas that could be explored in further 
future research. 
6.2. Summary of Findings 
Literature on corporate governance is dominated by the agency theory 
(principal-agent) perspective, in which one of the main issues is the separation 
between ownership and control, which leads to a conflict between the interests of the 
managers and those of the shareholders. Literature and previous empirical studies 
regarding the principal-agent problem have debated various mechanisms for 
example, independent boards of directors or aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders by offering incentives to managers (such as remuneration or/and equity 
ownership in the company), which can be used by companies in order to reduce the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Shareholders can also play 
an effective role in monitoring managers and ensuring that they are managing the 
company’s assets in their own interests.  
The thesis aimed to investigate the nature of the relationship between board 
composition and performance, equity ownership structure (managerial ownership, 
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substantial ownership,25 or institutional shareholders ownership) and performance. A 
number of hypotheses related to these issues were developed based on previous 
empirical studies, and were then tested. 
Prior empirical studies on corporate governance and corporate performance as 
provided in chapter two, have reached mixed conclusions on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate performance. This can be linked to the 
differences in corporate governance mechanisms that have been investigated and the 
variety of performance measures that have been used. The different conclusions can 
also be linked to the different corporate governance cultures in different countries. 
This thesis mainly focuses on studies in the UK and USA. 
Many studies have investigated the impact of the composition of the board of 
directors on firm performance (Ho, 2005; Holderness, 2003; Bhojani, 2002; Jensen, 
1993, Belkhir, 2003; Guest, 2009; Gillan & Starkes, 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2000). Others have examined the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny; 1997; Carrillo, 2007; 
Fernandes, 2008; Agrawal & Knober, 2012; Tang et al., 2012; Hope, 2013). While 
others have examined the impact of outsiders and outsider shareholders on the 
effectiveness of the board of directors and firm performance (Karpoff, 2001; 
Thomsen & Pederson, 2000; Chidambaran & John, 2000) and in reducing the 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. 
6.2.1. Summary of prior studies on board composition and 
performance 
Jensen (1993), Belkhir (2003) and Guest (2009) concluded that a large board of 
directors has a negative association with firm performance because of the higher 
complexity involved in communications between the board member and the reduced 
efficiency in terms of the ability to take quick decisions to react to any market 
25 Ownership of at least 3% of the company’s share capital. 
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opportunities. In contrast, other studies (Zahra & Stauton, 1998) concluded that 
board size does not have any significant association with corporate performance, 
they stressed that positive performance cannot be guaranteed with a small board, and 
that large boards are not necessarily ineffective in improving performance. This was 
supported by Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who suggested that companies can be 
managed more effectively with a large board of directors since such a board can 
bring more talent and creativity to the table. This view is in agreement with Colman 
and Biepke (2006) who found a positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s 
Q. It is important to note that Guest (2009) studied UK companies, while Colman 
and Biepke (2006) studied Ghanaian companies, and this supports the view that the 
impact of board size can be influenced by the country in which the study is carried 
out on, which keeps the debate on the influence of board size on corporate 
performance open.  
Regarding the board independence and performance, Argawal and Knoeber 
(1996) and Klein (1999) suggest a negative association between the proportion of 
outside directors and firm value, based on the explanation that inside directors are 
more informed about the company than outsiders are. This means their decisions are 
more closely based on facts and accurate information, which can improve the 
financial performance of the company; however, it can be argued that, although 
inside directors are more informed then outside directors, the problem of information 
asymmetry increases and the problem of conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders remain unsolved. On the other hand, Bhagat and Black (2001) and 
Filatotchev et al., (2007) found significant evidence of a positive correlation between 
the proportion of independent directors and Earnings26 to Sales ratios.  
Rhodes et al. (2000) and Kumar (2012) stressed that independent directors are 
more effective than non-independent ones due to their financial independence from 
26 Earnings before tax 
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the firm and their isolation from any conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders. However, Erkens et al., (2012) found a negative correlation between 
board independence ratios and return on stocks during the global financial crisis, but 
found that it was positively associated with equity capital raised. This, as explained 
by Erkens et al., (2012), is due to the higher risk taken by managers during the 
financial crisis, which led to greater losses for shareholders, and an increase in equity 
capital, which resulted in wealth transfer from shareholders to debtholders. 
6.2.2. Summary of prior studies on ownership structure and firm 
performance 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fernandes (2008), Shliefer and Vishny (1997) 
and Carrillo (2007) stressed that managerial ownership can be an instrument for 
reducing the principal-agent problem by aligning managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests. Papanikolaou and Panousi (2012) suggested that high levels of managerial 
ownership can result in a more risk averse firm. Sultz (1988) and Morck et al., 
(1998) found a positive association between a low proportion of managerial 
ownership and firm performance, and negative association with firm performance at 
high levels of managerial ownership. However, McConnell and Servas (1990) 
concluded there to be a U-shaped relationship between firm performance and level of 
managerial ownership, where managers are more likely to manage the company’s 
assets in their own interests at an intermediate level of equity ownership.  
Many studies have supported the U-shape relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance. For example Bamhart and Rosentein (1998) and 
Singhchawla et al., (2010) found a U-shaped relationship between the level of 
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Belghitar et al., (2011) and 
Grosfeld (2006) concluded there was a positive association with performance at a 
low level of ownership, while Cui and Mak (2002) reported a negative association at 
low levels of managerial ownership and performance. Thus, results on the 
relationship between ownership and performance are mixed. 
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Similarly, mixed conclusions were also reported on the impact of 
blockholdings27 on corporate performance. According to Holderness (2003) and 
Hope (2013), there is a positive correlation between the level of blockholdings and 
firm performance because of the incentives which blockholders have to monitor 
managers because of their large interests in the company’s equity, and the low 
monitoring costs they have in comparison to the returns they obtain. However, 
Argawal and Knober (2012) argued that blockholders can monitor the managers in 
their own interests and not in the overall interests of the stakeholders, which, in 
general can negatively impact on the value of the firm. Tang et al., (2012) results 
support Argawal and Knober’s (2012) conclusion, when they reported that the 
absence of large shareholders has a positive impact on firm performance. In addition, 
Zackhauser and Pound (1990), Maury and Pajuste (2005), and Ibrahimy and Ahmad 
(2012) concluded a positive association between large shareholders and firm 
performance. 
Smith (1996) and Solomon (2004) reported a positive association between 
institutional shareholders and firm performance because of their monitoring power. 
However, Karpoff (2001) concluded there was weak evidence for the impact of 
institutional shareholders on corporate performance, while Romano (2000) argued 
that institutional blockholders can positively impact the short term performance 
rather than the long term performance, and therefore do not solve the issue of the 
principal-agent problem. 
This thesis studied the impact of corporate governance on firm performance 
using the UK FTSE All Shares non-financial companies to broadly test two 
hypotheses: firstly, board composition influences firm performance, and secondly, 
the ownership structure of the firm influences the performance of the firm. The 
following paragraph provides a summary of the results obtained from chapter five. 
27 Blockholding is an ownership of more than 2.99% of the company’s total share capital 
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6.2.3. Summary of Results and discussion 
The results show an increase in independence ratio between 2005 and 2010 
from 48.38% to 51.86% respectively, which suggests evidence of the recognition of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code’s recommendations regarding a balanced board 
of directors with independent and non-independent directors in which 50% are 
independent. Board size, on the other hand has remained at a stable level during the 
sample period of 2005 to 2010 at between eight and nine directors. Average 
managerial ownership during the six years period was around 5%, which can be 
considered to be a low level of managerial ownership. In relation to blockholdings, 
the results show an increase in the average percentage of blockholders during the 
period after the financial crisis from an average of 3.72% before the financial crisis 
(2005 to 2007), to 4.212% after the global financial crisis (2008 to 2010). In order to 
answer the research question and test the hypotheses for this thesis, Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression, and Two Stages Least Square (2SLS) analyses were 
carried out. The following paragraphs present the discussion and summary of the 
results obtained from these analyses.  
The initial stage of the OLS analysis intended to test the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance. Different 
performance periods were used, mainly the measures for each year (2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010), and the average performance for the two main periods, 
pre-financial crisis (2005 to 2007) and during financial crisis (2008 to 2010). It is 
apparent from the analysis that the results generated were, in many cases, different 
for the two periods. To test the association between corporate governance and 
performance, the analysis was carried out using different stages of regression, 
starting with Pearson’s correlation, going on to OLS and then to 2SLS. The models 
were controlled by using three proxy control variables: firm size, firm age and an 
industry control variable (average performance for industry).  
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The OLS results show a clear high positive association between the board size and 
the market based performance measure, TQ, while no significant association was 
observed between board size and the accounting based measures, ROA and ROE.  
These results confirmed the work of Guest (2009), Coles et al. (2010), and Lehn et 
al. (2004) who found a positive association between board size and performance, in 
particular in relation to market based performance measures. However, the research 
findings in terms of the relationship between board size and performance disagree 
with the findings of Bhagat and Black (2002), where a high significant negative 
association is found between board size and Tobin’s Q. The findings of this research 
in regard to the positive association between board size and TQ can be considered an 
important finding since it is one of the rare examples of a relationship of this nature 
in a UK based study, where most UK based research on board size and performance 
have found negative or insignificant association with TQ. 
Regarding impact of board independence on performance, the results of the OLS 
regression show a high significant positive association with TQ during the period 
before the financial crisis, while a moderate positive significant relationship is 
identified in 2009. In regard to the association with the accounting based measures, 
the results reveal mixed findings, where high positive association is found with ROA 
in 2006 and 2008, and insignificant relationships for the remaining periods. Weak 
positive significant association is found between the board independence ratio and 
ROE (negative in 2010 at moderate level of significance). Overall results suggest 
strong evidence of a positive relationship between the board independence ratio and 
the market based measure, TQ, and less apparent positive correlation with ROA, 
where a strong significant positive association is evident only in 2006 and 2008. A 
moderate positive significant coefficient for 2008 and 2009 was found, when tested 
against the average ROA for the period after the financial crisis. No significant 
association was reported between the board independence ratio and ROCE. These 
results are parallel to those of Francis et al. (2012), who reported mixed results on the 
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relationship between board independence and performance depending on the 
performance measure used.   
In terms of ownership structure, the thesis did not find sufficient evidence for any 
significant relationship between managerial ownership and the different performance 
measures used, where the majority of the observations obtained show insignificant 
association between managerial ownership and both market based and accounting 
based performance measures. These results do not match with the findings of Morck 
et al., (1988), McConnell and Servas (1990), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and 
Grosfeld (2006) who concluded that there was a positive association between 
managerial ownership and performance. However, it supports Demsetz and 
Villalonga’s (2001) results showing insignificant association between managerial 
ownership and performance. Concerning the impact of the level of blockholdings on 
performance, the results show a moderate significant positive association with all 
performance measures during the period of the financial crisis (2008 to 2010), while 
no significant association was reported for the period 2005 to 2007. Results for 
institutional blockholders show mixed levels of significant negative association with 
TQ and insignificant association with the accounting based performance measures. 
The results of the 2SLS analysis confirmed the findings obtained from the OLS 
regression, which suggested there were no endogeneity problems with the model for 
all the performance measures used. 
 
6.3. Implications 
Based on the results and analysis presented in chapter five, there are many 
implications which can be highlighted. In terms of the compliance with the corporate 
governance practices, the thesis concluded that there is a different level of 
compliance amongst companies, and this can suggest different implications. The 
description of the FTSE All shares sample used in this thesis suggested that, in 
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general the compliance of corporate governance recommendation implies that the 
attempts of the authorities in United Kingdom, such as the FRC and FSA to improve 
and encourage the practices of good corporate governance have well received by 
companies, which is resulting in better improvement. In addition, the increase 
compliance to the corporate governance code suggests that the “comply or explain” 
principle is successful in the UK since it allows companies to believe in these 
practices rather than complying with the aim of “ticking boxes”.  
Moreover, the descriptive statistics and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
results suggest that the compliance with corporate governance code vary according to 
the industry and the size of the company. This was an expected finding since the full 
compliance can be costly, and therefore small to medium organisations in some 
industries, such as Technology, and Service Industries, may find it expensive to 
comply. This can be noticed from chapter five, where in average, the Leisure 
Industry has the lowest ratio of board independence. 
The results of the regression analysis in chapter five, suggests that complying 
with the corporate governance recommendations have a positive impact on market 
performance measures such as Tobin’s Q, however, not associated with the 
accounting performance measures such as return on Assets and Return on Equity. 
For instance, the results shows that having a sufficient board size have a statistically 
significant positive coefficient with the market measure Tobin’s Q, and mix 
insignificant coefficient with the accounting measures, ROA and ROE. This implies 
that, complying with the corporate governance practices results on long term 
performance (since TQ includes factors of future growth), and not necessarily on the 
current companies performance (since the accounting performance measures reflect 
current financial situation). Therefore, this can imply that the level of company’s 
compliance with the corporate governance practices can be a good indication for 
investors aiming for long-term return rather than those seeking short-term profits.  
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In terms of Board structure, the results in chapter five suggest that the impact 
of board size on corporate performance has mixed results depending on the type of 
the performance measure used. For instance, the board size shows a statistically high 
significant positive association with the market performance measure Tobin’s Q, and 
insignificant association with all the other accounting measures (ROA, ROE, ROCE, 
and SGRTH). In addition, the test on non-linearity assumptions suggested that such 
association is linear, which contrasts with: the agency theory expectations of optimal 
board size. The results also contrasted with the UK Corporate Governance Code 
recommendations of sufficient board size but not too large, and many of the 
empirical studies which suggested a non-linear association between board size and 
performance (such as Maka & Kusnadi, 2005; Coles et al., 2008). The significant 
positive association between board size and the firms’ market based measure TQ 
supports many previous empirical studies that concluded a positive association 
between board size and performance (such as Eisenhard & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Conyon & Peck, 1998; and Bermig & Frick, 2010). However, the finding is in 
contrast to many other previous studies that found no significant association or 
negative association between board size and performance (such as Yermack, 1996; 
Bhagat & Black, 2002; Guest, 2009). This significant positive association can imply 
that large board of directors includes a larger number of independent non-executive 
directors, which according to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, can reduce 
the agency problems between shareholders and executive directors. 
Regarding the level of board independence and performance, the results 
generally suggest a strong significant positive association between the level of board 
independence and corporate performance (regardless of the performance measure). 
This finding supports the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
on the importance of the independent non-executive directors in mitigating the 
agency problems, such as the problem of conflict of interest between shareholders 
and executive directors. Empirically, the finding is in line with many previous 
studies that found significant positive association between board independence and 
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performance, such as Dahya & McConnell (2007); Mura (2007); Abdulla and Page 
(2009), and Muravyev et al., (2014). On the other hand, the findings does not support 
the findings of other empirical studies that found negative or no significant 
association between the percentage of independent non-executive directors in the 
board and performance, such as Weir et al., (2001); Fernandes (2008); Bhagat and 
Black (2001); Pham et al., (2008); and Erkens et al., (2012). The implication of this 
finding is that the appointment of independent non-executive directors is not only to 
comply with the requirements of the Corporate Governance Code, but also their 
effectiveness as internal mechanisms to monitor the executives and to contribute the 
board effectiveness. In addition, it can be implied that the recommendations of the 
Code to appoint skilled, experienced, and committed non-executive directors, has 
provided a good mechanism to mitigate agency problems. 
In relation to managerial ownership, the findings suggest mixed results 
depending on the type of the performance measure used. For instance, the results in 
chapter five show a negative association between the percentage of shares owned by 
executive directors and Tobin’s Q, however this negative association was only 
significant in 2008 (with TQ) and 2005 (with AvROA20052007). On the other hand, 
the results show a positive association between managerial ownership and the 
accounting based measures, ROA, ROE, and ROCE, with higher significance level. 
The implication of this is that directors prefer short-term return over long term 
return, therefore the positive association between managerial ownership and ROA 
was expected, and the negative coefficient with TQ also can be explained by this, 
since the Tobin’s Q includes a long term factor and expectations. These findings are 
consistent with Keasy et al., (1994); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); and Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) who found positive association between the percentage of managerial 
ownership and Accounting based performance measures. Thus the results provides a 
good indication that managerial ownership can mitigate the agency problems for 
short term performance, however based on the insignificant coefficient in regard to 
Tobin’s Q, the thesis does not provide strong empirical evidence to consider the 
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managerial ownership as effective long term incentive option to align the long term 
interests of shareholders and executive directors.  
Finally, the thesis found a significant negative association between 
blockholding (including institutional blockholders) and performance, regardless of 
the performance measure used, for the period between 2008 and 2010 of the sample. 
While insignificant association was found for the period prior to 2008. This suggests 
that playing an ineffective monitoring role since the global financial crisis. This is 
inconsistent with the expectation that large shareholders have an incentive to monitor 
performance and take actions, and instead of their expected positive impact on 
managerial performance, the results suggests that large shareholders are playing a 
negative role, and are demotivating executives. The results are consistent with some 
previous empirical studies that also found a negative association between large 
shareholders and performance, such as Mudambi and Nicosia (1998); Hughes 
(2005); Seifert et al., (2005); and Moshirian et al., (2014). On the other hand, the 
results are inconsistent with many empirical studies that found positive or/and non-
linear association between blockholding and performance, such as Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), La Porta et al., (2002), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1990), Maury and Pajuste (2005), and Tang et al., (2012). The 
implication of this result, is that since the credit crises, the conflict of interest 
between blockholders and other institutional/individual blockholders has increased, 
and the tension between board of directors and blockholders also causing a negative 
impact on the financial performance.  
 
6.4. Contributions 
The thesis provides many contributions to the area of corporate governance and 
corporate performance in both, theoretical context and empirical context. 
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First, by reviewing empirical studies on corporate governance and corporate 
performance, it is clear, in comparison to US studies, that there is a limited number 
of studies that used the UK as case study (such as Guest, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 
2007; Weir et al., 2002; Weir & Laing, 2001; Short & Keasey, 1999; Faccio & 
Lasfer, 1999). Therefore the empirical literature is dominated by studies using USA 
market and companies (such as Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Coles et al., 2008; Lee 
& Filbeck, 2006; Bhagat & Black, 2002; Argawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; 
Lin et al., 2009; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997; Klein, 1998; Holderness et al., 1999; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990 & 1995; Morck et al., 1988). Therefore, this study adds 
to the limited number of empirical research in the UK context. 
Second, most of the recent studies in the UK, have not used a new data, and 
most of them used data prior to 2005 (such as Guest, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 
2007; Mura, 2007; Abdulla & Page, 2009; Khurshed et al., 2011). Therefore, their 
results do not take into consideration the impact of global financial crisis in 2007 on 
the practices of corporate governance and their impact on performance. This thesis 
uses recent data on UK non-financial FTSE All Shares Index information for the 
period between 2005 and 2010 inclusive, taking into account the impact of the credit 
crunch in corporate governance practices and performance. In addition, most of these 
empirical studies have not used panel data, which can carry a risk of bias in the 
selected period, while this thesis uses panel data, which allowed us to use effective, 
and useful regression analysis and test for endogeneity problems. 
Third, almost all of the studies in the UK, as well as in the USA, that 
investigated the impact of corporate governance on corporate performance, used one 
single presentation for the accounting or market based measure used. This thesis, 
presented the performance measures used in three different ways. For example 
Tobin’s Q was used in three different measures to count for the industry average by 
using the difference between the company ratio and the average industry ratio (i.e. 
∆TQ) and the period in which we examined which is pre financial crisis (i.e. 
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AvTQ20052007) and during the financial crisis (i.e. AvTQ20082010). Therefore, the 
thesis provides more performance figures then the common ones used in prior 
studies. 
Fourth, most of the UK studies on corporate governance and performance used 
data prior to 2005. The thesis uses data and information for the period between 2005 
and 2010, where some important changes and developments to the corporate 
governance codes and practices emerged. Therefore, the thesis contributes is in 
highlighting the major developments in the UK corporate governance codes, just 
before and during the global financial crisis, such as introducing the Company Act in 
2006; the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2006, and, it revised 
recommendations in 2008 and 2009; and the UK Corporate Governance Code in 
2010, and its amendments in 2012 and 2014. 
Finally, many UK studies on the impact of blockholders, as external 
mechanisms to control board of directors, have not tested the influence of the conflict 
of interest between blockholders and insiders on corporate performance (such as La 
Porta et al., 2002; Hughes, 2005; Seifert et al., 2005; Khurshed et al., 2011). This 
thesis contributes to the empirical literature by investigating the impact of the tension 
between external blockholders and insiders on corporate performance, in particular 
during the global financial crisis. 
 
6.5. Limitations 
As with any other empirical research, this thesis has number of limitations 
which need to be outlined.  
First, despite that the sample size is 363 companies and is relatively similar or 
larger than many other samples used in other empirical studies (such as Maka & 
Kusandib, 2005; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Larmou & Vafeas, 2010; Di Pietra et 
al., 2008; Bermig & Frick, 2010; O’Sullivan, 2000; and Weir et al., 2002), however, 
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the sample size between the different years vary, and this can influence the results 
and cause inconsistent regression outcomes from year to year. 
Second, between 2005 and 2010, many events had happened, that may 
influence the practices of corporate governance and their impact of corporate 
performance, and therefore provides confusing outcomes. For instance in 2007 a 
major shock hit the global markets, in particular the US and UK market, where the 
global financial crises initiated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in USA and 
Northern Rock in UK. In addition, during the period 2005 to 2010, major 
amendments to the UK corporate governance codes and recommendations were 
published, such as the Combined Code in 2006; the Company Act 2006; and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010. However, the impact of this limitation has been 
limited since the regression analysis was carried out separately for each year, to 
allow the identification of any major changes. 
Third, although the period length of six years used in this thesis is similar or 
more than the period used in many other pervious empirical studies (such as Eisnberg 
et al., 1998; Maka & Kusandi, 2005; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Fernandes, 2008; 
O’Sullivan, 2000’ Weir et al., 2002; Short & Keasey, 1999; Faccio & Lasfer, 1999; 
Davies et al., 2005; Bos et al., 2013), however, this sample period can be considered 
as relatively short for a panel analysis. Hence, this creates difficulty to observe 
significant changes in board structure and ownership structure. Despite the short 
sample period, this limitation was mitigated by using previous studies in UK (such as 
Abdullah & Page, 2009) and expanding their descriptive statistics to those obtained 
in this thesis in order to obtain the trends of ownership structure and board structure 
for longer period. 
Fourth, the thesis uses only UK samples (i.e. FTSE All Shares non-financials), 
and this makes it difficult to provide a meaningful comparison between the thesis 
findings and other empirical studies in different regions. However, such limitation 
may not be considered as significant problem since other studies that focused on the 
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UK market were used in this thesis (Guest, 2009; O’Sullivan, 2000’ Weir et al., 
2002; Short & Keasey, 1999; Faccio & Lasfer, 1999; Davies et al., 2005; Bos et al., 
2013). Another limitation, which also related to the sample is the exclusion of the 
financial sector from the sample. This has influenced the representation of the FTSE 
All Shares components, however, including financial companies, would have 
resulted in more considerable limitations, since the regulation, financing structure, 
and the nature of the services differ largely between financial and non-financial 
companies. 
Fifth, the thesis uses only two variables for board structure and characteristics, 
which are the size of board of directors and the level of board independence. Such 
limited number can be viewed as few in comparison to many other characteristics in 
which the board has, such as the experience of board members, their skills, and their 
expertise and commitment. However, the selection of the variables for board 
structure in this thesis focused on the quantified variables in order to use regression 
analysis more effectively. 
Sixth, one of the assumptions in this thesis in terms of the corporate 
performance variables is that the performance is only influenced by the corporate 
governance mechanisms and the companies’ industry, size, and age. However, 
corporate performance can be influenced by many external factors including 
microeconomic factors (such as inflation, unemployment, GDP) and the general 
health and stability of the economy (such as recession, credit crisis, consumer 
confidence, financing opportunities and costs), and these factors were not considered 
in the regression model. Although this limitation can be viewed as valid concern, 
however using the average performance for two periods (i.e. pre credit crisis and 
during credit crisis) did reduce such problems. 
Seventh, the regression analysis technique is a very effective and widely used 
technique in the area of corporate governance and firm performance to investigate 
the existence of association between different variables, however, using additional 
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statistic techniques to test the relationship between corporate governance variables 
and performance may have provided interesting outcomes. In addition, the 
endogeneity test and the 2SLS analysis, suffers from accurate identification of 
endogenous variables, however this is a problem, which is common amongst 
empirical studies and is very difficult to avoid. 
 
6.6. Recommendations for Further Future Research 
There are many ways in which this research can be developed and improved 
for further future research.  
First, the research can include variables related to external economic factors, 
such as inflation rate, risk free rate, consumer confidence, and competition level. 
This can provide a better understanding to the interaction between corporate 
governance mechanisms and external economic factors and their impact on firm 
performance. 
Second, since the credit crisis in 2007/2008, there is an increased attention and 
debate over board of director’s compensations and their effectiveness in mitigating 
agency problems. Therefore, future research can investigate the link between 
executive directors’ remuneration packages and their effectiveness in mitigating the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and performance. 
Third, in addition to remuneration as an effective mechanism to align the 
interest of shareholders to the interest of executive directors, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, as well as many empirical studies, focused their attention on the 
importance of separating the role of Chairman and CEO to avoid the risk of one 
individual having power over the board. Hence, future research can consider 
including the duality role of CEO and Chairman and study its contribution to 
effective board. In addition, more attention is given to the role of different board 
committees, namely, remuneration committee; audit committee; and nomination 
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committee, and therefore investigating their role in reducing agency problems would 
be an important aspect to research in future. 
Fourth, the effectiveness and influence of blockholders as external monitoring 
mechanisms can vary depending on the identity of the blockholder or/and 
institutional shareholder. Therefore, classifying and categorising blockholders and 
institutional shareholders according to their identity can be provide better 
understanding to the main effective blockholders. In addition, the second level of 
agency problems (i.e. conflict of interest between blockholders) can be further 
investigated by examining the impact of conflict of interest between those 
blockholders/institutional shareholders on firm performance. 
Finally, Future research could be expanded to separately examine companies, 
which do not fully comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code in terms of 
board independence, and to investigate these companies’ performance and whether 
lack of compliance with this element has an impact on their performance. Another 
area which could also be explored in future research is the period of time a specific 
director was sitting on the board to examine whether this could have an impact on the 
results obtained regarding board size and performance.
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 APEX4.1: List of the 566 FTSE All Shares non-financial companies and their survival period 
(Industry Codes: 0 for others, 1 for Technology, 2 for Energy, 3 for Consumer services, 4 for Leisure, and 5 for Industrial)   
Company Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Number of years survived 
888 HOLDINGS PLC 4       6 
AEGIS GROUP PLC 1       6 
AGA RANGEMASTER GROUP PLC 3       6 
AGGREKO PLC 5       6 
AMEC PLC 2       6 
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 2       6 
ANGLO PACIFIC GROUP PLC 2       6 
ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTATIONS 3       6 
ANITE PLC 1       6 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC 2       6 
AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD 2       6 
ARENA LEISURE PLC 4       6 
ARM HOLDINGS PLC 1       6 
ASHLEY (LAURA) HOLDINGS PLC 3       6 
ASHTEAD GROUP PLC 5       6 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS PLC 3       6 
ASTRAZENECA PLC 3       6 
ATKINS (WS) PLC 5       6 
AUTONOMY CORP PLC 1       6 
AVEVA GROUP PLC 1       6 
AVIS BUDGET EMEA LTD 0       6 
AXIS-SHIELD PLC 3       6 
BABCOCK INTL GROUP PLC 5       6 
BAE SYSTEMS PLC 5       6 
BALFOUR BEATTY PLC 5       6 
BARR (A.G.) PLC 3       6 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC 0       6 
BATM ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS 1       6 
BBA AVIATION PLC 5       6 
BELLWAY PLC 0       6 
BERENDSEN PLC 5       6 
BERKELEY GROUP HOLDINGS 0       6 
BG GROUP PLC 2       6 
BHP BILLITON PLC 2       6 
BLACKROCK GREATER EUROPE INV 0       6 
BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC 1       6 
BODYCOTE PLC 5       6 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP PLC 0       6 
BP PLC 2       6 
BRAEMAR SHIPPING SERVICES PL 5       6 
BRAMMER PLC 5       6 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC 0       6 
BRITISH POLYTHENE INDUSTRIES 2       6 
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GRO 1       6 
BROWN (N) GROUP PLC 3       6 
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BT GROUP PLC 1       6 
BTG PLC 3       6 
BUNZL PLC 5       6 
BURBERRY GROUP PLC 0       6 
BWIN.PARTY DIGITAL ENTERTAIN 4       6 
CABLE & WIRELESS COMMUNICATI 1       6 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC 2       6 
CAMELLIA PLC 5       6 
CAPITA PLC 5       6 
CARILLION PLC 5       6 
CARNIVAL PLC 4       6 
CARPETRIGHT PLC 3       6 
CENTAUR MEDIA PLC 1       6 
CENTRICA PLC 2       6 
CHARTER INTERNATIONAL PLC 5       6 
CHEMRING GROUP PLC 5       6 
CHRYSALIS GROUP PLC 4       6 
CLARKE (T.) PLC 5       6 
CLARKSON PLC 5       6 
COBHAM PLC 5       6 
COLT GROUP SA 1       6 
COMPASS GROUP PLC 4       6 
COMPUTACENTER PLC 1       6 
CONSORT MEDICAL PLC 3       6 
COOKSON GROUP PLC 5       6 
COSTAIN GROUP PLC 5       6 
CRANSWICK PLC 3       6 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL PLC 2       6 
CSR PLC 1       6 
DAILY MAIL&GENERAL TST-A NV 1       6 
DAIRY CREST GROUP PLC 3       6 
DE LA RUE PLC 5       6 
DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC 3       6 
DEVRO PLC 3       6 
DIAGEO PLC 3       6 
DIGNITY PLC 0       6 
DIPLOMA PLC 1       6 
DIXONS RETAIL PLC 3       6 
DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES PLC 1       6 
DS SMITH PLC 2       6 
E2V TECHNOLOGIES PLC 1       6 
EASYJET PLC 5       6 
ELECTROCOMPONENTS PLC 1       6 
ELEMENTIS PLC 2       6 
ENTERPRISE INNS PLC 4       6 
EUROMONEY INSTL INVESTOR PLC 1       6 
FENNER PLC 5       6 
FIDESSA GROUP PLC 1       6 
FILTRONA PLC 2       6 
FINDEL PLC 3       6 
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FIRSTGROUP PLC 5       6 
FISHER (JAMES) & SONS PLC 2       6 
FORTH PORTS PLC 0       6 
FULLER SMITH & TURNER -"A" 4       6 
G4S PLC 5       6 
GALLIFORD TRY PLC 5       6 
GAME GROUP PLC 3       6 
GKN PLC 0       6 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC 3       6 
GLEESON (M.J.) GROUP PLC 5       6 
GO-AHEAD GROUP PLC 5       6 
GREENE KING PLC 4       6 
GREGGS PLC 3       6 
HALFORDS GROUP PLC 3       6 
HALMA PLC 1       6 
HAYS PLC 5       6 
HEADLAM GROUP PLC 0       6 
HELPHIRE GROUP PLC 5       6 
HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC 3       6 
HILL & SMITH HOLDINGS PLC 2       6 
HMV GROUP PLC 3       6 
HOLIDAYBREAK PLC 4       6 
HOMESERVE PLC 5       6 
HORNBY PLC 5       6 
HOWDEN JOINERY GROUP PLC 3       6 
HUNTING PLC 2       6 
HYDER CONSULTING PLC 5       6 
IMAGINATION TECH GROUP PLC 1       6 
IMI PLC 5       6 
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC 0       6 
INCHCAPE PLC 0       6 
INFORMA PLC 1       6 
INMARSAT PLC 1       6 
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROU 4       6 
INTERNATIONAL POWER PLC 2       6 
INTERSERVE PLC 5       6 
INTERTEK GROUP PLC 5       6 
INTL CONSOLIDATED AIRLINE-DI 5       6 
INVENSYS PLC 5       6 
ITE GROUP PLC 5       6 
ITV PLC 1       6 
JD SPORTS FASHION PLC 3       6 
JKX OIL & GAS PLC 2       6 
JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC 2       6 
JOHNSTON PRESS PLC 1       6 
KAZAKHMYS PLC 2       6 
KCOM GROUP PLC 1       6 
KELLER GROUP PLC 5       6 
KESA ELECTRICALS PLC 3       6 
KIER GROUP PLC 5       6 
238 
 
Company Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Number of years survived 
KINGFISHER PLC 3       6 
KOFAX PLC 1       6 
LADBROKES PLC 4       6 
LAIRD PLC 1       6 
LOGICA PLC 1       6 
LONMIN PLC 2       6 
LOOKERS PLC 3       6 
LOW & BONAR PLC 0       6 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING GROUP 5       6 
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 3       6 
MARSHALLS PLC 2       6 
MARSTON'S PLC 4       6 
MCBRIDE PLC 0       6 
MEGGITT PLC 5       6 
MELROSE RESOURCES PLC 2       6 
MENZIES (JOHN) PLC 0       6 
MICHAEL PAGE INTERNATIONAL 5       6 
MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL 1       6 
MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE HOTEL 4       6 
MISYS PLC 1       6 
MITCHELLS & BUTLERS PLC 4       6 
MITIE GROUP PLC 5       6 
MORGAN CRUCIBLE COMPANY PLC 5       6 
MORGAN SINDALL GROUP PLC 5       6 
MOTHERCARE PLC 3       6 
MOUCHEL GROUP PLC 5       6 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP PLC 5       6 
NATIONAL GRID PLC 2       6 
NEXT PLC 3       6 
NORTHERN FOODS PLC 3       6 
NORTHGATE PLC 5       6 
NORTHUMBRIAN WATER GROUP PLC 2       6 
OXFORD BIOMEDICA PLC 3       6 
OXFORD INSTRUMENTS PLC 1       6 
PACE PLC 1       6 
PEARSON PLC 1       6 
PENNON GROUP PLC 2       6 
PERSIMMON PLC 0       6 
PETROFAC LTD 2       6 
PHOENIX IT GROUP LTD 1       6 
PHOTO-ME INTERNATIONAL PLC 5       6 
POLAR CAPITAL TECHNOLOGY TR 0       6 
PREMIER FARNELL PLC 1       6 
PREMIER FOODS PLC 3       6 
PREMIER OIL PLC 2       6 
PROSTRAKAN GROUP PLC 3       6 
PSION PLC 1       6 
PUNCH TAVERNS PLC 4       6 
PZ CUSSONS PLC 0       6 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES LTD 2       6 
239 
 
Company Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Number of years survived 
RANK GROUP PLC 4       6 
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC 0       6 
REDROW PLC 0       6 
REED ELSEVIER PLC 1       6 
RENISHAW PLC 1       6 
RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC 5       6 
RESTAURANT GROUP PLC 4       6 
REXAM PLC 2       6 
RICARDO PLC 5       6 
RIO TINTO PLC 2       6 
RM PLC 1       6 
ROBERT WALTERS PLC 5       6 
ROBERT WISEMAN DAIRIES PLC 3       6 
ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS PLC 5       6 
ROTORK PLC 5       6 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-A SHS 2       6 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-B SHS 2       6 
RPC GROUP PLC 2       6 
RPS GROUP PLC 5       6 
SABMILLER PLC 3       6 
SAGE GROUP PLC/THE 1       6 
SAINSBURY (J) PLC 3       6 
SAVILLS PLC 0       6 
SDL PLC 1       6 
SENIOR PLC 5       6 
SERCO GROUP PLC 5       6 
SEVERFIELD-ROWEN PLC 5       6 
SEVERN TRENT PLC 2       6 
SHANKS GROUP PLC 5       6 
SHIRE PLC 3       6 
SIG PLC 5       6 
SMITH & NEPHEW PLC 3       6 
SMITHS GROUP PLC 5       6 
SOCO INTERNATIONAL PLC 2       6 
SPECTRIS PLC 1       6 
SPEEDY HIRE PLC 5       6 
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING PLC 5       6 
SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS PLC 1       6 
SSE PLC 2       6 
ST. IVES PLC 5       6 
STAGECOACH GROUP PLC 5       6 
TATE & LYLE PLC 3       6 
TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC 0       6 
TED BAKER PLC 0       6 
TELECOM PLUS PLC 2       6 
TESCO PLC 3       6 
THORNTONS PLC 3       6 
TOPPS TILES PLC 3       6 
TRAVIS PERKINS PLC 5       6 
TRIBAL GROUP PLC 5       6 
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TRINITY MIRROR PLC 1       6 
TT ELECTRONICS PLC 1       6 
TULLOW OIL PLC 2       6 
UBM PLC 1       6 
UK COAL PLC 2       6 
UK MAIL GROUP PLC 5       6 
ULTRA ELECTRONICS HLDGS PLC 5       6 
UMECO PLC 5       6 
UNILEVER PLC 3       6 
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC 2       6 
UTV MEDIA PLC 1       6 
VEDANTA RESOURCES PLC 2       6 
VICTREX PLC 2       6 
VITEC GROUP PLC/THE 5       6 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC 1       6 
VP PLC 5       6 
WEIR GROUP PLC/THE 5       6 
WETHERSPOON (J.D.) PLC 4       6 
WHITBREAD PLC 4       6 
WILLIAM HILL PLC 4       6 
WILMINGTON GROUP PLC 1       6 
WINCANTON PLC 5       6 
WM MORRISON SUPERMARKETS 3       6 
WOLFSON MICROELECTRONICS PLC 1       6 
WOLSELEY PLC 5       6 
WOOD GROUP (JOHN) PLC 2       6 
WPP PLC 1       6 
WSP GROUP PLC 5       6 
XSTRATA PLC 2       6 
YELL GROUP PLC 1       6 
YULE CATTO & COMPANY PLC 2       6 
ARK THERAPEUTICS GROUP PLC 3      × 5 
ARRIVA PLC 5      × 5 
ASSURA GROUP LTD 3 ×      5 
BRITVIC PLC 3 ×      5 
BSS GROUP PLC 3      × 5 
CADBURY PLC 3      × 5 
CARE UK LTD 3      × 5 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE GROUPOLD 3      × 5 
CASTINGS PLC 5      × 5 
CHIME COMMUNICATIONS PLC 1 ×      5 
CHLORIDE GROUP LTD 5      × 5 
CLINTON CARDS PLC 3    ×   5 
COMMUNISIS PLC 5      × 5 
DANA PETROLEUM PLC 2      × 5 
DEBENHAMS PLC 3 ×      5 
DELTA PLC 2      × 5 
DIMENSION DATA HOLDINGS PLC 1      × 5 
DRAX GROUP PLC 2 ×      5 
DUNELM GROUP PLC 3 ×      5 
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EMBLAZE LTD 1    ×   5 
EXPERIAN PLC 5 ×      5 
FRENCH CONNECTION GROUP PLC 3      × 5 
FUTURE PLC 1      × 5 
GOLDENPORT HOLDINGS INC 5 ×      5 
HAMPSON INDUSTRIES PLC 5 ×      5 
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC 2 ×      5 
HOME RETAIL GROUP 3 ×      5 
INNOVATION GROUP PLC 1    ×   5 
INTEC TELECOM SYSTEMS PLC 1      × 5 
JJB SPORTS PLC 3    ×   5 
LAVENDON GROUP PLC 5 ×      5 
LUMINAR GROUP HOLDINGS PLC 3      × 5 
MELROSE PLC 5 ×      5 
OPTOS PLC 3 ×      5 
PENDRAGON PLC 3    ×   5 
QINETIQ GROUP PLC 5 ×      5 
R.E.A. HOLDINGS PLC 3 ×      5 
RENOVO GROUP PLC 3 ×      5 
RIGHTMOVE PLC 1 ×      5 
ROK PLC 5      × 5 
SMITHS NEWS PLC 1 ×      5 
SOUTHERN CROSS HEALTHCARE 3 ×      5 
SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC 3      × 5 
STHREE PLC 5 ×      5 
STOBART GROUP LTD 5 ×      5 
TOMKINS LTD 5      × 5 
VT GROUP PLC 5      × 5 
WH SMITH PLC 3 ×      5 
ANTISOMA PLC 3 ×     × 4 
BPP HOLDINGS PLC 0     × × 4 
BRITISH ENERGY GROUP PLC 2     × × 4 
CARILLION ENERGY SERVICES 2 × ×     4 
CINEWORLD GROUP PLC 4 × ×     4 
CONNAUGHT PLC 0 ×     × 4 
EIDOS PLC 1     × × 4 
EMERALD ENERGY PLC 2     × × 4 
FERREXPO PLC 2 × ×     4 
GEM DIAMONDS LTD 2 × ×     4 
GENUS PLC 3 × ×     4 
GOLDSHIELD GROUP PLC 3     × × 4 
HILTON FOOD GROUP LTD 3 × ×     4 
HOGG ROBINSON GROUP PLC 5 ×   ×   4 
HUNTSWORTH PLC 1    × ×  4 
INTERNATIONAL FERRO METALS 2 × ×     4 
MONDI PLC 2 × ×     4 
MONEYSUPERMARKET.COM 1 × ×     4 
NCC GROUP PLC 1 × ×     4 
PV CRYSTALOX SOLAR PLC 1 × ×     4 
SAFESTORE HOLDINGS PLC 0 × ×     4 
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SALAMANDER ENERGY PLC 2 × ×     4 
SCOTT WILSON GROUP PLC 5 ×     × 4 
SEPURA LTD 1 × ×     4 
SPORTECH PLC 4 × ×     4 
SPORTS DIRECT INTERNATIONAL 3 × ×     4 
SPRING GROUP PLC 0     × × 4 
STV GROUP PLC 1     × × 4 
TALVIVAARA MINING CO PLC 2 × ×     4 
TARSUS GROUP PLC 5    × ×  4 
TELECITY GROUP PLC 1 × ×     4 
THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC 4 × ×     4 
THOMSON REUTERS UK LTD 1     × × 4 
TUI TRAVEL PLC 4 × ×     4 
VECTURA GROUP PLC 3 × ×     4 
VENTURE PRODUCTION PLC 2     × × 4 
WELLSTREAM HOLDINGS PLC 2 × ×     4 
WYG PLC 5     × × 4 
XCHANGING PLC 1 × ×     4 
ABBOT GROUP LTD     × × × 3 
AEA TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
AIR PARTNER PLC  × ×    × 3 
ALFRED MCALPINE PLC     × × × 3 
ALIZYME PLC     × × × 3 
AXON GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
BLACKS LEISURE GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
BTG MANAGEMENT SERVICES LTD     × × × 3 
BURREN ENERGY PLC     × × × 3 
CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD  × ×    × 3 
CORIN GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
DETICA GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
DOMINO'S PIZZA UK & IRL PLC  × × ×    3 
EMAP INTERNATIONAL LTD     × × × 3 
ENNSTONE PLC     × × × 3 
ENODIS LTD     × × × 3 
ENTERTAINMENT RIGHTS PLC     × × × 3 
EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES  × × ×    3 
EXPRO INTERNATIONAL GRP LTD     × × × 3 
FIBERWEB PLC  ×  × ×   3 
FILTRONIC PLC     × × × 3 
FKI PLC     × × × 3 
FOSECO LTD     × × × 3 
FRESNILLO PLC  × × ×    3 
GLOBAL RADIO LTD     × × × 3 
GOODWIN PLC  × × ×    3 
GYRUS GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
HARDY OIL & GAS PLC  × × ×    3 
HERITAGE OIL PLC  × × ×    3 
KELDA GROUP LTD     × × × 3 
LAMPRELL PLC  × × ×    3 
LAND OF LEATHER HOLDINGS PLC     × × × 3 
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MEARS GROUP PLC  × × ×    3 
MORSE PLC     × × × 3 
NAMAKWA DIAMONDS LTD  × × ×    3 
NORTHGATE INFO SOLUTIONS HOL     × × × 3 
NSB RETAIL SYSTEMS PLC     × × × 3 
PINEWOOD SHEPPERTON PLC     × × × 3 
RAYMARINE PLC     × × × 3 
SANOFI PASTEUR HOLDING LTD     × × × 3 
SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE LTD     × × × 3 
SIGNET JEWELERS LTD     × × × 3 
SKYEPHARMA PLC     × × × 3 
SYNERGY HEALTH PLC  × × ×    3 
TAYLOR NELSON SOFRES PLC     × × × 3 
TDG LTD     × × × 3 
THUS GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
TRADUS PLC     × × × 3 
UMBRO PLC     × × × 3 
UNIQ PLC     × × × 3 
VANCO PLC     × × × 3 
WHATMAN LTD     × × × 3 
WOOLWORTHS GROUP PLC     × × × 3 
XAAR PLC     × × × 3 
ACAL PLC    × × × × 2 
AGCERT INTERNATIONAL    × × × × 2 
ALEXON GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
ALLIANCE BOOTS HOLDINGS LTD    × × × × 2 
ALTERIAN PLC  × × × ×   2 
AMSTRAD LTD    × × × × 2 
ARICOM PLC  × ×   × × 2 
ARLA FOODS UK PLC    × × × × 2 
AUTOGRILL HOLDINGS UK PLC    × × × × 2 
BIFFA LTD  ×   × × × 2 
BOOKER GROUP PLC  × × × ×   2 
CADOGAN PETROLEUM PLC  × × ×   × 2 
CAFFE NERO GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
CARTER & CARTER GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
CORPORATE SERVICES GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
CORUS GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
CREST NICHOLSON PLC    × × × × 2 
DAWSON HOLDINGS PLC   × ×  × × 2 
DIALIGHT PLC   × × × ×  2 
EMI GROUP LTD    × × × × 2 
ENSERVE GROUP LTD  × × ×   × 2 
ENTERPRISE PLC    × × × × 2 
EUROPEAN MOTOR HOLDINGS PLC    × × × × 2 
FIRST CHOICE HOLIDAYS PLC    × × × × 2 
GALLAHER GROUP LTD    × × × × 2 
GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
GEORGE WIMPEY LTD    × × × × 2 
HANSON LTD    × × × × 2 
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HARVARD INTERNATIONAL PLC    × × × × 2 
HEYWOOD WILLIAMS GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
HOMESTYLE GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
HUNTLEIGH TECHNOLOGY PLC    × × × × 2 
IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDS PLC    × × × × 2 
IMPERIAL ENERGY CORP PLC  × ×   × × 2 
INNOVATA PLC    × × × × 2 
ISOFT GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
ISOTRON PLC    × × × × 2 
JARVIS PLC    × × × × 2 
JESSOPS PLC    × × × × 2 
JOHNSON SERVICE GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
KEWILL PLC  × × × ×   2 
LATCHWAYS PLC  ×   × × × 2 
MANGANESE BRONZE HLDGS PLC  ×   × × × 2 
MECOM GROUP PLC  × × × ×   2 
METALRAX GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
MYTRAVEL GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
NESTOR HEALTHCARE GROUP PLC    × × × × 2 
NORD ANGLIA EDUCATION PLC  ×   × × × 2 
OFFICE2OFFICE PLC    × × × × 2 
PETROPAVLOVSK PLC  × × × ×   2 
REGENT INNS PLC    × × × × 2 
RHM LTD    × × × × 2 
SALVESEN (CHRISTIAN) LTD    × × × × 2 
SCOTTISH POWER LTD    × × × × 2 
SCS UPHOLSTERY PLC    × × × × 2 
SONDEX PLC    × × × × 2 
STYLES & WOOD GROUP PLC  ×   × × × 2 
SURFCONTROL PLC    × × × × 2 
TELENT PLC    × × × × 2 
TIMEWEAVE PLC   × × ×  × 2 
VERNALIS PLC    × × × × 2 
VISLINK PLC  ×   × × × 2 
WAGON PLC    × × × × 2 
WILSON BOWDEN PLC    × × × × 2 
XANSA PLC    × × × × 2 
XP POWER LTD  × × × ×   2 
4IMPRINT GROUP PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
ABACUS GROUP PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
ACCIDENT EXCHANGE GROUP PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
AFREN PLC  × × × × ×  1 
AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD PLC  × × × × ×  1 
ALLIANCE UNICHEM PLC   × × × × × 1 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS   × × × × × 1 
AWG PARENT CO LTD   × × × × × 1 
AZ ELECTRONIC MATERIALS  × × × × ×  1 
BAA AIRPORTS LTD   × × × × × 1 
BETFAIR GROUP PLC  × × × × ×  1 
BIOCOMPATIBLES INTL PLC   × × × × × 1 
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BIOME TECHNOLOGIES PLC   × × × × × 1 
BOC GROUP LTD/THE   × × × × × 1 
BODY SHOP INTERNATL PLC/THE   × × × × × 1 
BRAMBLES INDUSTRIES PLC   × × × × × 1 
BRISTOL WATER GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
CABLE & WIRELESS WORLDWIDE  × × × × ×  1 
CAMBRIDGE ANTIBODY TECH GRP   × × × × × 1 
CARCLO PLC  × × × × ×  1 
CARILLION JM LTD   × × × × × 1 
CENTAMIN PLC  × × × × ×  1 
CENTER PARCS (UK) GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
CLINPHONE PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
CPP GROUP PLC  × × × × ×  1 
CRESTON PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
DE VERE GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
DIODES ZETEX LTD   × × × × × 1 
DX SERVICES LTD   × × × × × 1 
DYSON GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
EASYNET GROUP LTD   × × × × × 1 
ENQUEST PLC  × × × × ×  1 
ESSAR ENERGY PLC  × × × × ×  1 
EUROTUNNEL PLC-UTS REGD   × × × × × 1 
EXILLON ENERGY PLC  × × × × ×  1 
EXPERIAN FINANCE PLC   × × × × × 1 
FIRST TECHNOLOGY PLC   × × × × × 1 
GENTING UK PLC   × × × × × 1 
GONDOLA HOLDINGS LTD   × × × × × 1 
HANSEN TRANSMISSIONS INT  × × × × ×  1 
HARDYS & HANSONS LTD   × × × × × 1 
HOUSE OF FRASER LTD   × × × × × 1 
ICM COMPUTER GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
INCISIVE MEDIA PLC   × × × × × 1 
INSTORE LTD   × × × × × 1 
KENMARE RESOURCES PLC  × × × × ×  1 
LAING (JOHN) PLC-ORD   × × × × × 1 
LONDON CLUBS INTL PLC   × × × × × 1 
MATALAN LTD   × × × × × 1 
MCCARTHY & STONE PLC   × × × × × 1 
METAL BULLETIN PLC   × × × × × 1 
MOSS BROS GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
NORCROS PLC  × ×  × × × 1 
OCADO GROUP PLC  × × × × ×  1 
OPD GROUP PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
OTTAKAR'S PLC   × × × × × 1 
PD PORTS LTD   × × × × × 1 
PEACOCK GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
PENINSULAR & ORIENTAL STEAM   × × × × × 1 
PILKINGTON GROUP LTD   × × × × × 1 
PLASMON PLC   × × × × × 1 
PROMETHEAN WORLD PLC  × × × × ×  1 
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PURICORE PLC  ×  × × × × 1 
RADSTONE TECHNOLOGY PLC   × × × × × 1 
RENOLD PLC  × × × × ×  1 
RETAIL DECISIONS PLC   × × × × × 1 
RICHMOND FOODS LTD   × × × × × 1 
RSM TENON GROUP PLC  × × × × ×  1 
SHL GROUP LTD   × × × × × 1 
SIMON GROUP PLC   × × × × × 1 
SINCLAIR IS PHARMA PLC  × × × × ×  1 
SPORTINGBET PLC  × × × × ×  1 
SUPERGLASS HOLDINGS PLC  × ×  × × × 1 
SUPERGROUP PLC  × × × × ×  1 
TALKTALK TELECOM GROUP  × × × × ×  1 
TELEFONICA EUROPE PLC   × × × × × 1 
VARDY (REG) PLC   × × × × × 1 
VIRGIN MOBILE HLDGS (UK) LTD   × × × × × 1 
VIRIDIAN GROUP LTD   × × × × × 1 
VOLEX PLC  × × × × ×  1 
WESTBURY LTD   × × × × × 1 
WH SMITH PLC/OLD   × × × × × 1 
WYEVALE GARDEN CENTRES PLC   × × × × × 1 
 
      Year 
Variable Diagnosing method   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSZE Mean -/+ 3SD N of diagnosed Outliers 16 17 11 15 9 11 
    % of outliers 4.78% 4.90% 3.03% 4.13% 2.51% 3.19% 
BIND G Factor N of diagnosed Outliers 22 23 17 19 15 18 
    % of outliers 6.57% 6.63% 4.68% 5.23% 4.19% 5.22% 
MGOW Mean -/+ 3SD N of diagnosed Outliers 11 13 13 12 12 11 
    % of outliers 3.27% 3.71% 3.60% 3.31% 3.38% 3.24% 
BKOW G Factor N of diagnosed Outliers 22 23 17 19 15 18 
    % of outliers 6.63% 6.65% 4.79% 5.28% 4.23% 5.33% 
INSOW G Factor N of diagnosed Outliers 18 18 18 18 18 18 
    % of outliers 5.42% 5.20% 5.07% 5.00% 5.07% 5.33% 
FSZE G Factor N of diagnosed Outliers 16 17 11 15 9 11 
    % of outliers 4.73% 4.82% 3.07% 4.20% 2.54% 3.20% 
FAGE G Factor N of diagnosed Outliers 2 2 2 2 2 2 
    % of outliers 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 0.55% 
TQ Mean -/+ 3SD N of diagnosed Outliers 16 17 11 15 9 11 
    % of outliers 4.92% 4.97% 3.07% 4.19% 2.56% 3.28% 
ROA Mean -/+ 3SD N of diagnosed Outliers 22 23 17 19 15 18 
    % of outliers 6.65% 6.74% 4.80% 5.32% 4.27% 5.33% 
APEX4.2: Statistics on the number of outliers diagnosed for each major variable where BSZE is Total number of directors in the 
board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to 
company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of 
shares they own in FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; 
FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. ROA Net Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; TQ 
is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; and SD is Standard Deviation
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  BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
BIND2005 .049 .081 .085 .096 .121
* .100 1           
BIND2006 .056 .040 .027 .071 .102 .078 .744
** 1         
BIND2007 .093 .075 .046 .062 .101 .098 .604
** .751** 1       
BIND2008 .114
* .111* .085 .053 .097 .105 .514** .629** .752** 1     
BIND2009 .136
* .132* .106* .073 .104 .105 .509** .598** .678** .737** 1   
BIND2010 .141
* .196** .160** .137* .183** .095 .447** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1 
APEX 5.1 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables where BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to 
total number of directors;**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
MGOW2005 -.143
** -.161** -.136* -.098 -.141* -.176** 1           
MGOW2006 -.119
* -.144** -.114* -.074 -.108* -.137* .964** 1         
MGOW2007 -.160
** -.159** -.171** -.134* -.142** -.157** .887** .931** 1       
MGOW2008 -.154
** -.152** -.169** -.124* -.133* -.152** .849** .900** .978** 1     
MGOW2009 -.144
** -.150** -.168** -.137** -.137** -.142** .765** .820** .914** .923** 1   
MGOW2010 -.156
** -.175** -.190** -.163** -.142** -.123* .730** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1 
  BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
BKOW2005 -.185
** -.185** -.184** -.154** -.181** -.169** 1           
BKOW2006 -.244
** -.244** -.270** -.232** -.261** -.249** .842** 1         
BKOW2007 -.290
** -.291** -.331** -.269** -.308** -.296** .649** .779** 1       
BKOW2008 -.292
** -.303** -.330** -.262** -.299** -.310** .601** .726** .855** 1     
BKOW2009 -.262
** -.268** -.311** -.270** -.288** -.323** .606** .710** .790** .873** 1   
BKOW2010 -.332
** -.329** -.336** -.283** -.306** -.331** .623** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1 
APEX 5.2 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables where BSZE is Total number of directors in the board;  MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
INSOW2005 -.108 -.133
* -.153** -.163** -.160** -.137* 1           
INSOW2006 -.233
** -.215** -.268** -.247** -.208** -.206** .760** 1         
INSOW2007 -.288
** -.269** -.292** -.270** -.268** -.283** .615** .780** 1       
INSOW2008 -.324
** -.320** -.336** -.300** -.305** -.345** .542** .693** .824** 1     
INSOW2009 -.315
** -.280** -.284** -.262** -.275** -.316** .496** .609** .744** .871** 1   
INSOW2010 -.323
** -.287** -.278** -.263** -.275** -.311** .500** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1 
 
  BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
FSZE2005 .650
** .657** .626** .592** .619** .584** 1           
FSZE2006 .633
** .648** .620** .593** .621** .595** .984** 1         
FSZE2007 .630
** .655** .638** .624** .650** .621** .966** .983** 1       
FSZE2008 .616
** .648** .632** .625** .653** .630** .952** .972** .988** 1     
FSZE2009 .610
** .637** .622** .618** .653** .630** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
FSZE2010 .599
** .626** .617** .615** .654** .631** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
APEX 5.3 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables where BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional 
shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BSZE2005 BSZE2006 BSZE2007 BSZE2008 BSZE2009 BSZE2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
BSZE2005 1                       
BSZE2006 .872
** 1                     
BSZE2007 .822
** .890** 1                   
BSZE2008 .750
** .821** .888** 1                 
BSZE2009 .735
** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSZE2010 .677
** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
FAGE2005 .033 .080 .062 .065 .062 .098 1           
FAGE2006 .033 .083 .065 .068 .066 .100 1.000
** 1         
FAGE2007 .034 .085 .064 .068 .063 .099 1.000
** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 .034 .085 .064 .068 .063 .099 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 .034 .085 .064 .068 .063 .099 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 .034 .085 .064 .068 .063 .099 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
APEX 5.4 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables where BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; **. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 
BIND2005 1                       
BIND2006 .744
** 1                     
BIND2007 .604
** .751** 1                   
BIND2008 .514
** .629** .752** 1                 
BIND2009 .509
** .598** .678** .737** 1               
BIND2010 .447
** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1             
MGOW2005 -.231
** -.234** -.164** -.145** -.183** -.176** 1           
MGOW2006 -.217
** -.217** -.159** -.159** -.189** -.169** .964** 1         
MGOW2007 -.236
** -.203** -.141** -.157** -.199** -.156** .887** .931** 1       
MGOW2008 -.188
** -.161** -.105* -.145** -.185** -.157** .849** .900** .978** 1     
MGOW2009 -.196
** -.132* -.108* -.129* -.181** -.168** .765** .820** .914** .923** 1   
MGOW2010 -.189
** -.132* -.101 -.122* -.183** -.176** .730** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1 
 
  BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 
BIND2005 1                       
BIND2006 .744
** 1                     
BIND2007 .604
** .751** 1                   
BIND2008 .514
** .629** .752** 1                 
BIND2009 .509
** .598** .678** .737** 1               
BIND2010 .447
** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1             
BKOW2005 -.208
** -.106 -.127* -.119* -.160** -.160** 1           
BKOW2006 -.181
** -.125* -.172** -.198** -.185** -.191** .842** 1         
BKOW2007 -.212
** -.156** -.241** -.244** -.222** -.238** .649** .779** 1       
BKOW2008 -.193
** -.116* -.195** -.230** -.199** -.210** .601** .726** .855** 1     
BKOW2009 -.204
** -.105 -.170** -.216** -.153** -.180** .606** .710** .790** .873** 1   
BKOW2010 -.220
** -.122* -.171** -.216** -.169** -.208** .623** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1 
APEX 5.5 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, 
government ...); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 
BIND2005 1                       
BIND2006 .744
** 1                     
BIND2007 .604
** .751** 1                   
BIND2008 .514
** .629** .752** 1                 
BIND2009 .509
** .598** .678** .737** 1               
BIND2010 .447
** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1             
INSOW2005 -.023 .080 .066 .099 .077 .055 1           
INSOW2006 .043 .111
* .114* .077 .079 .066 .760** 1         
INSOW2007 -.016 .006 .005 -.004 -.027 -.020 .615
** .780** 1       
INSOW2008 .033 .064 .068 .036 .023 .034 .542
** .693** .824** 1     
INSOW2009 .061 .095 .101 .060 .049 .046 .496
** .609** .744** .871** 1   
INSOW2010 .039 .061 .059 .041 .032 .027 .500
** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1 
 
  BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 
BIND2005 1                       
BIND2006 .744
** 1                     
BIND2007 .604
** .751** 1                   
BIND2008 .514
** .629** .752** 1                 
BIND2009 .509
** .598** .678** .737** 1               
BIND2010 .447
** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1             
FSZE2005 .317
** .323** .350** .358** .367** .347** 1           
FSZE2006 .314
** .327** .359** .361** .372** .344** .984** 1         
FSZE2007 .331
** .347** .352** .344** .358** .345** .966** .983** 1       
FSZE2008 .331
** .339** .349** .346** .363** .363** .952** .972** .988** 1     
FSZE2009 .341
** .335** .346** .358** .371** .375** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
FSZE2010 .345
** .337** .342** .360** .371** .381** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
APEX 5.6 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; INSOW is total percentage of shares owned 
by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; 
FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BIND2005 BIND2006 BIND2007 BIND2008 BIND2009 BIND2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
BIND2005 1                       
BIND2006 .744
** 1                     
BIND2007 .604
** .751** 1                   
BIND2008 .514
** .629** .752** 1                 
BIND2009 .509
** .598** .678** .737** 1               
BIND2010 .447
** .451** .539** .589** .722** 1             
FAGE2005 .057 .034 .023 .063 .059 .005 1           
FAGE2006 .057 .034 .024 .063 .059 .007 1.000
** 1         
FAGE2007 .057 .032 .021 .060 .057 .006 1.000
** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 .057 .032 .021 .060 .057 .006 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 .057 .032 .021 .060 .057 .006 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 .057 .032 .021 .060 .057 .006 1.000
** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
 
  MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 
MGOW2005 1                       
MGOW2006 .964
** 1                     
MGOW2007 .887
** .931** 1                   
MGOW2008 .849
** .900** .978** 1                 
MGOW2009 .765
** .820** .914** .923** 1               
MGOW2010 .730
** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1             
BKOW2005 .122
* .155** .155** .144** .144** .147** 1           
BKOW2006 .121
* .127* .159** .152** .131* .138* .842** 1         
BKOW2007 .139
* .149** .200** .212** .190** .201** .649** .779** 1       
BKOW2008 .142
** .155** .198** .209** .175** .190** .601** .726** .855** 1     
BKOW2009 .131
* .137* .204** .224** .214** .219** .606** .710** .790** .873** 1   
BKOW2010 .165
** .177** .228** .247** .223** .216** .623** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1 
APEX 5.7 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation 
MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by 
any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 
MGOW2005 1                       
MGOW2006 .964
** 1                     
MGOW2007 .887
** .931** 1                   
MGOW2008 .849
** .900** .978** 1                 
MGOW2009 .765
** .820** .914** .923** 1               
MGOW2010 .730
** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1             
INSOW2005 -.219
** -.248** -.248** -.247** -.234** -.230** 1           
INSOW2006 -.249
** -.266** -.275** -.276** -.277** -.277** .760** 1         
INSOW2007 -.238
** -.257** -.279** -.274** -.295** -.298** .615** .780** 1       
INSOW2008 -.213
** -.239** -.275** -.276** -.307** -.306** .542** .693** .824** 1     
INSOW2009 -.187
** -.222** -.286** -.279** -.313** -.306** .496** .609** .744** .871** 1   
INSOW2010 -.173
** -.204** -.249** -.244** -.281** -.274** .500** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1 
 
  MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 
MGOW2005 1                       
MGOW2006 .964
** 1                     
MGOW2007 .887
** .931** 1                   
MGOW2008 .849
** .900** .978** 1                 
MGOW2009 .765
** .820** .914** .923** 1               
MGOW2010 .730
** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1             
FSZE2005 -.233
** -.218** -.263** -.255** -.250** -.255** 1           
FSZE2006 -.243
** -.221** -.254** -.245** -.243** -.250** .984** 1         
FSZE2007 -.246
** -.221** -.249** -.240** -.241** -.250** .966** .983** 1       
FSZE2008 -.231
** -.207** -.237** -.231** -.236** -.247** .952** .972** .988** 1     
FSZE2009 -.236
** -.214** -.251** -.244** -.248** -.246** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
FSZE2010 -.236
** -.214** -.250** -.245** -.243** -.234** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
APEX 5.8 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); 
INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares 
non-financial companies used in this thesis; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
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  MGOW2005 MGOW2006 MGOW2007 MGOW2008 MGOW2009 MGOW2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
MGOW2005 1                       
MGOW2006 .964
** 1                     
MGOW2007 .887
** .931** 1                   
MGOW2008 .849
** .900** .978** 1                 
MGOW2009 .765
** .820** .914** .923** 1               
MGOW2010 .730
** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1             
FAGE2005 -.136
* -.120* -.127* -.129* -.122* -.129* 1           
FAGE2006 -.136
* -.118* -.125* -.127* -.120* -.127* 1.000** 1         
FAGE2007 -.134
* -.116* -.123* -.125* -.118* -.125* 1.000** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 -.134
* -.116* -.123* -.125* -.118* -.125* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 -.134
* -.116* -.123* -.125* -.118* -.125* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 -.134
* -.116* -.123* -.125* -.118* -.125* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
 
  BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 
BKOW2005 1                       
BKOW2006 .842
** 1                     
BKOW2007 .649
** .779** 1                   
BKOW2008 .601
** .726** .855** 1                 
BKOW2009 .606
** .710** .790** .873** 1               
BKOW2010 .623
** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1             
INSOW2005 .391
** .370** .275** .224** .209** .231** 1           
INSOW2006 .272
** .369** .284** .244** .206** .204** .760** 1         
INSOW2007 .134
* .192** .385** .295** .259** .264** .615** .780** 1       
INSOW2008 .122
* .174** .234** .352** .295** .301** .542** .693** .824** 1     
INSOW2009 .094 .128
* .191** .259** .347** .328** .496** .609** .744** .871** 1   
INSOW2010 .099 .122
* .180** .226** .266** .399** .500** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1 
APEX 5.9 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); FAGE 
is number of years since Incorporation ; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial 
companies used in this thesis;; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 
BKOW2005 1                       
BKOW2006 .842
** 1                     
BKOW2007 .649
** .779** 1                   
BKOW2008 .601
** .726** .855** 1                 
BKOW2009 .606
** .710** .790** .873** 1               
BKOW2010 .623
** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1             
FSZE2005 -.370
** -.443** -.471** -.452** -.460** -.495** 1           
FSZE2006 -.355
** -.425** -.443** -.436** -.452** -.478** .984** 1         
FSZE2007 -.364
** -.433** -.438** -.439** -.445** -.464** .966** .983** 1       
FSZE2008 -.357
** -.435** -.438** -.451** -.461** -.475** .952** .972** .988** 1     
FSZE2009 -.347
** -.436** -.449** -.456** -.469** -.473** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
FSZE2010 -.324
** -.418** -.438** -.456** -.470** -.481** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
 
  BKOW2005 BKOW2006 BKOW2007 BKOW2008 BKOW2009 BKOW2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
BKOW2005 1                       
BKOW2006 .842
** 1                     
BKOW2007 .649
** .779** 1                   
BKOW2008 .601
** .726** .855** 1                 
BKOW2009 .606
** .710** .790** .873** 1               
BKOW2010 .623
** .690** .730** .801** .881** 1             
FAGE2005 -.108
* -.183** -.124* -.183** -.163** -.174** 1           
FAGE2006 -.108
* -.182** -.123* -.180** -.160** -.170** 1.000** 1         
FAGE2007 -.103 -.177
** -.121* -.177** -.157** -.169** 1.000** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 -.103 -.177
** -.121* -.177** -.157** -.169** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 -.103 -.177
** -.121* -.177** -.157** -.169** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 -.103 -.177
** -.121* -.177** -.157** -.169** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
APEX 5.10 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, 
institutions, family, government ...); FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 
INSOW2005 1                       
INSOW2006 .760
** 1                     
INSOW2007 .615
** .780** 1                   
INSOW2008 .542
** .693** .824** 1                 
INSOW2009 .496
** .609** .744** .871** 1               
INSOW2010 .500
** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1             
FSZE2005 -.147
** -.182** -.251** -.288** -.283** -.267** 1           
FSZE2006 -.137
* -.174** -.229** -.271** -.280** -.275** .984** 1         
FSZE2007 -.143
** -.179** -.226** -.269** -.267** -.270** .966** .983** 1       
FSZE2008 -.156
** -.191** -.233** -.279** -.276** -.277** .952** .972** .988** 1     
FSZE2009 -.172
** -.214** -.256** -.290** -.278** -.275** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
FSZE2010 -.169
** -.212** -.265** -.304** -.292** -.289** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
 
  INSOW2005 INSOW2006 INSOW2007 INSOW2008 INSOW2009 INSOW2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
INSOW2005 1                       
INSOW2006 .760
** 1                     
INSOW2007 .615
** .780** 1                   
INSOW2008 .542
** .693** .824** 1                 
INSOW2009 .496
** .609** .744** .871** 1               
INSOW2010 .500
** .555** .704** .778** .862** 1             
FAGE2005 -.130
* -.063 -.008 -.072 -.045 -.049 1           
FAGE2006 -.131
* -.065 -.009 -.075 -.045 -.053 1.000** 1         
FAGE2007 -.127
* -.062 -.009 -.074 -.045 -.055 1.000** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 -.127
* -.062 -.009 -.074 -.045 -.055 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 -.127
* -.062 -.009 -.074 -.045 -.055 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 -.127
* -.062 -.009 -.074 -.045 -.055 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
APEX 5.11 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   FSZE2005 FSZE2006 FSZE2007 FSZE2008 FSZE2009 FSZE2010 FAGE2005 FAGE2006 FAGE2007 FAGE2008 FAGE2009 FAGE2010 
FSZE2005 1                       
FSZE2006 .984
** 1                     
FSZE2007 .966
** .983** 1                   
FSZE2008 .952
** .972** .988** 1                 
FSZE2009 .947
** .968** .979** .993** 1               
FSZE2010 .935
** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1             
FAGE2005 .165
** .171** .147** .144** .127* .124* 1           
FAGE2006 .165
** .174** .150** .148** .129* .127* 1.000** 1         
FAGE2007 .161
** .169** .145** .144** .126* .123* 1.000** 1.000** 1       
FAGE2008 .161
** .169** .145** .144** .126* .123* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1     
FAGE2009 .161
** .169** .145** .144** .126* .123* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1   
FAGE2010 .161
** .169** .145** .144** .126* .123* 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1.000** 1 
                          
APEX 5.12 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables, where FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; **. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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TQ ROA 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSZE2005 -0.032 -0.023 0.046 0.080 0.069 0.056 0.016 0.042 -0.041 -0.079 -0.018 0.054 
BSZE2006 -0.016 -0.024 0.029 0.071 0.058 0.020 0.048 0.026 -0.071 -0.062 -0.019 0.044 
BSZE2007 0.014 0.011 0.023 0.085 0.077 0.043 0.077 0.046 -.106* -0.053 -0.048 0.015 
BSZE2008 0.074 0.059 0.030 0.036 0.054 0.013 0.085 0.106 -0.090 -0.097 -0.054 0.019 
BSZE2009 0.054 0.063 0.064 0.042 0.048 0.017 0.103 0.099 -0.014 -0.048 -0.012 0.029 
BSZE2010 0.053 0.046 0.059 0.071 0.070 0.046 .124* 0.090 -0.025 -0.011 0.028 0.047 
BIND2005 0.074 0.083 .116* 0.105 0.065 0.020 0.065 .109* 0.080 .130* .158** 0.076 
BIND2006 0.031 0.024 0.064 0.009 -0.022 -0.025 -0.008 0.069 0.047 0.043 0.105 0.034 
BIND2007 -0.003 -0.023 0.063 0.047 -0.026 -0.024 -0.045 0.047 0.011 0.046 0.067 0.020 
BIND2008 0.000 0.016 .139** .104* 0.049 0.026 0.000 0.099 .106* .135* .141** 0.045 
BIND2009 0.047 0.049 .115* 0.081 0.041 0.039 0.035 0.097 .112* .129* .113* 0.084 
BIND2010 0.075 0.083 .143** 0.101 0.054 0.042 0.052 0.061 0.062 0.095 0.093 0.009 
MGOW2005 .125* 0.073 0.074 0.007 0.079 0.056 0.048 .151** 0.052 .119* 0.062 0.097 
MGOW2006 .115* 0.063 0.070 -0.036 0.052 0.041 0.075 .162** 0.050 0.095 0.027 0.063 
MGOW2007 0.066 0.034 0.067 -0.070 0.046 0.067 0.069 .139* 0.056 0.070 0.054 0.101 
MGOW2008 0.073 0.050 0.067 -0.080 0.040 0.071 0.060 .145** 0.058 0.069 0.042 .111* 
MGOW2009 0.080 0.056 0.077 -0.061 0.030 0.063 .111* .146** 0.061 0.032 0.016 0.092 
MGOW2010 0.067 0.052 0.079 -0.049 0.033 0.063 .146* .161** 0.040 0.022 0.028 0.105 
BKOW2005 .112* .111* 0.096 0.016 0.102 0.111 -0.010 0.019 0.025 0.045 -0.003 0.068 
BKOW2006 0.041 0.061 0.028 -0.017 0.039 0.041 -0.032 -0.027 -0.029 0.017 -0.012 0.010 
BKOW2007 0.069 0.025 -0.031 -0.099 -0.019 0.002 -0.008 -0.023 -0.023 -0.015 -0.087 -0.018 
BKOW2008 0.009 -0.028 -0.098 -.193** -.109* -0.101 -0.055 -0.084 -.108* -.106* -.156** -.132* 
BKOW2009 0.030 -0.001 -0.091 -.186** -0.091 -0.068 -0.040 -0.047 -.109* -0.098 -.147** -0.092 
BKOW2010 0.062 0.028 -0.089 -.171** -0.097 -0.089 -0.013 -0.035 -0.085 -0.099 -.171** -.121* 
INSOW2005 -0.001 -0.024 -0.031 0.051 0.017 0.024 -0.090 -0.069 0.011 0.037 0.046 0.043 
INSOW2006 -0.034 -0.089 -.122* -0.039 -0.107 -0.108 -.132* -.124* -0.021 -0.030 -0.014 -0.071 
INSOW2007 -0.028 -.111* -.184** -0.102 -.159** -.148** -.168** -.122* -0.061 -.105* -.117* -.151** 
INSOW2008 -0.013 -0.081 -.156** -.129* -.168** -.166** -.160** -.125* -0.087 -.123* -.138** -.220** 
INSOW2009 0.041 -0.037 -.138** -0.098 -.117* -.108* -.115* -0.074 -0.073 -0.092 -.113* -.160** 
INSOW2010 0.045 -0.003 -0.107 -0.051 -0.066 -0.069 -0.098 -0.057 -0.054 -0.066 -0.087 -.123* 
APEX 5.13 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables and main dependent variables, where ROA Net 
Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of 
the firm's assets ; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of 
directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW 
is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, 
government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this 
thesis;**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   ROE ROCE 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSZE2005 .130* .138* 0.078 -0.003 0.023 .138* 0.005 -.159** -0.077 -.128* -0.064 -0.044 
BSZE2006 .154** .121* 0.060 0.019 0.049 .113* -0.002 -.124* -0.025 -0.070 -0.057 -0.018 
BSZE2007 .211** .160** 0.087 0.009 0.059 0.103 0.046 -0.043 0.040 0.006 0.002 -0.012 
BSZE2008 .183** .192** 0.070 -0.033 0.036 0.068 0.066 0.000 0.022 -0.043 -0.026 -0.001 
BSZE2009 .173** .198** 0.072 -0.010 0.074 0.067 0.074 -0.026 0.020 -0.015 0.033 -0.004 
BSZE2010 .215** .202** 0.081 0.014 0.103 .120* 0.069 -0.047 -0.005 0.021 0.093 0.032 
BIND2005 .113* .156** 0.082 0.090 .119* 0.056 0.034 0.068 0.091 0.089 .121* 0.069 
BIND2006 0.018 0.092 0.016 0.014 0.059 0.021 0.016 0.038 0.060 0.044 0.056 0.035 
BIND2007 -0.033 0.046 0.043 0.075 0.088 0.021 -0.043 -0.010 -0.031 0.039 0.036 0.049 
BIND2008 0.024 0.084 0.102 .117* .142** -0.014 -0.033 0.006 0.055 0.099 0.077 -0.002 
BIND2009 0.032 0.105 0.093 0.094 .122* 0.037 -0.022 0.032 0.012 0.022 -0.001 0.051 
BIND2010 0.029 0.044 0.006 0.091 .115* -0.044 0.026 0.034 -0.005 -0.005 -0.047 -0.046 
MGOW2005 -0.011 0.026 0.005 0.059 0.034 0.008 0.014 0.017 -0.025 0.020 0.026 0.001 
MGOW2006 0.027 0.061 0.008 0.030 0.017 -0.021 0.042 0.010 -0.033 -0.002 0.011 -0.001 
MGOW2007 0.048 0.066 -0.019 0.047 0.022 0.033 0.047 0.027 -0.017 0.007 -0.006 0.051 
MGOW2008 0.028 0.069 -0.026 0.043 0.015 0.025 0.044 0.022 -0.020 -0.001 -0.017 0.058 
MGOW2009 0.043 0.045 0.005 0.029 -0.030 0.014 0.074 0.041 0.001 0.004 -0.046 0.042 
MGOW2010 0.069 0.052 -0.011 0.021 -0.048 0.019 0.079 0.037 0.002 0.002 -0.037 0.048 
BKOW2005 -.145* -0.071 -0.046 0.027 -0.059 -0.066 -.124* -0.030 -0.039 -0.004 0.006 0.007 
BKOW2006 -.137* -0.110 -0.109 -0.053 -0.044 -0.091 -0.100 -0.017 -0.049 -0.078 -0.028 0.006 
BKOW2007 -.136* -0.075 -0.105 -0.066 -.110* -.123* -0.081 -0.012 -0.103 -.163** -.110* -0.051 
BKOW2008 -.203** -.146** -.189** -.133* -.212** -.220** -0.081 -0.039 -.109* -.188** -.174** -.107* 
BKOW2009 -.179** -.112* -.194** -.149** -.223** -.206** -0.069 -0.035 -.113* -.184** -.182** -0.036 
BKOW2010 -.186** -0.101 -.182** -0.108 -.198** -.246** -0.072 0.027 -0.065 -0.102 -.138* -0.040 
INSOW2005 -0.102 -0.022 0.079 0.003 0.034 0.017 -0.014 0.025 .120* 0.037 0.072 -0.006 
INSOW2006 -.142* -0.077 0.015 -0.067 0.025 -0.059 -0.021 -0.005 0.060 -0.020 0.025 -0.055 
INSOW2007 -.204** -0.091 -0.015 -0.093 -0.076 -.155** -0.054 -0.006 -0.006 -.129* -0.092 -.154** 
INSOW2008 -.207** -.127* -0.061 -0.100 -.131* -.222** -0.037 0.004 0.002 -.131* -.133* -.174** 
INSOW2009 -.167** -0.080 -0.037 -0.097 -.132* -.186** -0.074 0.010 -0.024 -.106* -0.101 -0.103 
INSOW2010 -.154** -0.049 -0.026 -0.036 -0.089 -.157** -0.064 0.071 0.015 -0.046 -0.069 -0.094 
APEX 5.14 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables and main dependent variables, where ROE Net 
Income divided by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; ROCE Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by average of 
Capital Employed ; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number 
of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); 
BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, 
family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 
largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this 
thesis;**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   SGRTH 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BSZE2005 -0.096 -.176** -0.051 -0.049 -0.046 
BSZE2006 -0.099 -.172** -0.006 -0.054 -0.048 
BSZE2007 -0.022 -.154** -0.004 0.034 -0.053 
BSZE2008 0.005 -0.104 0.029 0.047 -0.018 
BSZE2009 -0.017 -0.096 0.031 0.014 -0.030 
BSZE2010 -0.031 -.121* 0.023 -0.016 -0.030 
BIND2005 0.052 -0.013 0.021 0.073 -0.044 
BIND2006 -0.002 -0.072 -0.033 0.030 -0.087 
BIND2007 0.009 -0.065 0.002 0.014 -0.037 
BIND2008 -0.020 -0.095 -0.025 0.049 -0.033 
BIND2009 -0.027 -0.079 0.022 0.071 -0.040 
BIND2010 0.041 -0.012 0.101 .146* 0.047 
MGOW2005 .137* 0.052 0.012 0.066 0.116 
MGOW2006 .156** 0.074 0.039 0.091 0.113 
MGOW2007 .172** 0.103 0.098 0.100 .190** 
MGOW2008 .174** 0.114 0.087 0.096 .194** 
MGOW2009 .186** 0.067 0.055 0.083 .193** 
MGOW2010 .178** 0.055 0.069 0.085 .205** 
BKOW2005 .126* 0.046 -0.021 -0.002 0.108 
BKOW2006 0.042 0.097 0.013 -0.023 0.089 
BKOW2007 0.033 0.080 0.045 -0.087 0.110 
BKOW2008 0.081 .119* -0.041 -0.072 0.114 
BKOW2009 0.022 0.115 -0.034 -0.080 0.126 
BKOW2010 0.086 .143* -0.012 -0.031 .140* 
INSOW2005 -0.042 0.009 -0.087 -0.065 -0.075 
INSOW2006 -0.109 -0.040 -0.074 -0.059 -0.124 
INSOW2007 -0.059 0.011 -0.034 -0.041 -.140* 
INSOW2008 -0.012 0.095 -0.039 -0.038 -0.098 
INSOW2009 -0.035 0.071 -0.025 -0.027 -0.067 
INSOW2010 -0.014 0.061 -0.052 -0.022 -0.075 
APEX 5.15 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between Independent variables and main dependent variables, where SGRTH is 
Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided by Total Sales for time (t-1) ; BSZE is Total 
number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of 
total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of 
at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total 
percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the 
total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis;**. Correlation is significant at 
the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Const     7.02     7.00     7.01     7.00 
BSZE2005 1.92 0.52 0.94 1.85 0.54 0.94 2.03 0.49 0.94 1.85 0.54 0.94 
BIND2005 1.21 0.83 0.49 1.19 0.84 0.49 1.17 0.86 0.48 1.20 0.83 0.49 
MGOW2005 1.15 0.87 0.28 1.16 0.87 0.28 1.15 0.87 0.28 1.16 0.86 0.28 
BKOW2005 1.44 0.70 0.14 1.41 0.71 0.15 1.40 0.71 0.15 1.42 0.70 0.15 
INSOW2005 1.33 0.75 0.07 1.34 0.75 0.07 1.33 0.75 0.07 1.32 0.76 0.07 
FSZE2005 2.33 0.43 0.03 2.26 0.44 0.04 2.37 0.42 0.05 2.23 0.45 0.05 
FMAGE2005 1.08 0.92 0.02 1.07 0.94 0.02 1.08 0.93 0.02 1.09 0.92 0.02 
INDPERF2005 1.08 0.93 0.00 1.05 0.95 0.01 1.07 0.94 0.01 1.12 0.90 0.01 
  TQ2006 ROA2006 ROE2006 ROCE2006 
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Const     7.06     7.05     7.04     7.02 
BSZE2006 1.99 0.50 0.95 1.99 0.50 0.95 2.16 0.46 0.95 1.97 0.51 0.95 
BIND2006 1.27 0.79 0.48 1.24 0.81 0.47 1.25 0.80 0.46 1.25 0.80 0.47 
MGOW2006 1.19 0.84 0.28 1.17 0.85 0.28 1.17 0.86 0.28 1.19 0.84 0.27 
BKOW2006 1.46 0.68 0.14 1.46 0.68 0.13 1.47 0.68 0.13 1.49 0.67 0.13 
INSOW2006 1.40 0.72 0.06 1.40 0.72 0.06 1.39 0.72 0.06 1.41 0.71 0.07 
FSZE2006 2.38 0.42 0.03 2.49 0.40 0.03 2.59 0.39 0.05 2.39 0.42 0.05 
FMAGE2006 1.09 0.92 0.02 1.06 0.94 0.02 1.08 0.93 0.02 1.08 0.93 0.02 
INDPERF2006 1.15 0.87 0.00 1.06 0.94 0.01 1.15 0.87 0.01 1.11 0.90 0.01 
  TQ2007 ROA2007 ROE2007 ROCE2007 
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Const     7.13     7.10     7.10     7.09 
BSZE2007 1.81 0.55 0.94 1.81 0.55 0.94 1.89 0.53 0.94 1.81 0.55 0.94 
BIND2007 1.26 0.79 0.43 1.24 0.80 0.43 1.24 0.81 0.42 1.26 0.80 0.43 
MGOW2007 1.26 0.79 0.29 1.26 0.79 0.29 1.24 0.81 0.29 1.24 0.81 0.29 
BKOW2007 1.55 0.65 0.11 1.54 0.65 0.11 1.54 0.65 0.11 1.57 0.64 0.11 
INSOW2007 1.50 0.66 0.05 1.47 0.68 0.05 1.42 0.70 0.06 1.49 0.67 0.06 
FSZE2007 2.11 0.48 0.02 2.13 0.47 0.04 2.23 0.45 0.05 2.13 0.47 0.05 
FMAGE2007 1.07 0.94 0.02 1.04 0.96 0.02 1.06 0.95 0.02 1.05 0.96 0.02 
INDPERF2007 1.11 0.90 0.00 1.03 0.97 0.01 1.06 0.94 0.01 1.04 0.96 0.01 
APEX 5.16a & APEX5.16b: Results for Multicollinearity diagnoses, where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of the firm's assets; ROA Net Income divided by Average Total Assets multiplied by 100; ROE Net Income divided 
by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; ROCE Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by average of Capital 
Employed; SGRTH is Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided by Total Sales for 
time (t-1); BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of 
directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW 
is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, 
government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; 
FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDPERF is the Average 
industry performance 
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 APEX5.16b 
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Const     7.14     7.07     7.08     7.11 
   BSZE2008 1.74 0.58 0.94 1.73 0.58 0.94 1.75 0.57 0.94 1.75 0.57 0.94 
   BIND2008 1.24 0.81 0.44 1.22 0.82 0.44 1.24 0.81 0.44 1.22 0.82 0.44 
   MGOW2008 1.27 0.79 0.27 1.26 0.79 0.28 1.26 0.79 0.27 1.26 0.80 0.27 
   BKOW2008 1.49 0.67 0.11 1.49 0.67 0.11 1.50 0.67 0.12 1.53 0.65 0.11 
   INSOW2008 1.50 0.67 0.05 1.49 0.67 0.07 1.45 0.69 0.07 1.49 0.67 0.05 
   FSZE2008 2.12 0.47 0.02 2.13 0.47 0.05 2.15 0.47 0.05 2.11 0.47 0.05 
   FMAGE2008 1.06 0.94 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 1.05 0.96 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 
   INDPERF2008 1.06 0.94 0.00 1.04 0.96 0.01 1.04 0.96 0.01 1.06 0.94 0.01 
     TQ2009 ROA2009 ROE2009 ROCE2009 
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Const     7.18     7.18     7.17     7.12 
   BSZE2009 1.84 0.54 0.94 1.83 0.55 0.94 1.85 0.54 0.95 1.83 0.55 0.94 
   BIND2009 1.22 0.82 0.43 1.22 0.82 0.43 1.20 0.83 0.42 1.20 0.83 0.42 
   MGOW2009 1.32 0.75 0.27 1.33 0.75 0.26 1.37 0.73 0.27 1.33 0.75 0.26 
   BKOW2009 1.50 0.66 0.10 1.51 0.66 0.10 1.59 0.63 0.09 1.52 0.66 0.10 
   INSOW2009 1.52 0.66 0.05 1.52 0.66 0.05 1.61 0.62 0.05 1.53 0.65 0.08 
   FSZE2009 2.36 0.42 0.02 2.36 0.42 0.03 2.36 0.42 0.03 2.33 0.43 0.05 
   FMAGE2009 1.09 0.92 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 1.05 0.96 0.02 1.04 0.96 0.02 
   INDPERF2009 1.09 0.92 0.00 1.06 0.95 0.00 1.07 0.94 0.01 1.05 0.95 0.01 
     TQ2010 ROA2010 ROE2010 ROCE2010 
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Const     7.15     7.14     7.15     7.12 
   BSZE2010 1.79 0.56 0.94 1.78 0.56 0.94 1.80 0.56 0.94 1.78 0.56 0.94 
   BIND2010 1.26 0.80 0.44 1.24 0.81 0.44 1.24 0.81 0.43 1.23 0.81 0.43 
   MGOW2010 1.30 0.77 0.28 1.30 0.77 0.28 1.33 0.75 0.29 1.29 0.77 0.27 
   BKOW2010 1.59 0.63 0.10 1.59 0.63 0.10 1.69 0.59 0.09 1.60 0.63 0.10 
   INSOW2010 1.54 0.65 0.06 1.54 0.65 0.06 1.57 0.64 0.06 1.55 0.64 0.06 
   FSZE2010 2.21 0.45 0.02 2.21 0.45 0.03 2.24 0.45 0.02 2.23 0.45 0.05 
   FMAGE2010 1.07 0.93 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 
   INDPERF2010 1.05 0.95 0.00 1.02 0.98 0.01 1.06 0.94 0.00 1.04 0.96 0.01 
   
  SGRTH2006 SGRTH2007 SGRTH2008 SGRTH2009 SGRTH2010 
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Const     7.01     7.06     7.11     7.09     7.17 
BSZE (T-1) 1.81 0.55 0.95 2.01 0.50 0.95 1.87 0.53 0.95 2.01 0.50 0.93 1.92 0.52 0.93 
BIND(T-1) 1.22 0.82 0.49 1.29 0.78 0.46 1.29 0.77 0.42 1.24 0.81 0.46 1.24 0.80 0.43 
MGOW(T-1) 1.16 0.86 0.27 1.18 0.85 0.28 1.26 0.80 0.31 1.19 0.84 0.30 1.33 0.75 0.27 
BKOW(T-1) 1.39 0.72 0.15 1.42 0.70 0.15 1.56 0.64 0.12 1.58 0.63 0.13 1.51 0.66 0.11 
INSOW(T-1) 1.30 0.77 0.07 1.43 0.70 0.05 1.48 0.68 0.05 1.39 0.72 0.05 1.51 0.66 0.05 
FSZE(T-1) 2.32 0.43 0.03 2.53 0.39 0.03 2.29 0.44 0.02 2.43 0.41 0.02 2.65 0.38 0.03 
FMAGE(T-1) 1.10 0.91 0.02 1.08 0.93 0.02 1.05 0.95 0.02 1.07 0.93 0.02 1.06 0.95 0.02 
INDPERF(T-1) 1.14 0.88 0.00 1.10 0.91 0.00 1.11 0.90 0.00 1.10 0.91 0.00 1.13 0.89 0.00 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
ROE2005 2005 -14.1 0.496 0.098 0.001 -0.07 -0.03 0.015 1.122 0.984*** 0.060 3.398*** 
ROE2006 2006 -22.6** 0.644 0.157 0.004* -0.00 -0.01 0.018 0.957 1.095*** 0.079 4.325*** 
ROE2007 2007 -10.2 0.340 -0.01 0.003 -0.04 0.055 0.033* 1.172 0.921*** 0.075 4.321*** 
ROE2008 2008 4.017 -0.41 0.185* 0.002 -0.08 -0.08 0.026 -0.70 0.937*** 0.066 4.006*** 
ROE2009 2009 5.597 0.352 0.173* 0.000 -0.19*** -0.10 0.031 -1.14 0.978 0.054 3.312*** 
ROE2010 2010 22.40* -0.29 -0.16** 0.003 -0.21*** -0.02 0.021 0.620 0.501 0.063 3.619*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROE20052007 2005 -12.2 0.148 0.125 0.003 -0.02 0.061 0.029 1.289 0.761*** 0.057 3.345*** 
AvROE20052007 2006 -10.7 0.247 0.010 0.002 -0.00 -0.00 0.028 1.503 0.852*** 0.065 3.839*** 
AvROE20052007 2007 -5.73 0.402 -0.13 0.004 -0.00 -0.00 0.030 1.928** 0.688*** 0.073 4.279*** 
AvROE20082010 2008 17.51** -0.16 0.118 0.002 -0.15*** -0.06 0.018 -0.72 0.260 0.037 2.659*** 
AvROE20082010 2009 15.54 -0.15 0.129 0.002 -0.17*** -0.08 0.018 -0.52 0.622 0.040 2.806*** 
AvROE20082010 2010 16.79 0.189 -0.00 0.002 -0.17*** 0.007 0.015 -0.29 0.330 0.016 1.692* 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROE2005 2005 -14.0 0.494 0.098 0.001 -0.07 -0.03 0.015 1.142 -0.01 0.022 1.848* 
∆ROE2006 2006 -22.6** 0.663 0.157 0.005* -0.01 -0.01 0.019 0.933 0.101 0.029 2.186** 
∆ROE2007 2007 -10.0 0.332 -0.01 0.003 -0.04 0.054 0.033* 1.167 -0.08 0.008 1.361 
∆ROE2008 2008 3.753 -0.40 0.185* 0.002 -0.08 -0.08 0.027 -0.71 -0.06 0.015 1.645 
∆ROE2009 2009 5.315 0.377 0.176* 0.000 -0.19*** -0.10 0.031 -1.17 -0.00 0.049 3.107*** 
∆ROE2010 2010 22.53* -0.29 -0.16** 0.003 -0.21*** -0.01 0.022 0.639 -0.51 0.059 3.464*** 
APEX5.17: ROE measures regressed against the identified explanatory and control variables. Where ROE Net Income divided by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; AvROE20052007 is the 
average ROE for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROE20082010 is the average ROE for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROE is the difference between each company's ROE and Average ROE for the relevant 
industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of 
directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); 
INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares 
non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROE is the Average industry performance; ***, **, 
and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
ROCE2005 2005 -3.90 -0.52 0.002 0.005 -0.27* 0.148 0.071 1.919 0.895** 0.021 1.875* 
ROCE2006 2006 2.274 -2.77* 0.262 0.000 0.045 -0.14 0.095* 1.538 0.808** 0.024 2.003** 
ROCE2007 2007 24.97 0.465 -0.25 0.001 -0.32* 0.101 0.007 -0.44 0.913*** 0.017 1.781* 
ROCE2008 2008 50.39* -2.22 0.359 -0.00 -0.42** -0.43** 0.005 -2.15 0.831* 0.053 3.505*** 
ROCE2009 2009 41.54* 0.858 0.030 -0.00 -0.44*** -0.26 0.043 -3.63 0.934** 0.037 2.692*** 
ROCE2010 2010 9.219 -0.53 -0.25 0.005 0.004 -0.21 0.084* 1.334 0.982** 0.014 1.594 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROCE20052007 2005 -1.87 -2.08* 0.150 0.003 -0.17 0.243 0.066 2.108 0.850** 0.037 2.546** 
AvROCE20052007 2006 -7.83 -1.19 0.204 0.003 -0.08 0.066 0.072* 1.621 0.845*** 0.031 2.373** 
AvROCE20052007 2007 18.97 -0.33 -0.21 0.004 -0.23 0.028 0.049 0.651 0.831*** 0.028 2.250** 
AvROCE20082010 2008 38.79* -1.20 0.227 -0.00 -0.29** -0.41*** 0.043 -2.24 0.702** 0.058 3.727*** 
AvROCE20082010 2009 38.68** -0.45 0.090 -0.00 -0.30** -0.29* 0.048 -1.87 0.873** 0.036 2.646*** 
AvROCE20082010 2010 13.84 0.112 -0.18 0.001 -0.18 -0.13 0.042 0.114 1.118*** 0.020 1.844* 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROCE2005 2005 -3.73 -0.50 0.004 0.005 -0.27* 0.148 0.071 1.875 -0.10 0.003 1.136 
∆ROCE2006 2006 2.207 -2.77* 0.264 0.000 0.046 -0.14 0.095* 1.548 -0.19 0.003 1.130 
∆ROCE2007 2007 24.96 0.456 -0.25 0.001 -0.33* 0.100 0.007 -0.43 -0.08 -0.01 0.570 
∆ROCE2008 2008 50.57* -2.22 0.358 -0.00 -0.42** -0.43** 0.005 -2.17 -0.17 0.037 2.741*** 
∆ROCE2009 2009 41.57* 0.871 0.029 -0.00 -0.44*** -0.25 0.044 -3.65 -0.06 0.023 2.036** 
∆ROCE2010 2010 8.946 -0.53 -0.24 0.005 0.003 -0.21 0.084* 1.339 -0.01 0.003 1.131 
APEX5.18: ROCE measures regressed against the identified explanatory and control variables. Where ROCE Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by average of Capital Employed multiplied by 100; 
AvROCE20052007 is the average ROCE for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROCE20082010 is the average ROCE for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROCE is the difference between each company's ROCE and 
Average ROCE for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares 
owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, 
institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of 
shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROCE is 
the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
SGRTH2005 2005 1.004** 0.013 -0.00 0.000** -0.00** 0.006** 0.002*** 0.934*** -0.09* 0.832 199.4*** 
SGRTH2006 2006 1.201** -0.02 -0.00** 0.000 -0.00 0.004 0.002*** 1.011*** -0.12** 0.807 176.2*** 
SGRTH2007 2007 2.026*** -0.01 -0.00 0.000 -0.00** 0.002 0.002*** 0.958*** -0.19*** 0.794 169.6*** 
SGRTH2008 2008 2.128*** -0.02 -0.00 9.632 -0.00*** 0.002 0.001** 0.920*** -0.14*** 0.823 206.0*** 
SGRTH2009 2009 2.582*** -0.02 -0.00** 7.668 -0.00*** 0.003 0.001** 0.961*** -0.22*** 0.808 185.5*** 
SGRTH2010 2010 1.153* 0.016 -0.00** 0.000 -0.01*** 0.007*** 0.001** 0.888*** -0.02 0.817 185.3*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
AvSGRTH20052007 2005 1.080** 0.003 -0.00 0.000** -0.00** 0.006** 0.002*** 0.928*** -0.07 0.827 191.8*** 
AvSGRTH20052007 2006 1.605*** -0.02 -0.01*** 0.000 -0.00 0.004 0.002*** 1.009*** -0.14** 0.806 175.6*** 
AvSGRTH20052007 2007 1.878*** -0.01 -0.00 0.000 -0.00** 0.004 0.002*** 0.992*** -0.23*** 0.774 151.5*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2008 1.860*** -0.00 -0.00 7.424 -0.00*** 0.002 0.001** 0.916*** -0.12** 0.806 184.9*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2009 2.344*** -0.02 -0.00** 0.000 -0.00*** 0.002 0.001*** 0.953*** -0.18*** 0.817 197.2*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2010 1.721*** 0.007 -0.00*** 0.000 -0.00*** 0.007*** 0.001** 0.901*** -0.10 0.810 177.4*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
∆SGRTH2006 2005 -2.19*** 0.054 0.015** 0.000 0.002 -0.00 -0.00** -0.22*** 0.068 0.084 3.981*** 
∆SGRTH2007 2006 -1.17 0.037 0.006 -8.75 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.33*** 0.137 0.107 5.072*** 
∆SGRTH2008 2007 -3.34*** 0.053 0.005 0.000 0.000 3.678 -0.00 -0.14** 0.225** 0.027 2.049** 
∆SGRTH2009 2008 -2.16* 0.068 0.007 1.713 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.16** 0.077 0.016 1.435 
∆SGRTH2010 2009 -7.38*** 0.077* 0.008 0.000 0.004 -0.00 0.001 -0.22*** 0.637*** 0.148 5.937*** 
                          
APEX5.19: SGRTH measures regressed against the identified explanatory and control variables. Where  SGRTH is Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided 
by Total Sales for time (t-1), multiplied by 100; AvSGRTH20052007 is the average SGRTH for the period 2005 to 2007; AvSGRTH20082010 is the average SGRTH for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆SGRTH is 
the difference between each company's SGRTH and Average SGRTH for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total 
number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's 
share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDSGRTH is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
ROE2005 2005 -24.7** 0.145 0.134 0.708 -0.11* 0.017 2.455* 1.079*** .092 4.892*** 
ROE2006 2006 -19.5* 0.688 0.132 0.728 -0.10 0.018 1.283 0.949*** .082 4.552*** 
ROE2007 2007 -7.00 0.352 -0.02 -0.29 -0.02 0.033* 1.024 0.914*** .081 4.829*** 
ROE2008 2008 10.50 -0.04 0.168* -1.27* -0.10 0.026 -1.89* 0.979*** .071 4.419*** 
ROE2009 2009 12.26 0.486 0.137 -1.17* -0.22*** 0.030 -1.72 0.760 .055 3.572*** 
ROE2010 2010 34.92*** -0.01 -0.17** -1.95*** -0.21*** 0.017 -0.92 0.560 .088 5.004*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROE20052007 2005 -19.1* 0.155 0.119 0.791 -0.04 0.021 2.086** 0.894*** .077 4.323*** 
AvROE20052007 2006 -7.68 0.384 -0.01 0.331 -0.05 0.028 1.537 0.730*** .062 3.805*** 
AvROE20052007 2007 -3.57 0.298 -0.13 0.255 -0.04 0.029 2.209** 0.601*** .075 4.588*** 
AvROE20082010 2008 28.09*** 0.115 0.090 -1.55*** -0.16*** 0.014 -2.07** 0.282 .049 3.365*** 
AvROE20082010 2009 24.95** 0.043 0.102 -1.24** -0.21*** 0.018 -1.44 0.424 .053 3.568*** 
AvROE20082010 2010 24.50* 0.566 -0.00 -1.38** -0.15*** 0.015 -1.42 0.314 .031 2.381** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROE2005 2005 -24.7** 0.142 0.134 0.710 -0.11* 0.016 2.482** 0.077 .052 3.112*** 
∆ROE2006 2006 -19.4* 0.704 0.132 0.715 -0.10* 0.018 1.247 -0.04 .041 2.722** 
∆ROE2007 2007 -6.93 0.346 -0.02 -0.29 -0.02 0.033* 1.028 -0.08 .014 1.605 
∆ROE2008 2008 -14.0** -0.07 0.115** 0.236 0.081** -0.00 -0.15 0.553*** .046 3.124*** 
∆ROE2009 2009 11.92 0.512 0.141 -1.17* -0.22*** 0.031 -1.75 -0.22 .051 3.388*** 
∆ROE2010 2010 35.10*** -0.02 -0.17** -1.96*** -0.21*** 0.018 -0.91 -0.45 .085 4.836*** 
APEX5.20: ROE measures regressed against LGTENSION and INOUTS. Where ROE Net Income divided by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; AvROE20052007 is the average ROE for the 
period 2005 to 2007; AvROE20082010 is the average ROE for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROE is the difference between each company's ROE and Average ROE for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total 
number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; LGTENSION is natural logarithm for (percentage owned by directors multiplied by percentage 
owned by external substantial shareholders); INOUTS is the domination of ownership, calculated as total holdings by external substantial shareholders less total holdings by insiders).   FAGE is number of 
years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROE is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
ROCE2005 2005 -18.9 -1.38 0.061 1.683 -0.21 0.074 4.360* 0.932** .037 2.549** 
ROCE2006 2006 21.49 -2.05 0.209 0.307 -0.10 0.081 -0.50 0.587 .012 1.498 
ROCE2007 2007 21.92 -0.18 -0.28 -0.59 -0.19 0.008 0.274 0.976*** .016 1.731 
ROCE2008 2008 63.39** -1.55 0.222 -3.98** -0.49*** 0.006 -4.69* 0.958** .053 3.609*** 
ROCE2009 2009 68.42** 1.428 -0.10 -4.55*** -0.43*** 0.054 -6.54** 0.740 .043 3.086*** 
ROCE2010 2010 36.91 -0.41 -0.24 -2.36 -0.22 0.072 -1.08 0.858* .016 1.698 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROCE20052007 2005 -11.7 -2.97** 0.184 1.236 -0.09 0.064 3.989* 0.956** .051 3.220*** 
AvROCE20052007 2006 4.128 -0.49 0.165 0.445 -0.10 0.065 0.178 0.702** .015 1.643 
AvROCE20052007 2007 2.897 -0.97 -0.24 1.279 -0.15 0.055 2.738 0.872*** .040 2.917*** 
AvROCE20082010 2008 55.64** -0.59 0.093 -3.77*** -0.40*** 0.041 -4.80** 0.802** .063 4.135*** 
AvROCE20082010 2009 67.14*** -0.18 -0.02 -3.63*** -0.40*** 0.053 -4.49* 0.646* .044 3.204*** 
AvROCE20082010 2010 31.58 0.739 -0.19 -2.46* -0.25* 0.040 -2.02 0.975** .027 2.220** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDROCE Adj R2 F-test 
∆ROCE2005 2005 -18.7 -1.37 0.062 1.676 -0.21 0.075 4.313* -0.07 .016 1.674 
∆ROCE2006 2006 11.43 0.570 0.140 -0.97 -0.04 0.034 -2.19 -0.19 -.018 0.222 
∆ROCE2007 2007 21.82 -0.19 -0.28 -0.59 -0.19 0.008 0.289 -0.02 -.014 0.377 
∆ROCE2008 2008 63.65** -1.55 0.221 -3.99** -0.49*** 0.007 -4.71* -0.04 .032 2.575** 
∆ROCE2009 2009 68.65** 1.444 -0.11 -4.56*** -0.43*** 0.054 -6.57** -0.26 .030 2.477** 
∆ROCE2010 2010 36.66 -0.40 -0.24 -2.36 -0.22 0.072 -1.08 -0.14 .004 1.187 
APEX5.21: ROCE measures regressed against LGTENSION and INOUTS. Where ROCE Earnings before Interest and Tax divided by average of Capital Employed multiplied by 100; AvROCE20052007 
is the average ROCE for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROCE20082010 is the average ROCE for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆ROCE is the difference between each company's ROCE and Average ROCE for 
the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; LGTENSION is natural logarithm for (percentage owned 
by directors multiplied by percentage owned by external substantial shareholders); INOUTS is the domination of ownership, calculated as total holdings by external substantial shareholders less total 
holdings by insiders).   FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROCE is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
SGRTH2005 2005 0.856 0.008 -0.00 0.045* -0.00* 0.002*** 0.962*** -0.10* .821 188.6*** 
SGRTH2006 2006 1.389** -0.02 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.001** 0.987*** -0.11* .803 177.5*** 
SGRTH2007 2007 2.710*** -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00*** 0.001** 0.941*** -0.23*** .791 176.3*** 
SGRTH2008 2008 2.772*** -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00*** 0.001** 0.909*** -0.19*** .823 218.4*** 
SGRTH2009 2009 3.352*** -0.03 -0.00** -0.06*** -0.00*** 0.001** 0.917*** -0.24*** .810 203.7*** 
SGRTH2010 2010 2.236*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.07*** -0.00*** 0.001* 0.847*** -0.07 .806 184.2*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
AvSGRTH20052007 2005 0.901 0.000 -0.00 0.046* -0.00 0.002*** 0.954*** -0.08 .813 179.4*** 
AvSGRTH20052007 2006 1.843*** -0.03 -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.001** 0.993*** -0.14** .798 173.1*** 
AvSGRTH20052007 2007 2.428*** -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00** 0.002*** 0.964*** -0.23*** .784 169.9*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2008 2.295*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00*** 0.001** 0.910*** -0.14*** .808 199.0*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2009 3.062*** -0.03 -0.00** -0.05** -0.00*** 0.001** 0.915*** -0.20*** .820 217.0*** 
AvSGRTH20082010 2010 2.805*** -0.01 -0.00** -0.06*** -0.00*** 0.001** 0.862*** -0.14** .799 176.7*** 
  
CGV 
Year Const BSZE BIND LGTENSION INOUTS FAGE FSZE INDSGRTH Adj R2 F-test 
∆SGRTH2006 2005 -1.37 0.049 0.011 0.032 -0.00 -0.00** -0.21*** -0.00 .065 3.399*** 
∆SGRTH2007 2006 -2.59** 0.019 0.006 0.008 -0.00 -0.00* -0.24*** 0.225* .073 3.909*** 
∆SGRTH2008 2007 -3.14*** 0.057 0.001 0.024 -0.00 -0.00 -0.08 0.175** .007 1.275 
∆SGRTH2009 2008 -2.27* 0.015 0.011 0.032 -0.00** -0.00* -0.08 0.034 .024 1.691 
∆SGRTH2010 2009 -7.16*** 0.090* 0.016** 0.158*** 0.007 0.001 -0.08 0.351*** .094 4.044*** 
                        
APEX5.22: SGRTH measures regressed against LGTENSION and INOUTS. Where RSGRTH is Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided by Total Sales for 
time (t-1), multiplied by 100; AvSGRTH20052007 is the average SGRTH for the period 2005 to 2007; AvSGRTH20082010 is the average SGRTH for the period 2008 to 2010; ∆SGRTH is the difference 
between each company's SGRTH and Average SGRTH for the relevant industry; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of 
directors; LGTENSION is natural logarithm for (percentage owned by directors multiplied by percentage owned by external substantial shareholders); INOUTS is the domination of ownership, calculated 
as total holdings by external substantial shareholders less total holdings by insiders).   FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDSGRTH 
is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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   BSZE2006 BIND2006 MGOW2006 BKOW2006 INSOW2006 FAGE2006 FSZE2006 INDTQ2006 ERR2005 
BSZE2006 1                 
BIND2006 .040 1               
MGOW2006 -.115* -.165** 1             
BKOW2006 -.244** -.125* .100 1           
INSOW2006 -.215** .111* -.256** .369** 1         
FAGE2006 .083 .034 -.096 -.182** -.065 1       
FSZE2006 .648** .327** -.129* -.425** -.174** .174** 1     
INDTQ2006 .204** .127* .084 .088 -.065 -.180** .065 1   
ERR2005 -.004 -.075 .136* .086 -.126* -.083 -.256** .032 1 
 
  BSZE2007 BIND2007 MGOW2007 BKOW2007 INSOW2007 FAGE2007 FSZE2007 INDTQ2007 ERR2006 
BSZE2007 1                 
BIND2007 .046 1               
MGOW2007 -.148** -.091 1             
BKOW2007 -.331** -.241** .186** 1           
INSOW2007 -.292** .005 -.273** .385** 1         
FAGE2007 .064 .021 -.100 -.121* -.009 1       
FSZE2007 .638** .352** -.161** -.438** -.226** .145** 1     
INDTQ2007 .146** .120* .097 -.032 -.177** -.126* .139** 1   
ERR2006 .026 -.073 .107* .064 -.171** -.086 -.225** .093 1 
APEX5.23: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BSZE2008 BIND2008 MGOW2008 BKOW2008 INSOW2008 FAGE2008 FSZE2008 INDTQ2008 ERR2007 
BSZE2008 1                 
BIND2008 .053 1               
MGOW2008 -.107* -.072 1             
BKOW2008 -.262** -.230** .184** 1           
INSOW2008 -.300** .036 -.276** .352** 1         
FAGE2008 .068 .060 -.103 -.177** -.074 1       
FSZE2008 .625** .346** -.143** -.451** -.279** .144** 1     
INDTQ2008 .001 .060 .140** .063 -.097 -.127* -.045 1   
ERR2007 -.018 .059 .007 -.104 -.138** -.086 -.153** .048 1 
  BSZE2009 BIND2009 MGOW2009 BKOW2009 INSOW2009 FAGE2009 FSZE2009 INDTQ2009 ERR2008 
BSZE2009 1                 
BIND2009 .104 1               
MGOW2009 -.119* -.122* 1             
BKOW2009 -.288** -.153** .206** 1           
INSOW2009 -.275** .049 -.314** .347** 1         
FAGE2009 .063 .057 -.098 -.157** -.045 1       
FSZE2009 .653** .371** -.169** -.469** -.278** .126* 1     
INDTQ2009 .089 .050 .101 .027 -.109* -.196** -.005 1   
ERR2008 -.001 .052 .012 -.077 -.092 -.086 -.123* .107* 1 
APEX5.24: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2010 BIND2010 MGOW2010 BKOW2010 INSOW2010 FAGE2010 FSZE2010 INDTQ2010 ERR2009 
BSZE2010 1                 
BIND2010 .095 1               
MGOW2010 -.112* -.138* 1             
BKOW2010 -.331** -.208** .208** 1           
INSOW2010 -.311** .027 -.278** .399** 1         
FAGE2010 .099 .006 -.107* -.169** -.055 1       
FSZE2010 .631** .381** -.156** -.481** -.289** .123* 1     
INDTQ2010 .062 .083 .060 .021 -.022 -.170** -.010 1   
ERR2009 .063 -.015 .036 -.071 -.053 -.089 -.112* .103 1 
APEX5.25: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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   BSZE2005 BIND2005 MGOW2006 BKOW2006 INSOW2006 FAGE2006 FSZE2006 INDTQ2006 ERR2005 
BSZE2005 1                 
BIND2005 .049 1               
MGOW2006 -.077 -.173** 1             
BKOW2006 -.244** -.181** .100 1           
INSOW2006 -.233** .043 -.256** .369** 1         
FAGE2006 .033 .057 -.096 -.182** -.065 1       
FSZE2006 .633** .314** -.129* -.425** -.174** .174** 1     
INDTQ2006 .189** .059 .084 .088 -.065 -.180** .065 1   
ERR2005 .000 .000 .136* .086 -.126* -.083 -.256** .032 1 
  BSZE2006 BIND2006 MGOW2007 BKOW2007 INSOW2007 FAGE2007 FSZE2007 INDTQ2007 ERR2006 
BSZE2006 1                 
BIND2006 .040 1               
MGOW2007 -.132* -.155** 1             
BKOW2007 -.291** -.156** .186** 1           
INSOW2007 -.269** .006 -.273** .385** 1         
FAGE2007 .085 .032 -.100 -.121* -.009 1       
FSZE2007 .655** .347** -.161** -.438** -.226** .145** 1     
INDTQ2007 .198** .145** .097 -.032 -.177** -.126* .139** 1   
ERR2006 .000 .000 .107* .064 -.171** -.086 -.225** .093 1 
APEX5.26: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2007 BIND2007 MGOW2008 BKOW2008 INSOW2008 FAGE2008 FSZE2008 INDTQ2008 ERR2007 
BSZE2007 1                 
BIND2007 .046 1               
MGOW2008 -.151** -.063 1             
BKOW2008 -.330** -.195** .184** 1           
INSOW2008 -.336** .068 -.276** .352** 1         
FAGE2008 .064 .021 -.103 -.177** -.074 1       
FSZE2008 .632** .349** -.143** -.451** -.279** .144** 1     
INDTQ2008 .035 .040 .140** .063 -.097 -.127* -.045 1   
ERR2007 .000 .000 .007 -.104 -.138** -.086 -.153** .048 1 
APEX5.27: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2008 BIND2008 MGOW2009 BKOW2009 INSOW2009 FAGE2009 FSZE2009 INDTQ2009 ERR2008 
BSZE2008 1                 
BIND2008 .053 1               
MGOW2009 -.119* -.072 1             
BKOW2009 -.270** -.216** .206** 1           
INSOW2009 -.262** .060 -.314** .347** 1         
FAGE2009 .068 .060 -.098 -.157** -.045 1       
FSZE2009 .618** .358** -.169** -.469** -.278** .126* 1     
INDTQ2009 .099 .028 .101 .027 -.109* -.196** -.005 1   
ERR2008 -.025 .065 .012 -.077 -.092 -.086 -.123* .107* 1 
  BSZE2009 BIND2009 MGOW2010 BKOW2010 INSOW2010 FAGE2010 FSZE2010 INDTQ2010 ERR2009 
BSZE2009 1                 
BIND2009 .104 1               
MGOW2010 -.128* -.130* 1             
BKOW2010 -.306** -.169** .208** 1           
INSOW2010 -.275** .032 -.278** .399** 1         
FAGE2010 .063 .057 -.107* -.169** -.055 1       
FSZE2010 .654** .371** -.156** -.481** -.289** .123* 1     
INDTQ2010 .077 .072 .060 .021 -.022 -.170** -.010 1   
ERR2009 .009 -.032 .036 -.071 -.053 -.089 -.112* .103 1 
APEX5.28: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (IVs) Lag of Endogenous variables (BIND and BSZE) where BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in 
this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average 
industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERR is the Error Term 
obtained from the 2SLS. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2005 BIND2005 MGOW2005 BKOW2005 INSOW2005 FAGE2005 FSZE2005 LGINVCAPtoAssets2005 LGDBTtoETY2005 INDTQ2005 ERRCD2005 
BSZE2005 1                     
BIND2005 .049 1                   
MGOW2005 -.092 -.187** 1                 
BKOW2005 -.185** -.208** .101 1               
INSOW2005 -.108 -.023 -.207** .391** 1             
FAGE2005 .033 .057 -.115* -.108* -.130* 1           
FSZE2005 .650** .317** -.133* -.370** -.147** .165** 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2005 .480** .202** -.162** -.202** -.109* .125* .681** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2005 .206** .055 -.126* -.026 .144* .041 .282** .212** 1     
INDTQ2005 .033 .049 .049 .037 .061 -.158** -.088 -.086 -.166** 1   
ERRCD2005 .353** -.879** .161** .144** -.018 -.074 -.065 -.018 .000 -.037 1 
 
  BSZE2006 BIND2006 MGOW2006 BKOW2006 INSOW2006 FAGE2006 FSZE2006 LGINVCAPtoAssets2006 LGDBTtoETY2006 INDTQ2006 ERRCD2006 
BSZE2006 1                     
BIND2006 .040 1                   
MGOW2006 -.115* -.165** 1                 
BKOW2006 -.244** -.125* .100 1               
INSOW2006 -.215** .111* -.256** .369** 1             
FAGE2006 .083 .034 -.096 -.182** -.065 1           
FSZE2006 .648** .327** -.129* -.425** -.174** .174** 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2006 .478** .176** -.159** -.254** -.116* .154** .695** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2006 .146* .078 -.068 -.081 .054 .131* .304** .291** 1     
INDTQ2006 .204** .127* .084 .088 -.065 -.180** .065 .092 -.014 1   
ERRCD2006 -.273** .928** -.098 -.027 .147** .005 .051 -.018 .000 .070 1 
APEX5.29: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (Log Capital Employed and Debt to Equity ratio) (BIND and BSZE as Endogenous) where BSZE is Total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) squared; BKOW is 
Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been 
classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry 
divided by number of companies classified under this industry; LGINVCAPtoAssets is the Natural Logarithm value for the Capital invested in the relevant year divided by total assets; LGDBTtoETY is the natural logarithm value for 
the debt to equity ratio. INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERRCD is 
the Error Term obtained from the 2SLS by using LGINVCAPtoAssets and  LGDBTtoETY as instrumental variables . **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2007 BIND2007 MGOW2007 BKOW2007 INSOW2007 FAGE2007 FSZE2007 LGINVCAPtoAssets2007 LGDBTtoETY2007 INDTQ2007 ERRCD2007 
BSZE2007 1                     
BIND2007 .046 1                   
MGOW2007 -.148** -.091 1                 
BKOW2007 -.331** -.241** .186** 1               
INSOW2007 -.292** .005 -.273** .385** 1             
FAGE2007 .064 .021 -.100 -.121* -.009 1           
FSZE2007 .638** .352** -.161** -.438** -.226** .145** 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2007 .483** .211** -.113* -.264** -.181** .109* .720** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2007 .186** -.008 -.074 -.104 .015 .100 .313** .292** 1     
INDTQ2007 .146** .120* .097 -.032 -.177** -.126* .139** .209** -.127* 1   
ERRCD2007 .275** -.664** .083 .096 -.202** -.062 -.176** -.073 .000 .025 1 
 
  BSZE2008 BIND2008 MGOW2008 BKOW2008 INSOW2008 FAGE2008 FSZE2008 LGINVCAPtoAssets2008 LGDBTtoETY2008 INDTQ2008 ERRCD2008 
BSZE2008 1                     
BIND2008 .053 1                   
MGOW2008 -.107* -.072 1                 
BKOW2008 -.262** -.230** .184** 1               
INSOW2008 -.300** .036 -.276** .352** 1             
FAGE2008 .068 .060 -.103 -.177** -.074 1           
FSZE2008 .625** .346** -.143** -.451** -.279** .144** 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2008 .438** .185** -.103* -.299** -.228** .104* .717** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2008 .184** -.025 -.010 -.126* -.051 .113* .289** .219** 1     
INDTQ2008 .001 .060 .140** .063 -.097 -.127* -.045 -.035 -.009 1   
ERRCD2008 .197** -.663** .026 .023 -.197** -.099 -.190** -.050 .000 -.015 1 
APEX5.30: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (Log Capital Employed and Debt to Equity ratio) (BIND and BSZE as Endogenous) where BSZE is Total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) squared; BKOW is 
Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been 
classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry 
divided by number of companies classified under this industry; LGINVCAPtoAssets is the Natural Logarithm value for the Capital invested in the relevant year divided by total assets; LGDBTtoETY is the natural logarithm value for 
the debt to equity ratio. INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERRCD is 
the Error Term obtained from the 2SLS by using LGINVCAPtoAssets and LGDBTtoETY as instrumental variables . **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSZE2009 BIND2009 MGOW2009 BKOW2009 INSOW2009 FAGE2009 FSZE2009 LGINVCAPtoAssets2009 LGDBTtoETY2009 INDTQ2009 ERRCD2009 
BSZE2009 1                     
BIND2009 .104 1                   
MGOW2009 -.119* -.122* 1                 
BKOW2009 -.288** -.153** .206** 1               
INSOW2009 -.275** .049 -.314** .347** 1             
FAGE2009 .063 .057 -.098 -.157** -.045 1           
FSZE2009 .653** .371** -.169** -.469** -.278** .126* 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2009 .460** .232** -.114* -.316** -.254** .084 .721** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2009 .183** .067 -.039 -.121* -.027 .073 .285** .207** 1     
INDTQ2009 .089 .050 .101 .027 -.109* -.196** -.005 .027 -.092 1   
ERRCD2009 .349** -.855** .059 -.015 -.190** -.058 -.069 -.009 -.008 .004 1 
 
  BSZE2010 BIND2010 MGOW2010 BKOW2010 INSOW2010 FAGE2010 FSZE2010 LGINVCAPtoAssets2010 LGDBTtoETY2010 INDTQ2010 ERRCD2010 
BSZE2010 1                     
BIND2010 .095 1                   
MGOW2010 -.112* -.138* 1                 
BKOW2010 -.331** -.208** .208** 1               
INSOW2010 -.311** .027 -.278** .399** 1             
FAGE2010 .099 .006 -.107* -.169** -.055 1           
FSZE2010 .631** .381** -.156** -.481** -.289** .123* 1         
LGINVCAPtoAssets2010 .444** .276** -.093 -.353** -.235** .078 .716** 1       
LGDBTtoETY2010 .126* .041 -.043 -.096 -.048 .083 .241** .177** 1     
INDTQ2010 .062 .083 .060 .021 -.022 -.170** -.010 .027 -.130* 1   
ERRCD2010 .439** -.753** .061 -.037 -.191** .002 -.022 .003 -.016 -.006 1 
APEX5.31: Correlation between Independent Variable and Error Term 2SLS with Instrumental Variables (Log Capital Employed and Debt to Equity ratio) (BIND and BSZE as Endogenous) where BSZE is Total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW is Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives) squared; BKOW is 
Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government, ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been 
classified as the top 20 largest shareholders according to their total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FSZE is the Firm Size measured by the Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets; FAGE is the firm age measured by Number of years since Incorporation; INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry 
divided by number of companies classified under this industry; LGINVCAPtoAssets is the Natural Logarithm value for the Capital invested in the relevant year divided by total assets; LGDBTtoETY is the natural logarithm value for 
the debt to equity ratio. INDTQ is the Average industry Tobin’s Q performance, calculated by adding the total value of the TQ performance for each industry divided by number of companies classified under this industry. ERRCD is 
the Error Term obtained from the 2SLS by using LGINVCAPtoAssets and LGDBTtoETY as instrumental variables. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  IV CGV Year Const BSZE(Endog) BIND(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
ROE2006 2005 2006 -31.2*** 0.715 0.337** 0.005* -0.04 0.008 0.020 0.588 1.183*** .094 4.939*** 
ROE2007 2006 2007 -11.0 0.182 0.005 0.002 -0.01 0.021 0.031 1.291 0.957*** .075 4.234*** 
ROE2008 2007 2008 2.926 0.259 0.143 0.003 -0.09 -0.06 0.028 -1.17 0.950*** .057 3.529*** 
ROE2009 2008 2009 4.333 -0.05 0.272* 0.000 -0.19*** -0.12 0.029 -1.08 0.949 .054 3.324*** 
ROE2010 2009 2010 19.59* -0.52 -0.02 0.003 -0.20*** -0.04 0.022 0.375 0.470 .051 3.063*** 
  IV CGV Year Const BSZE(Endog) BIND(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROE20052007 2005 2006 -17.5* -0.30 0.225 0.003 -0.04 0.001 0.029 1.636 0.896*** .083 4.615*** 
AvROE20052007 2006 2007 -3.96 -0.06 -0.10 0.002 0.009 -0.04 0.027 2.218** 0.711*** .069 4.024*** 
AvROE20082010 2007 2008 16.13* 0.151 0.121 0.003 -0.15*** -0.05 0.018 -0.99 0.269 .033 2.476** 
AvROE20082010 2008 2009 15.91 -0.49 0.158 0.001 -0.17*** -0.09 0.017 -0.31 0.608 .040 2.788*** 
AvROE20082010 2009 2010 15.30 -0.61 0.137 0.002 -0.16** -0.03 0.016 -0.08 0.330 .023 1.934* 
APEX5.32: ROE regressed against lagged variables (Board composition variables). Board Composition variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where Where ROE Net Income divided by Total 
Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; AvROE20052007 is the average ROE for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROE20082010 is the average ROE for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of 
directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-
executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares 
owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this 
thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROE is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. 
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  IV CGV Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW(Endog) BKOW(Endog) INSOW(Endog) FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2006 2005 2006 2.766 0.089*** 0.013*** 7.352 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 -0.23*** -0.24 0.0751508 4.260*** 
TQ2007 2006 2007 1.061 0.078*** 0.010** 2.434 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.21*** 0.718** 0.0937416 5.292*** 
TQ2008 2007 2008 0.803 0.032** 0.007*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.10*** 0.703 0.0795408 4.737*** 
TQ2009 2008 2009 1.542** 0.042* 0.007** -1.45 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.14*** 0.543 0.0634843 3.931*** 
TQ2010 2009 2010 0.799 0.053** 0.006** 0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.14*** 0.900** 0.0661241 3.876*** 
  IV CGV Year Const BSZE(Endog) BIND(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052007 2005 2006 3.020* 0.089*** 0.013*** 0.000* 0.002 -0.00 -0.00 -0.20*** -0.56 0.0808799 4.541*** 
AvTQ20052007 2006 2007 2.097*** 0.074*** 0.005 9.657 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.22*** 0.398 0.0934358 5.290*** 
AvTQ20082010 2007 2008 2.121** 0.045** 0.010*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.15*** -0.09 0.0765783 4.586*** 
AvTQ20082010 2008 2009 1.859*** 0.047** 0.008*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.17*** 0.385 0.0875326 5.184*** 
AvTQ20082010 2009 2010 1.213* 0.058*** 0.005* -3.44 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.13*** 0.524 0.0627485 3.761*** 
Apex5.33: Tobin’s Q regressed against lagged variables (ownership structure). Ownership structure variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where TQ is the Ratio of the market value of a firm 
to the replacement cost of the firm's assets; AvTQ20052007 is the average TQ for the period 2005 to 2007;  AvTQ20082010 is the average TQ for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); 
BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; 
FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDTQ is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
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  IV CGV Year Const BSZE BIND MGOW(Endog) BKOW(Endog) INSOW(Endog) FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2006 2005 2006 -7.28 0.338 0.091** 0.003*** 0.007 -0.02 0.011 -0.55 1.353*** 0.0556498 3.357*** 
ROA2007 2006 2007 3.335 -0.25 0.002 0.001 -0.02 0.000 0.009 -0.27 1.090*** 0.0456173 2.977*** 
ROA2008 2007 2008 2.787 -0.19 0.114*** 0.000 -0.00 -0.08* 0.009 -0.92** 1.175*** 0.0561458 3.572*** 
ROA2009 2008 2009 4.214 -0.06 0.046 0.001 -0.06** -0.04 0.004 -0.40 1.078 0.0276689 2.223** 
ROA2010 2009 2010 5.060 -0.03 -0.01 0.002* -0.03 -0.04 0.013** -0.27 0.926** 0.0414184 2.755*** 
  IV CGV Year Const BSZE(Endog) BIND(Endog) MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052007 2005 2006 -5.40 0.177 0.057* 0.001* 0.006 -0.01 0.010 -0.35 1.330*** 0.0382354 2.600*** 
AvROA20052007 2006 2007 3.630 -0.06 -0.00 0.002* -0.02 -0.01 0.009 -0.08 0.729*** 0.0349862 2.504** 
AvROA20082010 2007 2008 5.930* -0.00 0.067** 0.001 -0.02 -0.06** 0.008 -0.69** 0.482* 0.0421013 2.900*** 
AvROA20082010 2008 2009 5.582 0.028 0.078** 0.002* -0.06*** -0.06** 0.009 -0.76** 0.981 0.0620768 3.887*** 
AvROA20082010 2009 2010 5.565 0.031 0.021 0.000 -0.04 -0.04 0.008 -0.43 0.573 0.0163385 1.685 
Apex5.34: ROA regressed against lagged variables (ownership structure). Ownership structure variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where ROA Net Income divided 
by Average Total Assets) multiplied by 100; AvROA20052007 is the average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROA20082010 is the average ROA for the period 2008 to 2010; 
BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of 
board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, 
institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the 
total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the 
company Total Assets. INDROA is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
 
283 
 
  IV CGV Year Const BSZE BIND 
MGOW 
(Endog) 
BKOW 
(Endog) 
INSOW 
(Endog) FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
ROE2006 2005 2006 -24.8** 0.750 0.137 0.004 -0.03 0.068 0.021 1.128 1.081*** 0.0807001 4.302*** 
ROE2007 2006 2007 -17.7 0.661 0.011 0.005* -0.04 0.164* 0.034* 1.176 0.946*** 0.0854101 4.677*** 
ROE2008 2007 2008 -2.87 -0.27 0.185* 0.002 -0.00 -0.11 0.024 -0.33 0.967*** 0.0550158 3.401*** 
ROE2009 2008 2009 5.519 0.395 0.176* 0.004 -0.23*** -0.08 0.032 -1.15 0.957 0.048391 3.053*** 
ROE2010 2009 2010 23.02* -0.34 -0.15** 0.002 -0.18** -0.07 0.022 0.622 0.484 0.0488398 2.989*** 
  IV CGV Year Const BSZE BIND 
MGOW 
(Endog) 
BKOW 
(Endog) 
INSOW 
(Endog) FAGE FSZE INDROE Adj R2 F-test 
AvROE20052007 2005 2006 -13.1 0.566 0.010 0.003 -0.04 0.094 0.030 1.249 0.858*** 0.0696509 3.929*** 
AvROE20052007 2006 2007 -8.69 0.661 -0.11 0.005* -0.05 0.092 0.031 1.755* 0.707*** 0.0795218 4.466*** 
AvROE20082010 2007 2008 7.094 0.015 0.122 0.002 -0.06 -0.03 0.018 -0.24 0.307 0.0091977 1.393 
AvROE20082010 2008 2009 17.60* -0.17 0.143* 0.003 -0.19*** -0.11 0.017 -0.71 0.658 0.0422764 2.870*** 
AvROE20082010 2009 2010 22.63* 0.079 0.001 0.001 -0.19*** -0.05 0.013 -0.52 0.281 0.0199032 1.814* 
APEX5.35: ROE regressed against lagged variables (ownership structure). Ownership structure variables are considered as endogenous variables). Where ROE Net Income divided 
by Total Shareholders’ Equity) multiplied by 100; AvROE20052007 is the average ROE for the period 2005 to 2007; AvROE20082010 is the average ROE for the period 2008 to 
2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders 
according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDROE is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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  Const BSZE(t-1) BIND(t) MGOW(t) BKOW(t) INSOW(t) FAGE(t) FSZE(t) INDTQ(t) Adj R2 F-test 
Predicted BSZE 2006 -3.73 0.734*** -0.01*** -0.00* 0.003 -0.00 0.001 0.335*** 2.219* 0.784 150.2*** 
Predicted BSZE 2007 2.919*** 0.750*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* 0.158*** -0.24 0.804 173.9*** 
Predicted BSZE 2008 1.539 0.814*** -0.01** 0.000 0.006* -3.32 0.000 0.210*** -0.84 0.794 171.8*** 
Predicted BSZE 2009 0.668 0.732*** -0.00 -0.00 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 0.233*** 0.038 0.795 171.5*** 
Predicted BSZE 2010 1.397 0.800*** -0.02*** -8.57 -0.00 -0.00 0.000 0.184*** 0.332 0.768 138.1*** 
 
  Const BSZE(t) BIND(t-1) MGOW(t) BKOW(t) INSOW(t) FAGE(t) FSZE(t) INDTQ(t) Adj R2 F-test 
Predicted BIND 2006 -35.0** -0.70*** 0.597*** -0.00 0.012 0.057* -0.00 1.609*** 23.54*** 0.559 52.94*** 
Predicted BSZE 2007 11.93* -0.41* 0.692*** 0.002 -0.09*** 0.052 -0.00 1.166*** 1.903 0.554 53.19*** 
Predicted BSZE 2008 -2.09 -0.40* 0.707*** 0.000 -0.03 0.030 0.007 1.068*** 11.03 0.553 55.79*** 
Predicted BSZE 2009 -2.90 -0.40 0.650*** -0.00* 0.054* 0.000 0.003 1.500*** 7.728 0.526 49.64*** 
Predicted BSZE 2010 4.309 -0.76** 0.696*** -0.00 -0.04 0.034 -0.01 1.741*** 4.452 0.512 44.32*** 
APEX 5.36a Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 1 BSZE(T) = 𝛽0 + BSZE(T−1)𝛽1 +  BIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7 + INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
AND BIND(T) = 𝛽0 + BSZE(T)𝛽1 +  BIND(T−1)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7 + INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀  
Where: BSZE is Board Size represented by Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Board Independence Ratio represented by Percentage of independent directors 
divided by total number of directors; MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared 
(both executives and non-executives) squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, 
family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the 
total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets. INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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  Const PREDBSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2006 2.786 0.091*** 0.013*** 5.334 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.26*** -0.07 0.083 4.690*** 
TQ2007 1.035 0.099*** 0.011*** -5.75 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** 0.687** 0.109 6.169*** 
TQ2008 0.857 0.045** 0.007*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.12*** 0.764 0.124 7.265*** 
TQ2009 1.128 0.062** 0.007** 1.444 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.14*** 0.600 0.053 3.470*** 
TQ2010 0.643 0.055* 0.005* 0.000 -0.00*** -2.12 -0.00 -0.13*** 0.908** 0.059 3.582*** 
 
  Const PREDBSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2006 -5.51 0.237 0.092*** 0.003*** -0.00 -0.02 0.011 -0.50 1.288*** 0.056 3.447*** 
ROA2007 2.723 -0.02 0.009 0.000 -0.00 -0.02 0.009 -0.48 1.059*** 0.039 2.737*** 
ROA2008 4.786 0.079 0.116*** 0.001 -0.05* -0.05* 0.009 -1.36*** 1.155*** 0.073 4.504*** 
ROA2009 3.246 -0.32 0.037 0.000 -0.05** -0.03 0.004 -0.07 1.217 0.025 2.140** 
ROA2010 4.077 0.095 -0.01 0.002** -0.04** -0.01 0.014** -0.33 0.911** 0.047 3.015*** 
APEX 5.36b Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  Const PREDBSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052006 2.051*** 0.093*** 0.014*** 0.000 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.24*** 0.023 0.089 5.041*** 
AvTQ20052006 1.909*** 0.088*** 0.006* 3.320 0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.23*** 0.395 0.097 5.555*** 
AvTQ20082010 2.176*** 0.049** 0.009*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.16*** 0.002 0.099 5.842*** 
AvTQ20082010 1.426** 0.055** 0.007** -6.82 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.15*** 0.455 0.070 4.305*** 
AvTQ20082010 1.018 0.050* 0.005* 4.409 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.11*** 0.546 0.040 2.739*** 
 
  Const PREDBSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052006 -3.67 -0.09 0.046 0.001** -0.01 -0.01 0.011* -0.08 1.363*** 0.049 3.120*** 
AvROA20052006 3.418 -0.05 -0.00 0.001 0.008 -0.04* 0.008 -0.07 0.719*** 0.036 2.571** 
AvROA20082010 8.051*** 0.071 0.065** 0.001* -0.05** -0.05** 0.008 -0.91*** 0.463* 0.073 4.467*** 
AvROA20082010 4.183 -0.16 0.067** 0.001 -0.04** -0.05** 0.009 -0.44 1.035 0.044 3.021*** 
AvROA20082010 5.416 -0.12 0.013 0.001 -0.05** -0.01 0.009 -0.23 0.590 0.021 1.894* 
APEX 5.36c Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  Const BSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2006 3.281* 0.107*** 0.025*** 0.000 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.30*** -0.49 0.112 6.172*** 
TQ2007 1.067* 0.082*** 0.012** -7.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.22*** 0.691** 0.101 5.704*** 
TQ2008 0.896 0.030** 0.007** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.11*** 0.786 0.106 6.242*** 
TQ2009 1.127 0.049** 0.010** -4.31 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.14*** 0.575 0.052 3.379*** 
TQ2010 0.605 0.062*** 0.008* 0.000 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.14*** 0.869** 0.067 3.941*** 
 
  Const BSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052006 3.753** 0.105*** 0.025*** 0.000* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.27*** -0.91 0.116 6.374*** 
AvTQ20052006 1.802*** 0.088*** 0.013** -2.11 0.001 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.24*** 0.329 0.109 6.147*** 
AvTQ20082010 2.200*** 0.041** 0.008* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.15*** 0.037 0.084 5.030*** 
AvTQ20082010 1.414** 0.056*** 0.012*** -6.83 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.378 0.077 4.686*** 
AvTQ20082010 0.941 0.070*** 0.009** 5.925 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.14*** 0.464 0.062 3.727*** 
APEX 5.36d Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  Const BSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2006 -8.41* 0.360* 0.152*** 0.003*** -0.00 -0.03 0.011 -0.78** 1.388*** 0.065 3.850*** 
ROA2007 1.893 -0.23 0.054 0.000 -0.00 -0.03 0.009 -0.40 1.051*** 0.047 3.097*** 
ROA2008 9.583** -0.29 0.022 0.001 -0.05* -0.05 0.009 -0.80* 1.112*** 0.056 3.650*** 
ROA2009 1.185 -0.01 0.088* 0.000 -0.05** -0.03 0.004 -0.49 1.141 0.026 2.175** 
ROA2010 2.511 0.090 0.051 0.002** 0.014** -0.04* -0.02 -0.51 0.854** 0.050 3.140*** 
 
  Const BSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052006 -6.45 0.120 0.105** 0.002** -0.01 -0.01 0.011* -0.45 1.419*** 0.056 3.463*** 
AvROA20052006 1.679 -0.07 0.037 0.001 0.014 -0.05** 0.008 -0.17 0.726*** 0.038 2.693*** 
AvROA20082010 10.22*** -0.07 0.021 0.001* -0.05*** -0.04** 0.008 -0.68** 0.436* 0.061 3.877*** 
AvROA20082010 2.454 0.060 0.099** 0.001 -0.04** -0.05** 0.009 -0.73** 1.072 0.041 2.875*** 
AvROA20082010 2.948 0.159 0.083* 0.001 0.009 -0.04** -0.02 -0.66** 0.468 0.030 2.304** 
APEX 5.36e Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  Const PREDBSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2006 3.291* 0.110*** 0.024*** 0.000 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.30*** -0.50 0.094 5.228*** 
TQ2007 1.020 0.099*** 0.013** -5.92 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.24*** 0.674** 0.099 5.616*** 
TQ2008 0.856 0.044** 0.007** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.12*** 0.762 0.110 6.474*** 
TQ2009 1.117 0.066** 0.010** 1.032 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.15*** 0.540 0.053 3.446*** 
TQ2010 0.603 0.062** 0.008* 0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.15*** 0.862** 0.058 3.522*** 
  Const PREDBSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDTQ Adj R2 F-test 
AvTQ20052006 3.860** 0.117*** 0.025*** 0.000* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.28*** -0.98 0.101 5.592*** 
AvTQ20052006 1.785*** 0.096*** 0.012** 3.509 0.001 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.25*** 0.326 0.101 5.752*** 
AvTQ20082010 2.182*** 0.047** 0.008* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.16*** 0.029 0.082 4.934*** 
AvTQ20082010 1.412** 0.061** 0.012*** -6.56 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.370 0.072 4.407*** 
AvTQ20082010 0.962 0.061** 0.009* 5.403 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.13*** 0.477 0.043 2.856*** 
APEX 5.36f Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  Const PREDBSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2006 -7.40* 0.310 0.146*** 0.003*** -0.00 -0.03 0.011 -0.71* 1.287*** 0.060 3.625*** 
ROA2007 -0.36 0.081 0.075 0.000 0.000 -0.02 0.010 -0.73* 1.084*** 0.044 2.969*** 
ROA2008 8.257* -0.04 0.035 0.001 -0.05* -0.05 0.009 -1.05** 1.106*** 0.053 3.479*** 
ROA2009 1.884 -0.27 0.077* 0.000 -0.05** -0.04 0.004 -0.23 1.239 0.029 2.323** 
ROA2010 1.667 0.269 0.063 0.003*** -0.04* -0.01 0.014** -0.69* 0.821** 0.052 3.243*** 
  Const PREDBSZE PREDBIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE INDROA Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052006 -5.49 -0.02 0.096** 0.002** -0.01 -0.01 0.011* -0.27 1.375*** 0.055 3.407*** 
AvROA20052006 0.911 0.034 0.044 0.001 0.015 -0.05** 0.009 -0.28 0.738*** 0.038 2.677*** 
AvROA20082010 9.759*** 0.007 0.026 0.001* -0.05*** -0.04* 0.008 -0.76** 0.435* 0.061 3.853*** 
AvROA20082010 3.010 -0.14 0.090** 0.001 -0.04** -0.05** 0.009 -0.53 1.140 0.041 2.903*** 
AvROA20082010 3.579 0.021 0.074* 0.001 -0.04** -0.02 0.009 -0.52 0.490 0.028 2.221** 
APEX 5.36g Step by Step 2SLS 
Step 2 PERF(T) = 𝛽0 + PredictedBSZE(T)𝛽1 +  PredictedBIND(T)𝛽2 +  MGOW(T)𝛽3 + BKOW(T)𝛽4 + INSOW(T)𝛽5 + FAGE(T)𝛽6 + FSZE(T)𝛽7+ INDCV(T)𝛽8  +  𝜀 
 
 
Where: PredictedBSZE is predicted Board Size from step 1; predictedBIND is the predicted Board Independence from step 1.PERF is the Performance measure used. 
MGOW is Managerial Ownership squared represented by Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors squared (both executives and non-executives) 
squared; BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is 
total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets. 
INDCV is the Average industry performance; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
TQ2005 2005 2.010*** 0.093*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.001 -0.00 -0.00* -0.23*** 0.107 0.076 0.073 0.015 0.044 0.125 4.778*** 
TQ2006 2006 2.578*** 0.099*** 0.015*** 4.256 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.28*** 0.152 0.162 0.036 0.289 0.066 0.103 4.221*** 
TQ2007 2007 2.529*** 0.078*** 0.010** -3.84 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.22*** -0.01 0.292** -0.07 0.024 -0.06 0.117 4.868*** 
TQ2008 2008 1.897*** 0.031** 0.007*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.11*** 0.051 -0.00 0.108 0.031 -0.01 0.111 4.668*** 
TQ2009 2009 2.197*** 0.046** 0.006** -1.04 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.13*** -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.041 2.243** 
TQ2010 2010 2.282*** 0.058*** 0.006* 0.000* -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.14*** -0.23 -0.09 -0.24* -0.25 -0.23** 0.059 2.714*** 
                                  
  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
AVTQ20052007 2005 1.618*** 0.086*** 0.015*** 0.000* 0.002 -0.00 -0.00 -0.20*** 0.118 0.281* 0.121 0.127 0.144 0.089 3.620*** 
AVTQ20052007 2006 2.140*** 0.096*** 0.014*** 0.000 0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.26*** 0.088 0.268* 0.100 0.114 0.141 0.113 4.557*** 
AVTQ20052007 2007 2.721*** 0.080*** 0.005 2.614 0.001 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.23*** -0.01 0.235 0.047 -0.04 0.018 0.111 4.676*** 
AVTQ20082010 2008 2.316*** 0.038** 0.009*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.15*** -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 0.094 4.067*** 
AVTQ20082010 2009 2.237*** 0.051** 0.007** -6.26 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.15*** -0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.12 0.066 3.068*** 
AVTQ20082010 2010 1.949*** 0.064*** 0.005* 6.413 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.12*** -0.16 -0.08 -0.14 -0.09 -0.16 0.049 2.436*** 
APEX 5.37: Regression estimates TQ against board structure, ownership structure with industry control with dummy variables, DUMIND0 others equal to 1 others equal 0; 
DUMIND2 Energy equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND3 consumer services equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND4 leisure equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND5  Industrials equal to 1 
others equal to 0. TQ is Tobin’s Q defined as Total Market Value of the Firm divided by the replacement value of the Total Assets; Average TQ for the period 2005 to 2007; Average 
TQ for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of 
total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by 
any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; 
FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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   CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
ROA2005 2005 3.125 0.107 0.052 0.001 0.016 -0.03 0.007 -0.14 2.876 2.792* -0.53 -0.54 1.681 0.016 1.431 
ROA2006 2006 3.066 0.337 0.099*** 0.003*** 0.010 -0.04 0.009 -0.67* 2.584 2.330* -0.62 2.408 1.533 0.053 2.549*** 
ROA2007 2007 13.80*** -0.32 -0.00 0.000 -0.01 -0.02 0.009 -0.29 -0.67 2.277* -2.61** 2.380 0.473 0.038 2.156** 
ROA2008 2008 11.77*** -0.21 0.109*** 0.001 -0.04 -0.06* 0.008 -1.08** -2.87 2.045 -2.44* 0.692 0.050 0.065 3.041*** 
ROA2009 2009 8.338*** -0.06 0.042 0.000 -0.05** -0.03 0.004 -0.27 -1.90 -1.43 -1.30 -1.92 -1.21 0.012 1.352 
ROA2010 2010 11.17*** -0.01 -0.01 0.002** -0.04** -0.01 0.015** -0.19 -1.96 -1.09 -2.21* -2.36 -2.30** 0.037 2.066** 
                                  
  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
AvROA20052007 2005 2.560 0.166 0.077*** 0.002** 0.013 -0.00 0.008 -0.35 2.193 2.996*** -0.53 2.048 1.792* 0.046 2.300*** 
AvROA20052007 2006 5.857** 0.051 0.056* 0.001** 0.000 -0.03 0.009 -0.31 1.300 2.043* -1.62 1.086 1.113 0.034 2.000** 
AvROA20052007 2007 9.734*** -0.14 -0.00 0.001 -8.18 -0.04* 0.008 -0.02 0.899 1.263 -2.07* 0.528 0.441 0.028 1.861** 
AvROA20082010 2008 11.75*** -0.07 0.061** 0.001 -0.05** -0.05** 0.008 -0.77** -1.67 0.073 -1.89* -1.12 -1.12 0.066 3.099*** 
AvROA20082010 2009 8.934*** 0.021 0.070** 0.001 -0.04** -0.04* 0.010 -0.64** -2.27 -0.05 -1.62 -1.51 -1.02 0.040 2.241** 
AvROA20082010 2010 8.904*** 0.047 0.015 0.001 -0.05** -0.01 0.010 -0.35 -2.56* -0.20 -1.54 -1.24 -1.16 0.016 1.453 
APEX 5.38: Regression estimates ROA against board structure, ownership structure with industry control with dummy variables, DUMIND0 others equal to 1 others equal 0; 
DUMIND2 Energy equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND3 consumer services equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND4 leisure equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND5  Industrials equal to 1 
others equal to 0. ROA is Return on Assets defined as Net Income to Total Assets, multiplied by 100; Average ROA for the period 2005 to 2007; Average ROA for the period 2008 to 
2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by 
members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders 
(individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders 
according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural 
Logarithm of the company Total Assets; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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   CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
ROE2005 2005 -0.23 0.502 0.109 0.001 -0.06 -0.04 0.013 1.236 10.06* 5.813 2.519 -3.33 8.808** 0.049 2.290*** 
ROE2006 2006 -6.19 0.656 0.167* 0.005* -0.00 -0.03 0.017 1.083 7.495* 4.534 0.203 9.975** 10.98*** 0.070 2.929*** 
ROE2007 2007 5.989 0.313 -0.01 0.003 -0.04 0.049 0.033* 1.256 4.651 4.691 -3.93 9.455* 7.545** 0.064 2.886*** 
ROE2008 2008 17.00* -0.43 0.192** 0.003 -0.08 -0.09 0.026 -0.69 -5.30 7.762** -1.84 3.398 6.329* 0.056 2.677*** 
ROE2009 2009 14.35* 0.341 0.171* 0.000 -0.20*** -0.11 0.030 -1.02 -1.41 -2.39 -0.22 -2.51 1.757 0.043 2.227** 
ROE2010 2010 30.60*** -0.30 -0.17** 0.003 -0.20*** -0.02 0.024 0.735 -2.45 0.075 -1.10 -3.69 -1.61 0.053 2.448*** 
                                  
  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
AvROE20052007 2005 -2.63 0.182 0.161* 0.003 -0.02 0.053 0.024 1.169 9.103** 6.416* 0.238 5.197 8.960*** 0.062 2.734*** 
AvROE20052007 2006 2.662 0.218 0.012 0.003 -0.00 -0.01 0.026 1.628* 7.406* 4.646 -1.20 3.829 8.167*** 0.059 2.706*** 
AvROE20052007 2007 4.049 0.414 -0.11 0.004 0.007 -0.02 0.027 2.043** 6.648 2.803 -1.48 4.327 8.040*** 0.068 3.036*** 
AvROE20082010 2008 20.63*** -0.14 0.126 0.003 -0.15** -0.06 0.015 -0.73 -0.24 1.710 -0.88 1.981 2.797 0.027 1.816** 
AvROE20082010 2009 21.24*** -0.16 0.130 0.002 -0.17*** -0.08 0.017 -0.55 -3.45 0.570 -1.41 1.143 2.225 0.036 2.077** 
AvROE20082010 2010 20.53*** 0.136 -0.00 0.002 -0.17*** 0.000 0.014 -0.12 -4.08 0.752 -0.00 0.573 2.176 0.012 1.342 
APEX 5.39: Regression estimates ROE against board structure, ownership structure with industry control with dummy variables, DUMIND0 others equal to 1 others equal 0; 
DUMIND2 Energy equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND3 consumer services equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND4 leisure equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND5  Industrials equal to 1 
others equal to 0. ROE is Return on Equity defined as Earnings before dividends to Shareholders Equity, multiplied by 100; Average ROE for the period 2005 to 2007; Average ROE 
for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total 
shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any 
outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest 
shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; 
FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
ROCE2005 2005 25.98 -0.57 -0.00 0.005 -0.26* 0.144 0.072 2.043 4.980 -4.97 1.371 -10.1 8.416 0.009 1.243 
ROCE2006 2006 30.90 -3.01* 0.237 0.000 0.040 -0.14 0.098* 1.859 5.751 -3.46 -4.90 -17.3 6.455 0.012 1.350 
ROCE2007 2007 58.75*** 0.445 -0.25 0.001 -0.33* 0.103 0.008 -0.47 4.169 0.532 -7.62 -18.6 8.720 0.006 1.175 
ROCE2008 2008 72.18*** -2.23 0.373 -0.00 -0.42** -0.45** 0.000 -2.02 -6.85 0.289 1.021 -2.92 11.01 0.043 2.345*** 
ROCE2009 2009 56.93*** 0.804 0.018 -0.00 -0.44*** -0.26 0.044 -3.42 -6.33 -0.88 5.475 -10.0 7.708 0.026 1.789** 
ROCE2010 2010 32.24 -0.58 -0.26 0.005 0.007 -0.23 0.087* 1.685 -11.6 -4.97 2.813 -9.31 6.248 0.003 1.098 
                                  
  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
AvROCE20052007 2005 28.59* -2.21* 0.138 0.004 -0.17 0.252 0.067 2.243 4.925 -3.17 -4.14 -13.7 6.610 0.028 1.774* 
AvROCE20052007 2006 2.662 0.218 0.012 0.003 -0.00 -0.01 0.026 1.628* 7.406* 4.646 -1.20 3.829 8.167*** 0.059 2.706*** 
AvROCE20052007 2007 46.98** -0.28 -0.20 0.004 -0.22 0.021 0.047 0.675 5.375 -0.51 -4.22 -15.9 10.08 0.017 1.504 
AvROCE20082010 2008 56.80*** -1.21 0.232 -0.00 -0.28** -0.44*** 0.039 -2.01 -4.32 -1.02 2.978 -6.56 9.371 0.050 2.551*** 
AvROCE20082010 2009 53.78*** -0.53 0.081 -0.00 -0.30** -0.31* 0.046 -1.64 -9.23 -1.33 2.073 -7.35 8.492 0.027 1.834** 
AvROCE20082010 2010 39.35** 0.083 -0.20 0.001 -0.18 -0.13 0.047 0.342 -13.3 -1.29 5.639 -8.27 7.836 0.009 1.264 
APEX 5.40: Regression estimates ROCE against board structure, ownership structure with industry control with dummy variables, DUMIND0 others equal to 1 others equal 0; 
DUMIND2 Energy equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND3 consumer services equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND4 leisure equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND5  Industrials equal to 1 
others equal to 0. ROCE is Return on Capital Employed defined as Earnings before tax and interest divided by average of capital employed for year t and t-1, multiplied by 100; 
Average ROCE for the period 2005 to 2007; Average ROCE for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent 
directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of 
total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW is total percentage of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies 
used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; ***, **, and * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
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   CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
SGRTH2006 2006 9.490 1.646** -0.13 -0.00 -0.03 0.084 0.040 -1.13 0.557 -0.90 1.449 9.234 0.328 0.001 1.053 
SGRTH2007 2007 14.26 -0.65 -0.20* 0.000 -0.07 0.089 0.021 2.137** 8.494* -0.63 0.035 -3.92 -0.10 0.010 1.321 
SGRTH2008 2008 15.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.002 0.104 -0.15 0.045* -0.24 15.42** 4.299 8.053* 0.162 -0.47 0.026 1.773* 
SGRTH2009 2009 -10.5 0.630 -0.02 0.000 0.119* -0.01 0.034* 0.311 4.345 0.341 0.186 -0.45 2.523 -0.00 0.743 
SGRTH2010 2010 29.58*** -0.44 -0.20** -0.00 -0.18** -0.03 -0.00 -0.05 0.647 -0.12 -0.65 3.358 -1.13 0.008 1.225 
                                  
  CG Const BSZE BIND MGOW BKOW INSOW FAGE FSZE DUMIND0 DUMIND2 DUMIND3 DUMIND4 DUMIND5 Adj R2 F-test 
LGSGRTH2006 2006 -1.18** 0.029 0.013* 0.000 -0.00 -0.01** -0.00*** -0.18*** -0.36 0.229 -0.59** -0.61* 0.099 0.132 4.386*** 
LGSGRTH2007 2007 -1.01* 0.025 0.007 -4.20 0.000 -0.00 -0.00** -0.25*** -0.03 0.742*** 0.197 -0.08 0.460** 0.098 3.578*** 
LGSGRTH2008 2008 -1.52*** 0.052 0.000 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.11** 0.338 0.776*** 0.032 -0.40 0.528*** 0.083 3.308*** 
LGSGRTH2009 2009 -1.58** 0.033 0.010 6.310 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** -0.15** 0.442 0.211 0.226 -0.36 0.425* 0.036 1.651* 
LGSGRTH2010 2010 -2.73*** 0.044 0.013** 0.000 0.008* -0.00 0.001 -0.17*** -0.23 0.939*** -0.42* -0.46 -0.32 0.193 5.432*** 
APEX 5.41: Regression estimates SGRTH against board structure, ownership structure with industry control with dummy variables, DUMIND0 others equal to 1 others equal 0; 
DUMIND2 Energy equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND3 consumer services equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND4 leisure equal to 1 others equal 0; DUMIND5  Industrials equal to 1 
others equal to 0. SGRTH is Sales' Growth calculated by total Sales for time t Less Total Sales for time (t-1), divided by Total Sales for time (t-1), multiplied by 100; 
AvSGRTH20052007 is the average SGRTH for the period 2005 to 2007; AvSGRTH20082010 is the average SGRTH for the period 2008 to 2010; BSZE is Total number of directors 
in the board; BIND is Percentage of independent directors to total number of directors; MGOW Percentage of total shares owned by members of board of directors (both executives 
and non-executives); BKOW is Percentage of total shares of at least 3% to company's share capital owned by any outsiders (individuals, institutions, family, government ...); INSOW 
is total percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders who have been classified as top-20 largest shareholders according to the total number of shares they own in the 
FTSE All Shares non-financial companies used in this thesis; FAGE is number of years since Incorporation; FSZE is Natural Logarithm of the company Total Assets; ***, **, and * 
denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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